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1A B S T R A C T
The thesis deals with the relationship between ideology 
and policy-making. The main concern is the development of 
agrarian policy in India since Independence, but this topic 
necessarily has roots and ramifications which extend much 
further, both backwards into time and laterally into other 
aspects of policy.
The aim is also to consider how relevant are various 
sociological definitions of, and approaches to, ideology, 
for dealing with the problem of its relationship to policy­
making. The question of whether ideology is to be defined 
as manifest doctrine, or as underlying and possibly implicit 
evaluative assumption, is as important as whether ideology 
is to be interpreted primarily in a psychological, social 
structural or functional ’systems* context. An application 
of some of these approaches to the successive stages of 
political debate in India shows that no one type of approach 
can by itself adequately account for the nature of prevailing 
ideology and its relationship to policy or potential policy. 
But i;he various approaches may be subdivided and combined 
to provide ideal-type characterisdhioas of the way in which 
ideology plays an active role in political situations. It 
appears, however, that in such ideal-types the elements of 
a power - or structure - based interpretation of ideology 
tend to dominate.
Finally, there is the problem of how the changing nature 
of*official* ideology and policy in India, manifested in 
the swing from an advocacy of relatively socialist to 
relatively ’pragmatic* solutions, is to be described.
There is a danger of constructing a false dichotomy between 
’ideology* on the one hand and ’pragmatism’ on the other.
This can only be resolved by looking at the way in which 
the role of ideology has changed over time, and especially 
in the context of the rising and declining power of Congress 
and the Government.
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5C H A P T E R  I
Policy and Ideology
11 The primary problem of Asia is probably the agrarian 
problem... in India something has been done in the past few 
years in regard to the agrarian problem and the semi-feudal 
conditions that existed then. Pretty far-reaching changes
are being made now. We are putting an end to the big 
landlord system, the zaraindari system.... And so one of the 
major upsetting features in Asia has been controlled in 
India because of this policy that we have pursued in regard 
to land” (Nehru 1949 quoted in Norman 1965: 496).
”A total disregard in the current phase of land reform 
of the right of social groups to equal treatment; the right
of individual cultivators to floors and ceilings; the long - 
cherished hope of the landless agricultural workers to a
share in land...have very much watered down the utility of 
zamindari abolition, leaving village India almost completely 
disillusioned” (Singh 1961: 55-36).
*'ln 1950 the U.P. Legislative Assembly passed the U.P. 
Zamindari Abolition and Land .Reform Act. Should one repeat
6what so many writers have said before, that this law 
changed practically nothing, since it only meant that the
tenants changed their name to sirdare and paid to the state
what they had previously paid to the zamindar Etienne 
1968: 58 & 60}?
-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-
Policy and criticisms of policy: the agrarian case,
Post-Independence policies in India have given rise to 
at least two types of literature* The first might be called 
the apologetic and explanatory. It seeks to elucidate and 
advance a rationale for the mechanism of planning in 
particular. The second type is the post mortem variety, and, 
as the label suggests,seeks to analyse where and how the 
process of planning has gone astray. This is an attitude 
which has been encouraged by the Planning Commission itself,
perhaps with varying degrees of enthusiasm at different stages 
in the development of planning, but nevertheless with 
important results, as some of the Programme Evaluation 
Organisation Reports show.1
That such critiques of planning and of the policies
7associated with planning should have emerged so readily is 
not surprising. It would be more surprising if there were 
not a good many ways in which specific policies were felt
to have failed, or at least to have underfulfilled themselves, 
and it would be regrettable if such criticisms could not be
expressed. What is particularly interesting, however, is 
the range of approaches which is manifest in these critiques, 
and the range of factors which they indicate as being' 
relevant for any attempt to understand the gap between policy 
proposals and the achievement of results which are generally 
felt to be satisfactory.
The range of criticisms is well-illustrated by attitudes 
to one particular set of policies, those relating to the
agrarian and land reform measures which have been implemented
2
in India since Independence. Perhaps the most vocal observers 
and sections of political opinion tend to be those with the 
greatest sense of disillusionment and frustration, which 
makes it difficult to assess how representative such views
are. ' Nevertheless, accusations that certain policies or 
aspects of policies have failed, or have produced little
material change,have been made, sufficiently often to 
indicate that the disappointment is fairly widespread. 
Obstacles to implementation. The reasons given for
8dissatisfaction with the results of the reforms are various 
but there is at least one major divide amongst the types of 
assessments made. First, there are those analyses which may 
be described as being in the realm of explanation, and of
explanation in pragmatic terms. They cite a series of
i
factors which have acted as obstacles in the path of policy 
implementation. Several such factors come immediately to
mind. For instance, studies of the administrative machinery
at state, district and local level, have revealed
inefficiences due to the position of particular officials.
Dube, for instance, described in the mid-fjO’s the 
ambivalence, and therefore the inadequacy, of the role played 
by the Collector or Deputy Commissioner at the district 
level of the Community Development hierarchy (Dube 1958).
Under the Raj he had been a traditional law and order 
executive, and his development duties were now regarded as a
minor addition to the traditional role.
It has also been asserted that directives and policy
plans become diluted or distorted in the process of transmission.
An example of this is described by Retzlaff in connection
with the activities of a Land Management Committee in the 
Western U.P. Rajput-dominated village of Khalapur. Under 
the 1950 Zamindari Abolition Act, this committee of the Gaon
9Panchayat, or village council, was instructed to distribute 
any available village land and to give the landless labourers
preference in this. But the Khalapur L.M.C. in fact sold 
the land at Hs. 2G0 per bigha, to the comparatively wealthy, 
and mostly Rajput, landowners who could afford the price 
(Retzlaff 1962).
This is perhaps less a failure of communication and 
more a matter of deliberate evasion, of which many other 
examples can be cited, especially in relation to attempted 
land reforms. Below the state level, resistance from the 
various local vested interests and delaying tactics such as 
parliamentary filibustering, ultra vires legislation, and 
massive exploitation of loop-holes in the legislation, 
have all been recognised as important obstacles.
Also there is the more elusive level of ftcultural 
resistance" which has been explored extensively by
sociologists, anthropologists, and agricultural economists 
alike. This has sometimes been supposed to rest on so-called 
"rational1 attitudes, and sometimes on "irrational" ones.
An example of the former type of explanation is a study by 
Sanwal which came to the conclusion that peasant reluctance 
to co-operate with the advice of the Community Development 
gram sewak, or village level worker, and to accept, for
10
instance, new crop strains, may have sprung from an 
awareness that the traditional strains, even if less 
productive, yield indispensable by-products, or from the 
belief that, in a subsistence situation, it is better to 
use a low-yielding but safe crop, rather than a high-yielding
i
but more vulnerable one (Sanwal 1965)*
Kusum Nair, on the other hand, falls into the category 
of those who draw attention to the "irrational", even if 
understandable, aspects of cultural and psychological 
resistance* She describes the failure of individual 
cultivators in Andhra to make use of newly available 
irrigation facilities* She quotes the example of Venkatararam 
Reddy-, who "could irrigate another 30 acres with T.B.P.
(Tungabhadra Project). But he ...refuses* He simply says:
!I am satisfied1 " (Nair 1961: 69)* Another confounding case 
is that of the Mysore cultivators who, as soon as their 
income went up even marginally^ preferred to convert the 
increment into leisure or into conspicuous consumption, 
rather than into any kind of tangible improvement in living 
conditions, let alone into investible resources. Kusum Nair 
remarks. "The consumption of surplus income seems to begin 
and end with less personal work in the field and with the 
taking of coffee and better food in a hotel and going
11
regularly to the cinema..t Q0% of these peasants in Man&ya 
would still be in debt. Nor is the increase in their 
prosperity reflected in any other visible improvement in the 
manner and condition of their life" (56). The general 
conclusion is that in many rural communities there tends to 
be a cut-off point in aspirations. "The upper level they are 
prepared to strive for is limited and it is the floor 
generally that is bottomless" (192-3). Hence,"there cannot 
be any economics in isolation from sociology and social 
psychology" (194).
The important point about such explanations of policy 
underfulfilment, is that they accept the policies essentially 
on their own terms, and assess them within these limits. The 
most explicit intention of each particular measure has in 
some way been frustrated, and this can be traced to tangible 
factors, whether in the fabric of administrative machinery, 
or in the nature of the social environment. An exploration 
and cataloguing of such factors can go a long way towards 
explaining both the short-fall of the policies and the 
frustration which this has engendered.
Disagreement about means. It is unlikely, however, that such 
a catalogue would provide an exhaustive set of reasons for
the widespread feeling that the land reform and Community
12
Development policies have, in some sense, failed, to 
enumeration of administrative bottlenecks and tensions, 
failures of communica.tion between the centre and the periphery, 
vested interest resistance and cultural prejudice, cannot 
yield a total explanation. It is at this point that the 
second species of critique which has been advanced becomes 
relevant. This is the kind of criticism-; which queries the 
actual intention of the policies concerned, and implies that 
their design was in some sense faulty or inadequate.
This kind of criticism again falls into two camps, 
ii’irst, there are some areas of concrete disagreement about 
pragmatic possibility. It may be argued that the policy- 
framers actually miscalculated in supposing that a given end 
could be subserved by a particular means. This is particularly 
relevant where it has been implied that the ends of social 
justice and economic efficiency can be harnessed together 
and jointly furthered by the same policy-tool, such as for 
example, land redistribution or co-operative farming. It may 
be argued that such suppositions were misconceived, that as 
a matter of fact, for instance, redistributing land or 
bestowing ownership rights or security of tenure, turns out
actually to lower the rate of investment, to lower productivity 
and to lower the marketable surplus available. A case in
13
point is a Hyderabad study, which showed that, after the 
extension of security of tenure, the index of productivity 
on owner-cultivated lands declined by 7.2 points in 1953-4, 
whilst that of tenant-cultivators increased by only 0.8 
points. It seemed, therefore, that the land reform had 
reduced overall agricultural efficiency (Quoted in 
Sundaram 1962; 517).
Here the disagreement is about the relation between 
means and ends, and is resolvable by resorting to the evidence. 
This does not, of.course, mean that the policy implication 
will thereafter become uncontroversial. It may still be 
argued that the evidence is insufficient, that the policy 
has not been giver* a fair chance, or that there are other 
predisposing factors which have been absent and which can 
be introduced into the situation. Nevertheless, this kind 
of debate lies basically in the realm of ^facts'* as Ginsberg, 
for instance, defines them, in the course of arguing for 
the reducibility of some parts of supposedly irreducible 
evaluative arguments, duller knowledge”, he suggests,
”may not unreasonably be expected to bring about some 
convergence of views now widely opposed, or at least 
greater tolerance of divergence” (Ginsberg 1963: 413).
14
Value-judgments about ends: the relevance ofIdeology. It 
is clear, however, that this is not the only way in which 
disagreement about ends and means can occur. One large 
source of criticism of actual policy is necessarily provided 
by the conflict between the various ends which are held to 
be desirable. This is the core of irreducible values which 
remains in political disagreement after the conflicts which 
Ginsberg describes as being open to rational debate on the 
grounds of empirical evidence, have been subtracted. In the 
end, value judgments ^cannot be reduced without remainder 
to assertions of what is, has been, will or can be^ (413).
It is certainly the case that, in any political 
situation, the expectations engendered by a given policy 
will be influenced by value judgments about the ultimate 
ends to which the policy is seen as contributing, as well 
as by more neutral empirical judgments about the immediate 
concrete effects of the given measure. In a pluralist 
society, or one which is in any way segmented or stratified, 
the hopes and expectations of various groups vis a vis a 
particular reform, will almost certainly diverge. Hence in 
the case of the ^umbrella11 policy of land reform, or the .even 
more omnibus category of agrarian reconstruction at large 
there was bound to be a whole range of justifications, even
15
for a fairly closely defined series of policies, and 
therefore an inevitable element of dissatisfaction and 
frustration in some quarters with the final outcome. In 
examination of the literature reveals that there certainly 
has been, and still is, a wide divergence of attitudes to 
land reform in India, and hence of long-term perspectives 
into which current policies are seen to fit, and degrees of 
disagreement about how adequate or inadequate present 
measures must be deemed to be.
But to present the situation only in these terms runs 
dangerously close to over-simplification. It is not the 
case that there has been a series of centrally-devised and 
administered policies with definable aims, and a series of 
distinct criticisms from clearly differentiated foci of 
opposition. The role of values or of ideology has been a 
much more highly diffused and perhaps even elusive one.
The policies themselves have often been ambiguous as to 
intention or implication. In this sense, their ’'ideological 
content1' can hardly be treated as constant or homogeneous.
As sociologists have often illustrated, sets of values, or 
ideologies, may be supposed to have many functions and 
determinants, and to operate at many levels. The problem 
then is to find reference points which will be sufficiently
16
specific to shed light on the way in which ideology may be 
an active and perhaps even a confusing factor in the 
development of specific policies and their implementation.
Definitions of ideology, At this point, it seems necessary 
to elucidate the way in which ideology is to be defined if 
it is to be found relevant to the development and
implementation of specific policies. It cannot merely be 
assumed to be synonymous with ^values91 or "value judgments’”.
Already, two kinds of ideological factors, or two aspects 
of ideology, have been cited as relevant to the land reform 
and agrarian structure case. First, it has been pointed 
out that images of a given policy held by various sections 
of the community, and their expectations of it, will be a 
function of their own scales of priorities or, in other 
words, of their particular ideological position. In this 
sense, ideology is used to denote a set of political values 
and ideas held explicitly by individuals or groups.
Secondly, it has been suggested that policies themselves
manifest some degree of ideological content by virtue of
the assumptions which they appear to make about the kinds
of ends which ought to be striven for. But this attributing 
of ideological content to policies is itself problematic,
Is the ideological element to be identified from the official
17
justifications which accompany a policy? Or is it for the
observer to interpret and abstract from the policy its ^realtS!
kernel of value-assumptions? The same problem can of course
be posed of the previous case also. Are the ideologies
professed by groups and parties to be taken at face value,
or is it legitimate to look for the underlying and perhaps
concealed, ideological core within? Ideology clearlynhas
been, and is, used in both senses; both of a set of expressed
ideas on its own terms and of the less explicit normative
elements which are embedded in them.
A large part of the problem lies in the fact that any
attempt to define ideology, or to identify its uses, cannot
be merely a semantic exercise, but already trespasses onto
theoretical and controversial ground. The question of 
whether or not ideologies are to be considered as self-
contained bodies of rational constructs, or whether they are to 
be analysed in relation to extraneous social factors, and if
so to which such factors, is the very subject matter of the 
sociology of knowledge. It therefore seems apposite to 
consider briefly some contrasting treatments of ideology, 
both to determine what the reference points of the term
ideology should be, and to discover whether concrete theories 
about the nature of ideology can be made to extend themselves
18
into being theories about the role which ideology may be 
supposed to play in the process of policy formation and 
implement at i on.
Sociological analyses of ideology.
Pejorative implications. The first issue to be dealt with 
is the question of whether or not ideology can still be used 
with a general and a purely descriptive reference. As 
Geertz has pointed out, Mit is one of the minor ironies of 
modern intellectual history that the term "ideology" has 
itself become thoroughly ideologised" (Apter 1964: 47 ).
This:is.:;as true of sociological and epistomological analyses 
of ideology as it is of the connotations which ideology has 
acquired in the world of political and party-political 
debate. In the former area, "ideological thought" has often 
been used to denote not only subjectivism, but also bias 
and distortion. As Geertz again puts it, "That the' conception 
of ideology now regnant in the social sciences is a 
thoroughly evaluative (that is, perjorative) one is readily 
enough demonstrated" (49). This claim is backed with 
several examples. Werner Stark, for instance, considers 
"ideological thought....something shady, something that 
ought to be overcome and banished from our mind", (1958; 48)
19
and Talcott Parsons is quoted as saying ”The problem of 
ideology arises where there is a discrepancy between what is 
believed and what can be (^established as 3 scientifically 
correct” (1959: 58).
This taint clearly carries over into the arena of 
political opinion also. Here, ideology is conceived as 
applying to a particular brand or category of political 
doctrines which are seen as overly rigid, restrictive and 
somehow artificial. This is the implication in V.J.Narasimhan's 
remark ”1 doubt whether the term ideology could be applied 
to such natural aspirations as industrialisation, 
modernisation or even nationalism1” (1965: 21). Clearly, the 
Gandhian philosophy is not considered to amount to an
ideology either, for, in the course of arguing for a new 
adherence to the trusteeship formula, Narasimhan1goes on to 
comment; ”We must shift our thinking from ideology to 
ethics” (25).
It turns out that what are considered as constituting 
ideologies in this brand of attack, are the archetypal 
cases of Communism^ Nazism and perhaps Nationalism. This 
is what Geerts describes as Shilsfs tack of invoking the 
extreme pathologies of ideological thought - Nazism,
Bolshevism, or whatever. - as its paradigmatic forms” (Apter
20
1964: 52). (It might be noted in passing that "pathologies” 
itself is a somewhat loaded term). Ik similar line of thought 
is pursued by Daniel Bell in the course of his argument that 
what we are seeing in the West tod.ay is the "end of ideology". 
This is held to be demonstrated by the fact that "amongst the 
intellectuals, the old passions are spent", and "few serious
minds believe any longer that one can set down fblue-prints1
and through 'social engineering1 bring about a new utopia of 
social harmony". Where such passionate commitment to total 
solutions is missing, ideology is necessarily absent. Where 
there is an unemotional consensus over "the acceptance of 
the Welfare State, the desirability of decentralised power, 
a system of mixed economy and of political * pluralism", it 
is clear that there "the ideological age has ended" (I960: 
373-4).
If the term ideology is thus restricted to all-embracing 
and manifest doctrines, then the debate about the ubiquity 
or otherwise of ideology can hardly be a real one. It seems 
more useful to accept Apter's comparatively neutral definition
of ideology as "a generic term applied to general ideas 
potent in specific situations of conduct; for example, not 
any ideals, only political ones; not any values, only those 
specifying a given set of preferences; not any beliefs, only
21
those governing particular modes of thought51 (1964: 17) 
and further to agree with him that the term can be extensively 
applied, and as validly to Western democracies as to 
Communist states. The difference may be that ”In the Western 
world, ideology has changed considerably from the more 
dogmatic statements that periodically in the Eighteenth 
and nineteenth Centuries, heralded total solutions to 
world problems. Today our ideologies are disguised.” Other 
taxonomies of ideological types can of course be devised. 
Ginsberg, for instance, suggests that flWe have to 
distinguish between 'open1 and ’closed1 ideologies”, the 
distinguishing marks of the former being that ”they are often 
criticised from within and that they also learn from each 
other” (1963: 418). No doubt such categories can be further 
elaborated^i'or contested. The point is that they attempt 
to identify species of ideology, rather than to distinguish 
between its existence and non-existence.
If such a stance is taken, then the values informing 
particular ."policies need not be identifiable with one of 
the archetypal doctrines in order to be classed as ideological. 
Ili the Indian context, it is not only the major ideological 
themes of nationalism and socialism which are of interest, 
though these may tend to dominate the scene. Less extreme
22
and less clearly defined sets of values may also be 
influential. It may well be the case, in fact, that the 
archetypal cases are not in any case as distinct and 
homogeneous as might be assumed, and that they are really 
more like whole constellations of minor ideologies, than 
single entities.
The various approaches to ideology. So much then for the 
range of application of the term ideology. The second task 
is to look at some distinct sociological approaches which 
either set out to examine the process of ideology-formation 
directly, or which seek to include ideology as an active 
ingredient in broader political processes. Such theories 
may indeed contain assumptions about the epistomologieal 
status of ideology, but the important point is that they 
also examine its social role. Marxian theory, for example, 
contributed substantially to the concept of ideology as 
’’false consciousness”, but it also laid the foundations 
for the social structural interpretation of ideology as 
related to the distribution of economic and political power, 
and the two levels of analysis do not seem to be irrevocably 
connected or to face the same problems* The relating of 
going ideologies to identifiable economic structures and 
situations, for example, may or may not entail an acceptance
23
of relativeisra, but it does not necessarily run up against
the difficulty of defining a state of "true” consciousness
by relying on notions of real or latent interest/ It does
encounter other difficulties of course, such as that of
specifying the mechanism, psychological or otherwise, by
which the economic structure gives rise to, or selects a
given ideology. This is a problem which has been referred
4to for instance by Birnbaum.
At the level of social or contextual analysis of 
ideology, at least four broad directions or types of approach 
can be identified. These may be characterised as the 
"psychological”, the "interest”, the ttinput-output", and 
the "range-of-possibility” approaches. These four are not 
necessarily either strictly comparable or mutually exclusive. 
The last two, for example, both rely on a framework which 
may loosely be called systems analysis and which takes a very 
broad perspective. The first two, on the other hand, take 
much more specific points of reference, such as the 
individual psyche, or the social stratum or class. The 
various approaches are distinguished most clearly by their 
particular starting points and perspectives.
1. The psychological approach. At its purest, the 
psychological approach is concerned only with the relation
24
between individual psyche and espoused ideology. This 
relation may be argued in either behavioural or psycho­
analytic terms. In the former case, the process described 
is a relatively non-teleological one, Eysenck, for example, 
maintains that ”We have to learn our politics as we learn 
our language, and if we wish to know anything about political 
attitudes, then we should be able to turn to the laws of 
learning...We might call these laws the law of hedonism and 
the law of association'” (1957: 271).
Briefly, it is first maintained that the right-left 
continuum of attitudes is produced by the association of a 
piece of behaviour with ensuing gratification, the assumption 
being that in Britain voting Labour materially rewards the 
low-class or low-status man. There is also a cross-cutting 
tough-minded - tender-minded continuum of attitudes, however, 
and this correlates with the degree of ^conditionability5” 
in the individual, which will determine his state as relatively 
over- or under-socialised. These states manifest themselves, 
in the one case as ”a tender-minded regard for conventions 
and rules protecting society from the more biological drives 
of human na/fcure” and, in the other case, as ”a tough minded 
desire to over-ride these conventions and seek direct 
expression of these animal instincts” (280). It is argued
25
that the laws of learning give rise to opinions, opinions 
cluster in attitudes, and an analysis of the relationships 
between attitudes brings us to "a higher-order construct 
yet, namely, that of ideology11 (286).
The psycho-analytical approach to ideology, as opposed 
to the behavioural, has a somewhat different theoretical 
base, but again the starting point is the individual psyche, 
even if more in terms of its *!needs" than of its ability to 
acquire conditioned reflexes. The object is broadly to 
establish a plausible connection between the tensions within 
and personality system and the cognitive and affectual 
security or outlet afforded by the particular world view 
espoused. Erikson, for instance, in a study of Martin Luther, 
(subtitled "a study in psychoanalysis and history*1) defines 
ideology as "an unconscious tendency underlying religious and 
scientific as well as political thought; the tendency at a 
given time to make facts amenable to ideas and ideas to 
facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough 
to support the collective and individual sense of identity" 
(1962; 22).
At first sifeht, it would seem that these psychological 
approaches, rooted as they are in the individual, can have
little to say about the social,role of ideology. Consideration
26
of the individual psyche*s needs or dispositions may suggest 
something about the mechanism of the individual *s attachment 
to a:going ideology, but it can say less about the active 
role of ideological factors in political situations. In any 
case, it naturally raises larger questions which a purely 
psychological approach can only begin to answer, about why 
individuals are or become psychologically disposed or 
susceptible in these specific ways. If the.individual psyche 
is not an autonomous unit, one is led to enquire into the 
ways in which its needs may be socially structured.
This aspect of ideology can be met by a social 
psychological approach, and Erikson is perhaps more than 
half way to such a standpoint when he remarks that **In some 
periods of history....man needs...*a new ideological 
orientation as surely and as sorely as he must have air and 
food1 (22). But what is tantamount merely to background for 
Erikson becomes a vital dimension for those who interpret 
ideology as. the patterned response to a specific social 
situation. The '^ strain** may then be seen as originating in 
the structure of society and manifesting itself only 
secondarily through individual psychological mechanisms. 
Geertz says of this kind of approach, nthe clear and distinct 
idea from which strain theory departs is the chronic
malintegration of society” (Apter 1964: 54).
But Geertz himself is concerned to argue that most 
so-called strain theories have neglected the foie of
ideology as a manipulator of symbols. It is this which 
gives it its status as 11 a cultural system” and one which
5
is most readily and manifestly resorted to in time of 
rapid change,- when the individual is overwhelmed by ”a loss
of orientation” and "an inability, for lack of usable models, 
to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibiliti 
(64). Thus, "whatever else ideologies may be...they are 
most .distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and 
matrices for the creation of collective conscience.” Yet 
the map so presented is not to be taken or left as the
individual wills, for it is also the case that "ideology 
names the structure of situations in such a way that the 
attitude contained towards them is one of commitment” (71).
2^ _ The interest approach. The above approach then is one
step nearer to analysing the specifically social determinants 
or stimulants of ideology. A second type of approach, which 
tackles such determinants directly, is the interest or power 
approach, typified by the Marxian view of ideology as a 
part of the social superstructure, dependent on the material 
base in the same manner as the more concrete institutions of
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the political system arid legal and judicial code.^ The
motivational or psychological link in this process of
determination between material base and expressed ideology
tends not to be elaborated in the traditional Marxian line
of argument; hence the accusation that ”its psychology is
too anaemic and its sociology too muscular19 (Apter 1964: 53).
The Marxian approach is not of course the only example 
of this power perspective. It puts forward a specific
theory of the relationship between ideology and the power
structure, which will be examined more closely below. Other
theories have suggested variables other than economic
position as the major determinants of the allocation of
power and thus as the most important reference points for
the content of ideological thought. Weber*s concept of the
social group or class is a case in point. Sometimes Weber
tends to insist on the autonomy of religious ideas even
though in ffThe Protestant Ethic” he protests that he has no
intention of substituting a religious for an economic
determinism and even though his major concern is clearly
w i t h  the process of selection which operates between social
position and religious outlook. Yet elsewhere he is
ambivalent about the relationship which can be said to
7
link social groups and their religious outlook. Hinduism,
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for instance, he describes as the religion of a hereditary
caste of ritualistic literati who are the custodians of
8
the sacred doctrine informing the caste hierarchy. Indeed, 
Carlo Intoni suggests that, "If Weber did not insist on the 
autonomy of mystical experience, his sociology would differ 
from materialism only by its substitution of social class 
for economic class** (1959: 166).
5. The input-output approach. In rather marked contrast to
the interest or power analysis of ideology, are the various 
species of functionalist or system theory. The whole 
perspective here is quite different. Instead of taking as 
the initial assumption the conviction that the segmentation 
of society into classes or strata is fundamental and in some 
sense primary to an appreciation of the role of ideology, 
functional theory takes as its perspective an overall view 
of society as a system and attempts to devise a model which 
will most adequately account for the mechanisms of social 
interaction. Each element is viewed as a component part, 
the linking mechanism being explained in terips of some 
analogous model or process such as input-output flows or 
cybernetic information passage and feed-back. The social 
system is thus envisaged as a set of variously flexible 
constraints, capable of degrees of accommodation.
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The case of a fast-developing society is a much- 
considered one since it is here that rates of change are 
liable to produce the ^strains11 or ’’crises" most interesting 
in the context of an assumed noi’mal state of integration. 
Ideology is seen as capable of performing certain functions 
which contribute to the total process. Easton, for instance, 
sees ideology partly as a potential conveyor of demands 
from,as it were, political consumers to political producers. 
Hence, ideology generally fulfils its main function on the 
input side of the model. Easton suggests that "Regardless 
of the scope and general context of belief systems, they 
may be classified according to their demand content1 
(1965: 43), and, further, that "the demands flowing into a 
system constitute one of the major sources of stress acting 
on its essential variables*1 (37).
4. The range-of-possibility approach. A fourth approach is 
that of Apter. It must be said at the outset that Apter 
himself clearly distinguishes between what he refers to as 
political norms or values, and political ideologies, the 
latter being an off-shoot of the former. 4lIdeology” it is 
explained, "can be defined as the explicit and derivative 
articulation of political norms** (1965: 270). Although the 
two categories seem to be closely linked in this definition,
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Apter*s treatment of them is in fact quite different. In 
considering a society’s Apolitical morality^ or ^normative 
principles11, for instance, he deals with the broadest 
possible themes such as liberty, equality, democracy and 
totalitarianism or collectivism, but in dealing with 
ideology, the four themes selected are nationalism, socialism, 
fascism and science. In dealing with these manifest 
ideologies, the approach seems to be a mainly fmotional 
one. It is maintained that f|what gives an ideology its real 
force and conviction during its period of maximum 
effectiveness, is its contribution to establishing identity 
and solidarity^ (1964: 328). Whether the fulfilment of 
such functions is to be related to psychological needs, or 
to the^needs1 of the political system must be investigated 
later. It would seem most interesting here to look at 
Apter*s treatment of the wider political values of a society 
as well as what he specifically defines as ideology.
Apter*s main task is to analyse the ^politics of 
modernisationa . The alternative to a Marxian analysis he 
sees as what he calls a probabilistic study, uniting 
normative, structural, and behavioural theory. But the 
approach, it seems, is again basically a structural and 
functional one. The various types of system distinguished
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are assessed for their potential adequacy in dealing with 
the task of modernisation. As Apter himself says, other 
types of analysis may address themselves to the question 
of which choices are made by groups or individuals and why, 
whereas structural analysis concerns itself with what 
choices are possible.
S’ or Apter, the range of possible choices seems to be 
a function of the authority-type of the particular system. 
But the type of authority, or the principle of legitimation, 
is itself seen as an outcome of choices made on value 
premises.- As Apter puts it, ^Politics is peculiar insofar 
as principles of legitimation are normative first, and 
structural second^ (1965: 16). Thus, normative principles, 
such as ^liberty'0 or “potentiality** “become principles of 
legitimation0 and these give rise to generalised models of 
polity. These are essentially distinguished by their 
values-and purposes, for “the two different normative 
models aim at quite different moral ends. The secular- 
libertarian model essentially accepts society as it is and 
suggests a framework that will allow modest change over 
time,...the sacred-collectivity model is opposed to 
conditions as they are“ (33-34).
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The total implication, therefore, is that the norms 
and values of a polity are in some sense primary, but they 
have structural implications because of the types of authority 
to which they give rise and the means through which authority 
is expressed. In,effect, then, the basic political norms 
set constraints on the range of policy possibilities. There 
is in Apter1s analysis also a notion of the evolutionary 
development of sets of political values and systems. Because 
the sheer dimensions of organisational and administrative 
capacity required for modernisation will probably prove to 
be uneasily afforded within certain types of system, and 
because the need to establish authority effectively will 
initially take precedence over the desire for equity or a 
diffused distribution of power, it is assumed that a 
’^collective*’ policy may be a precondition for a ’’liberal” 
one, as far as the individual society is concerned. The 
range of normative possibility is thus seen as being 
dependent on the stage of development of the process of 
modernisation with which the system is coping. Ideology, 
in other words, may be a constraint on the immediate 
situation, but is itself a function of the overall stage of 
development. In concrete terms, the implication is that 
fully-fledged democracies cannot be expected to emerge in
Mdeveloping and modernising states.
jigLQC-& e^ween the theories.
It is clear that these four treatments of ideology 
differ considerably, not only in their general perspective, 
but in- their theoretical assumptions also. The aim in this 
context is tb discover what light any or all of them may 
shed on the relationship between ideology and policy
formation, and for this purpose, the most important aspects 
of the various approaches are the substantive statements 
they make about ideology and its role. But it is as well 
to clarify first the level of explanation at which each
operates before considering their concrete conclusions and 
whether they are mutually exclusive or reconcilable.
Each approach manifests, first, a particular stance 
or perspective vis a vis ideology as a variable. It may, 
for instance, seek to outline the determinants of ideology, 
or it may be more concerned with its wider effects, or even 
w i t h  the interhal structure and ’^syntax" of ideologies 
themselves. Secondly, this perspective is likely either 
to rest on or to imply a particular kind of theoretical 
framework, as, for example, the Marxian direction of analysis 
from material base to ideological super-structure, assumes 
the existence "of some kind of causal relationship, and,
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moreover, the vaility of attempting to identify such a 
relationship.
Directions of analysis and theoretical, foundations* Prom 
the point of view of perspective or direction, the four 
approaches here mentioned fall roughly into two camps. Both 
the psychological and the interest approaches look behind or 
beneath ideology to its determinants or preconditions, in
the one case psychological and in the other, social and 
structural. In this respect, social psychological theories
of ideology are intermediate, since the immediate influence 
on ideology is seen as being the individual psychological 
stale, but this in turn is seen as produced by a given state 
of society. But in all three cases, the body of ideas 
which constitute a given ideology is conceived as, in some 
sense, answering to the prior state of individuals or groups, 
and this prior state may in some cases actually be given 
the status of a causal factor.
The 1 ast two treatments of ideology here discussed, 
however, are much less specific in direction of analysis.
Both Baston and iftpter argue within the general framework 
of structural-functional analysis. Consequently, their 
perspective is a higher-level and a more multi-directional 
one. Insofar as there is a direction of explanation, it
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tends to be from the phenomenon to its consequences or 
eff-ects. Again the particular perspective is firmly tied 
up with the theoretical base on which the argument rests.
The analysis is in terms of interaction between variables, 
and changes in the overall state of the system. As..far as 
any one variable is concerned, there are two kinds of 
performance described. First, a variable may at any given 
time be fulfiling a function which contributes to the 
maintenance of the whole system. Ideology, for instance, 
may express and channel demands, and so effect communication 
between governed and governing. This process is assumed to 
be quite distinct from, and even independent of, the causal 
factors which actually provoke and shape the variable 
concerned. Because of this, and because the mechanisms 
which sustain the process remain obscure, this kind of 
explanation remains somewhat problematic. As Geertz puts 
it, pattern of behaviour shaped by a certain set of forces 
turns out, by a plausible but nevertheless mysterious 
coincidence, to serve ends but tenuously related to those • 
forces** (Apter 1964: 55).
The second kind of performance described is that in 
which the variable reacts as part of a sequence of change, 
induced, it is usually assumed, by some exogenous force.
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The main weight of Apter*s analysis, for instance, is 
directed towards allowing for the major impetus to change 
represented by modernisation. In response to such an 
impetus, either the.variables accommodate, and so jointly 
manifest smooth progress towards a new overall equilibrium 
or. a continuing state of stability, or else there is a 
failure of adjustment, caused by a too-rigid structural 
constraint* In this case there is a build-up of strain or 
pressure which is followed, according to the terminology 
employed, either by a breakdown of the system, or by a push 
towards a completely new state of the system. In Easton^ 
model, ideology might be described as the barometer in such 
a situation, in that it registers the build-up of pressure on 
the mechanisms of distribution through the intensity of its 
demand-cont ent.
The adequacy of functional analysis continues, of course, 
to be debated. Its advocates argue that it has clear 
advantages over other approaches. 1/s/hat have here been 
called interest or power structure theories, Easton labels 
as ^allocative theories*’, since they are mainly concerned 
with ?lthe way in which the political pie is cut up and how 
it happens to get cut up in one way rather than another*’
(1965: 475). He finds their major flaw in the fact that
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ttthere is a status quo bias built into allopative research.*1
He believes that a systems analysis, on the other hahd, proves
$
to have a more comprehensive explanatory power, because 
'■"where the system itself is threatened with destruction, as 
in highly unstable systems, allocative theories, although 
relevant no longer suffice. We need to turn to the basic 
forces - here described as stress - if we are to understand 
the processes through which political systems are able to 
fulfil their characteristic task, that of allocating values 
authoritatively for a society.1 This is perhaps a little
ironical as precisely the same accusation, that of being 
biased in favour of the status quo and of being ill-equipped
to explain social change, has often been levelled at
9functional theory. [Further, it can hardly be argued that 
interest theory, and the Marxian one in particular, is not 
capable of yielding a theory of social change.
What is certain about funcl’ional analysis is the extent 
of its usage. It operates over a range of levels, and often 
overlaps with other kinds of explanation. Psychological 
theory, for instance, though sometimes appearing as a species 
of causal explanation, readily furnishes functional 
explanations also. Here, the language of cause, explanation 
and function is particularly difficult to segregate out,
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since human behaviour is in any case acceptably described 
as purposive or teleological. It seems plausible to maintain, 
as Apter does for instance, that ideologies contribute to
the establishing and maintenance of solidarity and identity, 
if the reference's to the functional needs of individuals 
rather than those of political systems* The difficulty 
arises in applying functional concepts to the performance 
of abstractions, such as institutions, and*to unpurposed 
entities such as the ‘"goals’" of a system*
Nevertheless, functional language at this level does 
seem to be concerned with factors and relationships which 
cannot be ignored* The main difficulty may perhaps be 
avoided by using the term function strictly in the sense of 
consequences* Thus the expression of demands may be 
( understood as an effect or consequence, either intended or 
unintended, of the nature of a given ideology, rather than 
as one of its functions in an organic sense. Similarly, as 
far as society or 'Hhe system” is concerned, the promotion 
of solidarity.or the maintenance of a collective identity, 
may be regarded either as the purpose of deliberately 
sponsored ideologies, or as the unintended consequences of 
more spontaneous ideologies.10 it would be regrettable if' 
such aspects of the social role of ideology had to be
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excluded, and only its determinants or moulding influences 
examined... This would be particularly so in the context of 
the relation between ideology and policy formation.
Substantive conclusions of the various approaches. If the 
four approaches are examined in terms of their substantive 
comments about the nature, causes and effect of ideology, 
rather than in terms of their theoretical assumptions, they 
may be seen as dividing along somewhat different lines. Both 
the social psychological approach, as represented by Geertz 
and by a part of Apter*s systems analysis, direct attention 
to the situational conducements for the emergence of ideology, 
whether as general phenomenon or as particular specified 
doctrine. The need for mmaps of problematic social reality’1 
will obviously be greatest when social reality is felt to 
be at its most problematic. The predisposing factors 
therefore, are political instability and conditions of rapid 
change. Nowadays the situation is ripe for the expansion 
of ideological currency because *’for the most part, the new 
states are still groping for usable political concepts, and 
not yet grasping them?n (Apter 1964: 65)*
Easton^ model and the interest approach, on the other 
hand, although they have quite different starting points, 
both direct attention not so much to the broader situational
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preconditions for the emergence of ideology, but to the way
in which ideology relates to and affects the power structure,
and in particular, the government-governed power axis.
Marxist theory, for instance, is most concerned with
ideology as a ra/fcionalisation of the position of the ruling
class and therefore as a virtual extension of the power of
11the politically and economically dominant. Ideology is 
an instrument for the extension and maintenance of power. 
Easton, by contrast, is principally concerned with the 
demand content of ideology, and hence with the possibility 
of its limiting the initiative of the government. The 
analysis is explicitly not made in terms of power, but there 
is clearly an underlying power dimension present. The 
strength and effectiveness of the demands must surely be a 
function of the relative strength of those who do the 
demanding and of those who are at the receiving end of the 
demands.
It must be noted that neither the Marxist nor Easton*s
12theory is as one-sideA as is here implied. Both, in fact, 
consider the converse effects of ideology. Eor example,
Lenin in particular did not see ideol&gy only as a ^'mystifying'7 
force. In particular circumstances, true consciousness 
does arise and the real interests of the proletariat,
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constitute ideology in its scientific sense. Such ideology 
does constitute a threat to the established ruling class. But 
Marx of course saw this as an essentially unstable situation, 
which could only issue in conflict and revolution. He did 
not foresee the possibility of on-going ’^sub-cultures’1 and 
encapsulated ideologies becoming permanently embedded in the 
structure of the policy, or the possibility of compromise 
and adjustment between governing and governed, as represented, 
for instance, by the evolution of the Welfare State. It 
was left to later pressure group theories to elaborate 
these possibilities.
Similarly, Haston does not identify ideology solely or 
completely with the input side of his model. He recognises 
that it may also function for the legitimation of the current 
regime, and for the pei'petuation of the political community. 
But he does nevertheless underemphasise the possibility that 
the f”officialn ideology may actually mould the demands of 
the governed. Apter too, in his treatment of the connection
between ideology and government stresses the legitimising 
aspects of ideology, ^Government policy*1, he says, affects 
consummatory rather then instrumental values through the
manipual&tion of ideology. Idebl^g^Q^tpox^Qyt thus 
related to the contingent functions of government in its
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symbolic, sanctional, integrational and definitional 
aspects3* (1965: 313). But there is little detail here of 
the way in which the going ideology may actually influence 
concrete wants and demands. Thus the interest or power 
approach and the systems type of analysis may well be
complementary. The tvro-way aspect of ideology as it operates 
between government and governed is a vital dimension and 
directs attention to the balance operating within the power
structure of society.
Finally, and apart from the situational-conducement, 
ab d the power-balance types of observations about ideology, 
there is a third kind of statement. This arises in the part 
of Apter*s model which deals with political norms as sets of 
situational constraints on the range of options available to 
the political system. It will be interesting to consider 
whether values or ideology may in fact foe considered as 
primary constraints in this way.
*■ ■.
Implications for the ideology-policy relationship.
What light can these various treatments of ideology 
shed on the relationship between ideology and policy 
formation? What framework do they suggest for analysing 
the development of particular policies, such as the Indian
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land reform and agrarian ones, and for understanding the 
attitudes which are provoked by these policies and by the 
process of their implementation?
The kind of approach which focuses on the situational 
conducements and preconditions for ideology, whether 
functionalist or otherwise, tends to treat ideology as the 
end-product of the analysis and is little concerned with 
the relation between it and concrete policy. Ideology is 
dealt with as a self-contained cognitive or symbolic system. 
Eor Geertz, ideologies appear as ^matrices for the creation 
of collective conscience1”, the preconditions being social 
disruption or uncertainty. In the narrow and specific sense 
in which Jpter uses the term, ideology is similarly seen as 
1f,a specific case of political religion'” (1965: 270), its 
distinguishing characteristics being its capacity to promote 
a sense of solidarity and identity.
If taken as guide-lines, these particular points would 
seem to suggest that the Indian case should first be 
approached in terms of the historicalnemergence of the main 
ideological currents themselves, and that these should be 
considered as bodies of sentiments fulfilling social
psychological functions. The implications of this approach 
for the relationship between ideology and the formation of
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policy may seem somewhat tenuous. It remains to be seen 
whether such theories do yield conclusions about this 
relationship.
The second group of approaches, on the other hand, 
focus attention onto ideology as related to the power-axis 
which exists between government and the nation at large.
From this point of view the Indian case, and indeed that of the 
new states in general, is a particularly interesting one, 
since the governed have actually been transformed into the 
governing by a fairly rapid transition. This suggests that 
the developing role of Oongress must be considered a vital 
factor, with Independence as an important divide. Ideology 
may be considered either as a set of demands, related to 
• identifiable groups or interests within society and directed 
towards the governing, or as a justificatory and instrumental 
weapon in the hands of the politically-dominant, and 
therefore directed towards the governed. Whether such '"demands1" 
or "justifications'11 are to be related to economic or...group 
interest, or whether they are to be seen in terms of the 
interaction of parts of the political system, is a question 
which cannot be answered in advance.
The final approach is that deriving from Apter*s general 
analysis. In his treatment of the broader political values,
4-6
of which ideology is seen as an explicit form, Apter gives 
the impression that he is dealing with a set of constraints 
and institutionalised priorities, rather than a series of 
sentiments* It, may well be that this level of values, or 
of ’'latent5*1 ideology is an important consideration for the 
analysis of policy formation, and it suggests that the 
ideological patterns discerned should be considered for the 
ways in which they may have set limits to the range of policy 
possibilities* In this process, the degrees of internal 
ideological consistency, or possibly of conflict, may be 
an important factor*
fframework of analysis* These various approaches and their 
implications would seem to suggest two different sets of 
critiera for analysing the Indian case: first, a series of
ideological themes, and secondly, the phases of Congress 
development over time. These general frameworks would seem 
to be partially congruent and partially cross-cutting. It 
cannot be assumed that analysis in terms of the continuities 
and shifts in the content of ideological themes will necessarily 
coincide with the outlines of Congress development. On the 
other hand, it is clearly impossible to devise two such series 
of categories which are independent of one another. The 
emergence of ideological themes cannot have been unaffected
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by the growth of Congress, similarly, it may well be the 
case that shifts in ideological gear are part of what 
actually helps to define changes in Congress's role. The 
aim then is to find a series of phases and areas which will 
accommodate topics concerned with both themes, and allow 
their inter-relations to emerge.
Is far as Congress is concerned, it would seem 
reasonable to take Independence as the initial and major 
divide, and then to distinguish other phases or sub-divisions 
within the larger periods.. The process of specifying and 
isolating ideological themes, however, is one which as 
suggested above, is fraught with difficulty. It involves 
a process of abstraction in two senses; first because at
any given time, a cross-section of a society's political 
opinion will reveal a whole diversity of constellations of 
view-points. Ideal-types may be constructed, such as 
"the radical position**, "The social democratic1', '"the 
conservative*1 or "the reactionary" attitude, but the many 
groups and individuals, or social .units of whatever kind, 
will hold such positions with their own reservations and 
interpretations, which may add up to a mixture of 
ingredients from the various ideal-types. Secondly, even
apart from the range of constellations of ideological
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position, there remains the difficulty of attaching political 
labels. The observer's schema may entail assigning the 
political positions encountered to categories other than the 
exponents themselves would acknowledge.
To some extent this kind of imposition and interpretation
from outside is inevitable. But there is a case, at least 
initially, for concentrating on the broadest possible 
ideological themes which themselves have been umbrellas for 
diverse opinion, rather than the alternative method of 
trying immediately to identify ideological positions in 
terms of particular groups and grading them along a 
continuum of some kind. By taking the large themes, one 
can rather see how they themselves have operated as arenas 
for debate, with different political groups being pushed in 
and out of the limelight over time. This would seem the 
more fruitful background for exploring how given policies 
have emerged, and for examining how ideology and policy 
have been mutually related.
The three ideological themes which suggest themselves 
in the Indian context are those of nationalism,, socialism- 
planning, and Gandhism-populism-democracy. Necessarily
these are stereotypes; vague, all-inclusive and overlapping,, 
and for these reasons, often seemingly meaningless. But
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precisely because they have meant many things to many 
people they are not unsuitable for the purpose.
Plan of the thesis.
Prom the point of view of chapter content, it would 
seem easiest, for the period before Independence, to allow 
these ideological themes to dictate the divisions, but after 
Independence, to allow the chronological sequence of Congress 
development and activity to take over. This is partly 
because the ideological themes seem more separable before 
Independence but also because the sequence of phases and 
events becomes particularly important after Independence 
when the task was that of formulating and implementing
policy in the immediate situation in contrast to the more 
gradual gestation process which characterised the formation 
of policy intentions before Independence.
Chapter 2 will therefore be concerned with the theme of
nationalism in the pre-Independence setting, and Chapter 5 
with socialism and .GShdhisim over the same period. These 
two chapters will thus cover both the pre-Gandhian and the
Gandhian phases of Congress development. Chapters 4 and 5 
will then deal with the phases into which government activity
can be seen as falling after Independence; Chapter 4 with
5Q
the immediate post-Independence period, and Chapter 5 with 
the 2nd Five-Year Plan period and with the subsequent 
developments of the 1960’s* These two chapters will thus 
cover the inter-relations of ideological themes within 
specific time periods*
Chapter 6 represents something of a deviation, in that 
it attempts to draw the analysis down from the generalness 
of the all-India level to the setting of a particular state, 
but at the same time to see whether there are parallels to 
be found between the two levels*
In sum, then, the purpose of taking this panoramic view 
of both the development of Congress and the development of 
ideology in India, is specifically to try and discover what 
the relationships between ideology and policy-formation 
have been* In the process, the fruitfulness of the various 
sociological approaches to ideology for this particular 
kind of analysis, may be further considered, as also the 
ways in which they may be either mutually conflicting or 
pompl ement ary.
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Notes, Chapter I.
“  ■— **- — w ^
1. The P.E.O. was established in October 1952, ”to assess 
the progress of the community projects and of other intensive 
development schemes in the rural areas” (Hanson 1966: 65).
But its reports on community development in the mid-*1950fs, 
which suggested that"Results were incommensurate with effort 
and expenditure (64, and see Chapter 5 below) made it unpopular 
with the Ministry and the Development Commissioners. 
Consequently, ”the P.E.O. has ceased to publish annual 
evaluation reports or indeed surveys of any kind. Instead,
it now selects; a few of the important plan programmes for 
rural development for intensive and comprehensive study” (64).
2. This is of course a large and loose category, which 
covers a complex of related measures, from land reform to 
community development, the National Extension Service and 
the re-establishment of panchayats or village councils.
5. The problem of ”true consciousness” has of course been 
a perenhial problem, and not only in Marx, because the 
alternative of total relativism has seemed unacceptable. It 
gives rise to what Geertz has called mMannheim*s paradox”.
The paradox is that of trying to establish a point of valid 
or real objectivity, from which to appraise the subjective 
or relative.
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4. Birnbaum (BJS 1955) suggests that Marx oversimplified 
the relation betweeh base and superstructure, and did'*-not 
elaborate the process by which ideologies come to be 
describable as reflections of class position. There is 
fcoom here, he argues, for a psychological wedge. The 
institutions of capitalism and, in Weberfs phrase, ‘'’the 
spirit of capitalism”, for instance, did not develop from 
feudalism in ”any‘mechanistic sense, but demanded a specific 
set of values and specific psychological qualities” (140)*
5. It seems that Geertz identifies ideology with a 
manifest or conscious espousal of certain doctrines. In 
stable traditional situations, men are rather guided by
”untaught feelings” and”unexamined prejudices51 (Apter 1964: 65).
6. In i1fThe German Ideology”, Marx and Engels write: ”We set 
out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real 
life process we demonstrate■the development of the ideological 
reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms 
formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates
of their material lifefprocess^;, which is empirically
verifiable and bound to material premises* Morality, religion, 
metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding 
forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance
of independence...life is not determined by consciousness,
53
but consciousness by life11 (1938: 14-15).
7. In "The Social Psychology of the World Religions11,
WeberTs ambivalence is clear. On the one hand, he says 
firmly ""However incisive the social influences, economically 
and politically determined, may have been on a religious 
ethic in a particular case, it receives its stamp primarily 
from religious sources," However, although he goes on to 
say "other spheres of interest could have only a secondary 
influence11, he qualifies this by. remarking that "often, 
however, such influence is very obvious and sometimes it is 
decisive11 (Gerth and Mills 1948: 270).
8. Weber writes; "Earlier Hinduism was borne by ,a 
hereditary caste of cultured literati*, who being remote from 
any office, functioned as a kind of ritualist and spiritual 
advisers for individuals and communities. They formed a 
stable centre for the orientation of the status stratification, 
and they placed their stamp upon the social order. Only 
Brahmans, educated in the Veda, formed, as bearers of 
tradition, the fully recognised religious status group
(Gerth and Mills, ed. 1948; 268-9).
9. See, for instance, R. Dahrendorf (1958) and D. Lockwood 
(1956). Admittedly both of these attacks are directed 
mainly at Talcott Parsons and the extreme case of equilibrium
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analysis. But Dahrendorf refers, more widely, to ”the sense 
of complacency with - if not justification of - the status 
quo, which, by intention or default, pervades the structural “
functional school of thought11 (122).
10. Apter applies the language of function in a social and 
in an individual sense. Thus he says ”1 am inclined to the 
view that ideology helps to perform two main functions; one 
directly social, binding the community together, and the 
other individual, organising the role personalities of the 
maturing individual” (1964: 18). It later becomes clear, 
however, that in the social functional usage, Apter is at 
least partly referring to the deliberate and purposive 
sponsoring of ideology by governments or leaders.
11. nThe ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the 
ruling ideas: i.e. the class, which is the ruling material force 
of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. 
The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of 
mental production’” (Marx and Engels 1958: 59).
12. This is particularly clear in the case of Easton.
Indeed, he locates the dynamic nature of his whole approach 
in the fact that he recognises how, within the input-output
systems model of politics, ,fthe outputs of the conversion
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process have the characteristics of feeding back upon the 
system and shaping its subsequent behaviour** (31). The 
implication is that the demands of the system are themselves 
at least partly conditioned by the nature and influence of 
government, Furthermore, he later argues that y encouraging 
members to adopt, the principles, purposes and assumptions of 
of an ideology as the premises of their behaviour, a 
leadership may be successful in capturing the energies of 
the members for specified policy objectives that they, the 
leadership, may consider desirable or necessary” (340). This 
is relevant also to the problem of mobilisation, which is dealt 
with in Chapter 5 below.
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Nationalism and theories of ideology*
It was suggested above that the topic of ideology and 
policy-formation should be approached on the one hand from 
the point of view of the ideologies themselves and their 
emergence, and, on the other hand, from the standpoint of 
Congress and its phases of development. There will then be 
scope for considering how well theories about ideology as 
situationally-conduced, or as situationally constraining, 
mesh with theories which relate ideology rather to the 
balance of power and the role of government. This being so, 
there is a good case for starting ifith a study of nationalism, 
since this is clearly a segment of ideology which is inti­
mately and almost necessarily, related to the course of 
Congress development. Indeed, analysing the fabric of 
nationalism means not only describing Congress*s evolution, 
but also enquiring into the very nature of Congress as a 
movement.
However, nationalism, like ideology itself, is analys- 
able at many levels, and has accordingly often been considered
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in ways other than in relation to particular political 
movements. Certainly the main aim here is to consider how 
nationalism, as a species of ideology, may be related to 
the changes in the power structure which the growth of 
Congress effected, but the various other kinds of inter­
pretations of nationalism must also be taken into account.
In general, there is the same three-fold classification as 
was applied to statements about ideology at large; namely, 
observations dealing with, respectively, situational con- 
ducements, the relevance of the balance of power between 
government and governing, and finally, implications for the 
range of choices open to a system. The ways in which such 
types of theories deal specifically with nationalism must 
be considered, so that their conclusions or suggestions may 
be measured against the Indian case.
The situational condueements approach» The situational 
conducements category, as with theories of ideology in 
general, is made up mainly of theories concerned with social, 
or individual, psychological predispositions and needs, with 
the states of society which are productive or permissive of 
these, and with the functions of ideology in catering to 
such states. This focuses attention onto nationalism as a 
sentiment, and onto the mechanisms of attachment of indi­
viduals to particular bodies of ideas. Apter*s treatment
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of nationalism, which he accepts as one of four identified 
"ideological tendences" (1965: 51?) illustrates this well.
His general approach, as pointed out above, seems to com­
bine notions of functionality for the system, with a stress 
on the social psychological "needs" of individuals. Like 
other forms of ideology, nationalism is seen as providing 
both a buttressing sense of identity, and a uniting sense of 
solidarity. The identity function is fulfilled either through 
a sense of continuity or through a new sense of belonging, 
for "nationalism either preserves an identity that is carried 
over from the traditions of the past or creates a new set 
of attachments centering on the modern state" (350). Soli­
darity is provided by the all-encompassing nature of this 
sense of identity. "Nationalism incorporates primordial 
loyalties in a readily understandable synthesis •.• Diffuse 
enough to encompass all specific forms of loyalty and 
tradition, it elevates them to a national inheritance.
The value of nationalism lies in its functional flexibility" 
(55^)* The question which naturally arises from these 
statements is that of whether or not Indian nationalism is, 
in fact, most adequately characterised in terms of its 
identity-creating and solidarity-producing effects.
The power-balance approach. The second category of sub­
stantive statements about ideology was labelled as the
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power-axis or government-governing one. This is the diverse 
grouping which includes both Marx and Easton, not because 
their theoretical assumptions are similar, which they are 
not, but because they both direct attention to the power 
structure context of ideology. In the case of Easton*s 
approach, the suggestion that nationalism must be seen as a 
set of demands acting on the allocative and power-regulating 
mechanisms of society would seem a fairly plausible one, 
especially when the early history of Congress is examined.
The difficulty is, however, that the very language of sys­
tems analysis evades the problem of the precise origin and
1sponsorship of the demands. As a connective mechanism m  
the system, it is enough that they travel from one point to 
another, and that they may be the manifester of “strain11 
or “tension11* But the query inevitably arises, and par­
ticularly in the Indian context, and in view of the previous 
theory*s predominant stress on the unifying nature of 
ideology, as to how specific or how broad is the base from 
which these demands originate*
It is here that the other half of this power-axis 
category of theories, the Marxian or interest line of 
analysis, is relevant, because more specific and therefore 
more suggestive. In fact, Marx hardly confronted the 
specific problem of nationalism, but, applying the general
principles which were held by Marx or, subsequently, by 
Lenin, to explain ideology, nationalism in the Indian con­
text would be open to two interpretations* Either it 
represented the interests of a class other than the pro­
letariat, in which case the ideology must have a “mystify­
ing” aspect, or else id did represent proletarian interests, 
in which case it was a truly revolutionary force* In the 
former case, if the class interest was a bourgeois one, 
then this might constitute the challenging of an essentially 
feudal regime by a pre-socialist revolution, but the 
ideology would clearly correspond to the sectional or class 
interest of the bourgeoisie alone.
In fact, of course, Marxist theory has had difficulty in
accommodating nationalism and nationalist movements within
2
the confines of its traditional concepts. It is of par­
ticular interest to discover how adequately an interest 
theory can deal with the case of Indian nationalism.
The range-of-possibility approach. The third category of 
approaches to nationalism is the range-of-possibilities one. 
Here the intention would be to describe how nationalism as 
a set of operative values sets constraints on the policy- 
options available to a given society. In Apter*s model, 
the “normative elements” which characterise political 
systems, or stages of development of these systems, are the
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multi-faceted ones of collectivism and liberalism, but 
similar surmises can be made about the ways in which 
nationalism as entrenched ideology might be held to set 
constraints on political action.
The most obvious case of this is the way in which 
nationalism may appear to delineate the operative or “felt” 
political unit. Secession and partition, or, in the reverse 
direction, federation and "pan” movements, may equally be 
inspired by nationalism of a kind. This leads to specu­
lation about the way in which such nationalistic boundaries 
may in fact be correlated with other, and perhaps prior, 
sets of constraints. This is the line of enquiry pursued, 
for example, by Gellner (194-6) who concludes that the 
operative unit is a cultural-administrative one.
Nationalism as a setter of constraints in this sense, 
is certainly an important topic. But it is not clear that 
in the Indian case it is one which has any immediate bearing 
on the emergence of agrarian policy. In some cases, it is 
perhaps arguable that religious cleavage reinforced landlord- 
tenant conflicts and divisions, and so exacerbated anti- 
zamindar feeling. But, although regional and communal 
divisions have become increasingly important in post- 
Independence India, and so have almost begun to threaten the 
viability of national unity and the possibility of imple­
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menting national policies, their influence on the evolution 
of domestic policy before Independence was much more limited* 
This is an aspect of nationalism, therefore, which will not 
be pursued in detail here.
One way in which nationalism may well have acted as a 
delineator of policy-possibilities, however, was in its 
capacity as an identifier of targets. It may be that the 
logic of nationalist ideology itself focusedL.i attention onto 
certain aspects of the agrarian structure and so helped to 
mould future agrarian policy.
The initial task then, is to consider the rival claims 
for nationalism as a unifying sentiment, or as a set of 
sectional demands. Are either, or both, of these claims 
appropriate? Do they necessarily conflict, or are they 
reconciliable? Secondly, what other aspects of nationalism 
emerge in this pre-Independence period; did it in fact help 
to select the issues of debate and the objects of opposition? 
In general, was it the case that the nature of nationalism 
and its course of development militated against the emer­
gence, either immediately, or in the long term, of a "really 
radical" agrarian policy, or could it have acted as a 
stimulus for this? These various questions must be con­
sidered against the concrete background of the growth of the 
nationalist movement as represented by the Indian National
C>Z
Congress.
Congress and nationalism in the pre-Gandhian phase.
T h e development of the Congress before Independence 
seems to divide naturally into at least two phases, and 
these are particularly relevant from the point of view of 
ideology. (The dividing line is the appearance of Gandhi as 
a major influence on Congress at the beginning of the 1920s. 
It seems convenient to consider the two periods separately, 
partly because the progression from one to the other clearly 
marked an extension and enlargement of the nationalist move­
ment, but also because the transitional point and its impetus 
may themselves be variously interpreted, according to the 
main line of argument pursued.
How then is this first phase of nationalism and of 
Congress development, stretching from the 1880*s to the 
early 1920*s, to be described? What kind of interpretation 
might be advanced, first of all, by a social psychological 
and functional approach?
A social psychological interpretation. It seems appropriate 
to take Apterfs description of nationalism as representative 
of this view-point, not least because he specifically 
suggests a series of chronological developments through 
which ideology may pass in "countries moving from dependent
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to independent status." This path is defined partly in 
terms of a dialectic with other ideological tendencies, 
and particularly socialism. But this is seen as being more 
important at a later stage. In the initial stages "the 
periods of nationalism build up slowly. At first there is 
emphasis on a common citizenship leading to more effective 
participation in agencies of rule and greater educational 
opportunity. Primordial loyalties continue to serve as the 
basis of the society*s uniqueness an& to promote pride in 
identity. The period of nationalism, therefore, accepts 
the main structure of society as it stands while seeking 
greater opportunities. It is "radical" only in one political 
context - colonialism" (1965: 335)*
This is worth quoting at length because in some ways, 
as will appear later, it seems an apt description of the 
early stages of Indian nationalism. But if it seems satis­
factory at the descriptive level, it seems less adequate as 
an e:Kplanation. It is not really clear, for instance, why 
emergent nationalism accepts the structural status quo. The 
implication seems to be that this is because the sense of 
group identity promoted by nationalism directs attention to 
the cleavage between "natives" and "colonials" or masters, to 
the exclusion of all else, and the emphasis therefore 
naturally falls on the need to break the monopoly control
of the latter over the going structures. The main weak­
ness here seems to lie in the description of the demand for 
gfeater participation as stemming from a sense of "common 
citizenship". It is imperative to know quite how common 
is the sense of citizenship at this stage, and how general 
is the sentiment. Apter1 s account can be too easily inter­
preted as implying that the sentiments of nationalism at 
successive stages pertain to a homogeneous and constant set 
of people, or of types of people.
A power-axis interpretation. By contrast, the interest, or 
power-balance approach concentrates on the content of the 
ideology and on the nature of the social groups involved. 
Easton*s account of ideology as a set of demands is admittedly 
too broad a characterisation to do more than imply that there 
may be sectional interests at work here. But an elite theory 
or a Marxist account, such as that advanced by A.E. Desai 
(1966) puts forward a clearly, and perhaps even a crudely, 
specific explanation of the nature of such interest. Accord­
ing to such a view, the origins of the nationalist movement 
as embodied in the Indian National Congress, were over­
whelmingly upper middle class with elements of the aristo­
cratic. Nationalism received its first definition in terms 
of elite goals; its initial impetus derived from the eager­
ness of an educated non-governing professional group to gain
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access to the arena of power, to be allowed to participate 
in the process of administration and government. Moreover, 
it is argued that this had important long-term effects for 
it was an urge which died extremely hard, as witness the 
controvercies which continued right into the 1920*s and 
1930’s over the merits of co-operation as against non- 
co-operation, participation as against non-participation, 
and especially the long controversy which engrossed Congress 
in the 1920's over the merits of taking office in the legis­
lative councils. T h e prospect of accepting whatever modi­
fications and reforms were offered because they represented 
a means to sharing in the exercise of power was a constant 
temptation to those who were qualified, especially when the 
further justification could be added of wanting to share in 
government, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the 
changes which could thereby be implemented.
It is not implied that such men were graspingly eager 
for self-aggrandisement. On the contrary, men such as 
Motilal Nehru were deeply committed to the goal of self- 
government. The point is that the entire outlook and am­
bitions of such men were geared towards fighting for in­
clusion in the going process of government and it was 
difficult for them to reject piecemeal concessions and 
gradual extensions of participation. Such a tradition left
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its legacy, even when the generation which conformed to 
it most obviously has passed, in that the goal continued 
to be the taking over of the machinery of government, 
although the tactical means altered considerably, This 
was not the sort of heritage which directed attention to a 
fundamental reorganisation of society. It meant also that 
the attitude of Congress to the elite and to those who had 
a vested interest in the establishment, whether these were 
wealthy businessmen or large landowners, was always 
ambivalent.
The nature of Congress before 1920. If the concrete origins 
of Congress are examined, it is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that the latter account is substantially accurate. 
The foundation of Congress in 1885 was to a large extent the 
outcome of the spread of “English education and the con­
sequent rise of a new educated professional and clerical 
middle and lower-middle class. Before the 1892 Council 
Reform Act, the only access for Indians to politics was via 
Government appointment to the legislative councils. This 
had inevitably limited such opportunities to the wealthy and 
influential, to men such as those who belonged to the 
British India Association. The B.I.A. had been founded in 
1851 and was basically an association of wealthy landholders, 
but included also professional and commercial interests.
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T h e i r characteristic concern was the preservation of 
zamindari rights, even to the extent of opposing Government- 
sponsored tenancy reforms, such as those included in the 
Bengal Rent Bill, introduced in 1882, which proposed that 
occupational and sales rights should accrue to tenants of 
12 years* standing. Lhe extent of their influence is re­
vealed by the fact that the bill, as finally passed three 
years later, was substantially modified. Such men often 
received preferment; for example, in Bengal between 1862 
and 1892, thirty-five members of the B.I.A. were appointed to 
the Legislative Council (Misra 1961: 344).
But for the newly educated middle class, the doctors, 
lawyers, teachers, traders and money-lenders, who lacked 
such considerable resources and influence, these avenues 
were not open, and the demand for representative institutions 
was therefore an obvious one, and indeed after the 1892 
Councils Act, Congress itself became an avenue of advancement 
for election to the councils and beyond, fhe Government in 
its turn found it useful to appoint moderate Congressmen to 
official positions such as judgeships, and to award knight­
hoods, thereby cementing support for the Government. Loyalty 
to the throne however was never really in doubt at this 
period. "What was being demanded was an expansion of 
education, greater access to public service, elected
G9
legislatures, a free press, moderate taxation, direct 
representation in the British Parliament, simultaneous 
Indian examinations for entry to the civil service, the 
fostering of Indian industry and reductions of land 
revenue and excise duties on cotton goods (Sitaramayya 
1935: 98-9); in fact all the traditional liberal free­
doms and institutions which would benefit the rising 
educated and professional classes. It could indeed be said, 
as the Chairman of the Congress deception Committee, Sardar 
Dyal Singh Majithia, put it in 1893* that the Congress was 
"the greatest glory of British rule in this country" 
(Sitaramayya 1935: 100).
But in the 1890*s and the first decade of the (Twentieth 
Century, frustration continued and increased. By 1893* 
there were still only 20 Indians in the Indian Civil Service 
as against 1,000 Europeans (Sitaramayya 1935: 112)* Then 
Lord Cursor's Police Commission specifically excluded 
Indians from the Special Services. The general discontent 
was reinforced by widespread opposition to the proposed 
partition of Bengal. Business interests too had their 
grievances. For them, imperialism meant the domination of 
imported British goods, and the Swadeshi movement was a 
direct response to the policy of Imperial Preference. In 
the *90's, the representation of business interests in the
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Congress increased considerably. The demand for the 
development of indigenous capital became a general middle- 
class grievance. Not until the setting up of the Tariff 
Board of 1923 was there any real protection of Indian pro­
duction (Misra 1961: 359)* Further indignation was provoked 
by the military policies of the British Government. It was 
felt that the Afghan and Burmese Wars, which swelled the 
Indian public debt, were essentially carried on in the 
interest of Britain and the commercial interests of the 
East India Co. (Misra 1961: 358)* By 'fcb.e Lucknow Congress 
of 1916; the demand for self-government was being formalised 
in definite proposals; namely that the provincial legislat­
ive councils should be 4/5 elected and 1/5 nominated, and 
that there should be direct elections on a wide franchise 
(Sitaramayya 1935s 43)*
The direct parentage of Congress is disputed, but the 
B.I.A. was certainly a contributory influence, and the 
tradition of representing landlord interests was firmly 
maintained, although Congress did tend to be dominated by 
professional men. In the period 1892 - 9* for instance,
40% of those attending the annual meetings were members of 
the legal profession (Hisra 1961: 353)* But the complexion 
of Congress support varied regionally. In Bengal certainly 
professional men were dominant. But elsewhere in the country,
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support was drawn also from other elements, including 
zamindars and maharajas, and Congressmen-?;serving on the 
councils tended systematically to oppose measures designed 
to protect the peasantry. Resolutions such as the 20th 
Resolution of the 1915 Bombay Congress, which demanded 
that a limit should be fixed to the state's demand on land 
and that permanent settlement should be introduced in all 
areas, whether ryotwari or zamindari, creating fixity of 
tenure for the occupants, were regularly proposed and 
passed. Such resolutions were first and foremost a state­
ment of landlord interests, since permanent settlement made 
little difference to the cultivating peasant at the bottom 
of a hierarchy of intermediaries, and even nominally 
ryotwari areas were not free of intermediaries. 
i'he adequacy or otherwise of a class-interest account, 'thus, 
the interpretation of Congress attitudes along primarily 
class lines seems in many ways to be supported by the evidence. 
But there are ways in which this account, by itself, is too 
crude and one-sided. It has been suggested, for instance, 
that the identification of nationalist leaders with landlord 
interests has been grossly overstated. Bipan Chandra 
sets out to challenge the grounds on which various writers 
have "accused the Indian leadership of being the spokesman 
of the privileged zamindars and of ignoring, and even
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opposing, the interests of the underprivileged and 
oppressed ryots" (1964: 144). John McLane similarly 
challenges the view that ,fthe social vision of the middle 
class nationalist was determined hy his class interests", 
and argues that "on most issues, the hostility of the Con­
gress to the G-overnment was not an effort by self-seeking 
Congress leaders to protect their economic interests, des­
pite the G-overnment1 s occasional success in conveying that 
impression" (1963: 66-7)*
Both writers choose to concentrate on the issue of
7
Congress support for the extension of permanent settlement. 
£hey both argue that Congress was stigmatised with a demand 
it was not making, namely for "the extension of a permanent 
settlement, of the Bengal or Cornwallis type" (McLane 1963s 
68), which would have meant instituting the system of 
zamindari even where it had not previously existed. Bipan 
Chandra quotes a considerable amount of evidence to show 
that much of nationalist opinion was in fact demanding the 
permanent settlement of revenue, whatever the tenure system. 
McLane goes further and argues that some nationalist 
leaders, such as R.C. Dutt, wanted a second kind of settle­
ment both in zamindari areas and where there were less 
official intermediaries, which would limit the claims of 
zamindars on tenants.
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Such claims do indeed indicate that some nationalist 
leaders were prepared to represent peasant, as well as 
landlord, interests. However, both writers conclude that 
the weight of nationalist opinion was almost certainly on 
the side of the landlords, even if it was driven by motives 
other than pure self-interest, such as the reluctance to see 
the rents received by zamindars transferred to Government 
hands, or the admiration of the zamindars as ftat least one 
class of people who were able to keep up some standards of 
social and intellectual excellence" (Ohandra 1964-: 154*).
The conclusion, then, would seem to be that a total 
e:xp>lanation of nationalist attitudes in terms of middle-class 
or elite interests, is indeed too one-sided. The defence of 
such interests was tempered, on the one hand, by elements 
of paternalism, and, on the other hand, by less obvious 
motives such as the reluctance to advocate any reform which 
would directly profit the Government.
There is, however, another explanation of nationalist 
attitudes during this period. This is put forward by He Lane 
who argues that the main characteristic of Congress policy 
was its deliberate aim of avoiding controversy, and promoting 
unity. This was not a matter of sentiments automatically 
engendered by nationalism, but of deliberately sponsored 
aims. This "preoccupation with national unity helped give
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the early Congress sessions their air of unreality”
(1963: 70), for Congress leaders "usually avoided divisive 
issues” and, with the exception of permanent settlement, 
"rarely opposed the Government or advocated changes in the 
exclusive interest of a limited section of the population”* 
T h e emphasis in this kind of explanation is on the role 
of Congress as a nationalist movement making specific 
demands and furthering specific goals vis a vis the 
Government. OOhe content of early nationalist ideology was 
fashioned then, by a combination of economic interest 
and deliberate tactics.
rj?he Gandhian phase.
1920 onwards; Congress as a, mass movement? Ihe conclusion 
that, in these early stages, the nationalist movement in 
general, and Congress in particular, existed primarily to 
further the interests and ambitions of an elite, is one 
which it would be hard to reject. However, it is often 
supposed that this middle-class liberal phase was but a 
precursor, and perhaps a historically necessary precursor, 
to the more radical mass phase into which the nationalist 
movement entered with the inception of the "Gandhian era" 
in the early 1920*s. It is therefore important to discover 
how penetrating this change really was and to what extent
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the extension of the "base of Congress support represented a 
permanent broadening in the aims and structure of the 
nationalist movement.
The clearest turning point seems to be the organisation 
of Gandhi1s 1919 S&atyragraha Sabha in response to the Rowlatt 
Act, a series of Government measures which sought to extend 
and even enlarge the central authority which had been embodied 
in the wartime Defense of India Act, and which was regarded 
by most Indians as a clear suppression of civil liberties.
This act of Satyragraha, although suspended before the end 
of the year, was extremely important in that it was the 
first time a movement of civil disobedience had been 
launched in support of a general nationalist cause. The 
satyragahis were pledged not merely to observe a boycott, 
but actually to disobey the law and therefore to risk 
trial and imprisonment (Sitaramayya 1955= 212-5)* Now 
the introduction of a new tactical method would not 
necessarily of itself have been enough to produce a new 
distribution of support and participation in political 
action, though it could perhaps be argued that such a method 
would appeal more to the young, the more extreme and the 
more committed. But the introduction of non-violent 
action of this kind produced such an effect primarily 
because it was Gandhi who introduced it. Gandhi attached to
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the policy a certain justification, a certain philosophy, 
without the aura of which he held the policy to be
O
invalid. This aura combined elements of Hindu mysticism 
with a basic humane populism, and, since Gandhi*s area 
of political intervention had already been firmly 
demonstrated as being amongst the urban workers and the 
peasants a new element was inevitably introduced into 
the Congress appeal when non-violence was officially 
accepted as a policy in 1920.^
There is no doubt that the visible image of Congress 
began to change. As Nehru puts it:- "The whole look 
of the Congress changed; European clothes vanished, and 
soon only khadi was to be seen; a new class of delegate 
chiefly drawn from the lower middle classes, became the 
type of Congressman; the language used became increasingly 
Hindustani, or sometimes the language of the province 
where the session was held, as many of the delegates did 
not understand English, and there was also a growing 
prejudice against using a foreign language in our national 
work; and a new life and enthusiasm and earnestness 
became evident in Congress gatherings'* (1956: 66-7)*
And also:- "Gandhi immediately brought about a 
complete change in (the Congress]) constitution. He madec 
it democratic and a mass organisation. Democratic it
had been previously also, but it had so far been limited 
in franchise and restricted to the upper classes. Now 
the peasants rolled in, and in its new garb it began to 
assume the look of a vast agrarian organisation with a 
strong sprinkling of the middle classes. This agrarian 
character was to grow. Indian workers also came in, 
but as individuals and not in their separate organised 
capacity" (1946: 505)-
% i s  was indeed the point at which Congress's new 
and changing image became evident. Nrom then on, it 
became part of the philosophy of mainstream nationalism 
that the movement must be a mass one, and one in which 
all interests were represented and united. The Gandhian 
aim was to "work for an India in which the poorest shall 
feel that it is their country, in whose making they have 
an effective vote, an India in which there shall be no 
high class and low class of people, an India in which 
all communities shall live in perfect harmony" (Nehru 
1946: 307- 8 ) .
Theories about the transition* The onset of this new 
phase in Congress development is again open to several 
levels of explanation. In social psychological and 
functional terms, this seemed to mark the onset of 
nationalism, par excellance, for there seemed to be the
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dawning of a real sense of general unity and a pushing 
out of the boundaries of solidarity. The question 
which arises here inevitably is, how deeply rooted was 
this sense of unity? How effective and enduring was it? 
What happened to it as the prospect of Independence 
became a more real one?
Again, Apter provides a description of the later 
phases of nationalist development. “Quite often”, he 
suggests, “nationalist movements take a leftwards 
turn during the last phase of the struggle for 
independence“ (1965= 335)* With the prospect of 
independence looming ahead, “nationalism finds it 
necessary to employ socialism as a development ideology.” 
There is here almost the notion that nationalism and 
socialism are functionally interchangeable from the 
social-psychological and sentiment point of view, for 
“radicalism adds a sense of community - aspects of which 
are egalitarianism and a sense of shared purpose.” But 
was it in fact the case, insofar as there was a leftwards 
turn in the Indian nationalist movement, that this was 
but a natural development of nationalism itself, an 
application, as it were, of the sentiments of nationalism, 
to the practical problems of economic policy and 
development? Was socialism functionally interchangeable
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with, or complimentary to, nationalism in this way?
Perhaps the burden of these questions relates mainly to 
a later chapter which deals specifically with socialism. 
But it is relevant to observe here, that, if Apter*s 
account of the logic of nationalism*s development is 
correct and applicable to the Indian situation, it would 
seem that in the 1920*s and 1950*s there should have been 
a strong likelihood of Congress widening its interests 
and perhaps taking up the cause of peasant and tenant 
grievances more trenchantly.
Congress and agrarian grievances.
What ibhen were the reasons for this major shift in 
image and in the apparent purposes of Congress?
Ike first and perhaps major reason for the change 
was Gandhi himself and the concept of political action 
which he brought with him into the Congress organisation. 
His first ^involvement in Indian politics had been in 
defence of kisan interests in a local and specific 
dispute. Ihis first act of civil disobedience was in 
April 19171 when he disobeyed a court prohibition order 
against remaining in the area of Champaran, which would 
have prevented him from investigating the grievances 
of the indigo workers (Sitaramayya 1935* 23^-8). In the
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following year, the second satyagraha was undertaken in 
the near-famine conditions of Kaira District of bomb ay, 
wherd the peasants were agitating for the lifting of the 
rent assessment. In 1918, he had also made inroads' into 
the industrial situation with his involvement in the 
dispute between the weavers and millowners of Ahmedabad 
(Bitaramayya 1935• 241-4). He had first argued the 
case for arbitration, controlled a premature strike And 
finally inaugurated a strike in defence of & 35% wage 
increase claim. It was not the case that links between 
Gongress and the industrial workers and peasants had 
previously been non-existent. But what’links there were 
had been very much peripheral to the control concerns 
of Congress. Hew Gandhi united the potential of such 
campaigns with the general nationalist movement through 
the technique of non-violent action, and the political 
support which he had begun to command amongst the 
industrial and rural poor. After 1919 > civil disobedience 
and no-tax campaigns began to be organised both in response 
to specific local grievances and in support of the general 
aims which were concerning the nationalist movement, fhe 
1921 Chirala campaign, for instance, was conducted against 
the setting up of a new municipality, ahd Gandhi here 
advised the villagers to protest by withdrawing and living
on the boundaries (Sitaramayya 1935: 369-70). ^he main 
themes cited in the Bardoli no-tax campaign of 1922, on 
the other hand, were the general ones of the Khilaphat 
issue, Swaraj, and opposition to the military rule in 
Punjab and Government repression following the Bombay 
riots (Sitaramayya 1935; 392-7).
In a sense then, the enlargement of Congress!s 
support and aims came primarily from an impetus which 
was external to the development of the core of the 
movement itself. This represented a challenge to the 
moderate leadership. Some adapted, if reluctantly, and 
remained to form the Swaraj Party, which stood for 
constitutional participation, whilst others removed 
themselves to a separate moderate camp. In Calcutta in 
1919, the first sitting of the Liberal Federation was 
held, and by the end of 1920, the "extreme" moderates had 
cut themselves off from Congress completely, subsequently 
becoming firm bastions of the establishment. Surendra 
Nath Banerjee, for instance, was knighted, and Lord Sinha 
became the first Indian Governor of Bihar and Orissa 
(Sitaramayya 1935; 353)*
Ihe political emergence of Gandhi by itself then, 
was a major influence on the course of Congress at this 
point, coming as it did in conjunction with the fervour
of antagonism roused in all sections of Indian opinion 
by the Howlatt Act and incidents such as Jalianwalabagh, 
and the generally repressive measures of the Government, 
fhe other major factor which was conducive to more wide­
spread protest was the steady worsening of economic 
conditions, ‘^his of course was most noticeable later
in the quickening of agrarian unrest in the slump con-
10ditions of the 1930fs, when Congress campaigns, and 
particularly Gandhi’s Salt March, coincided with the 
steady recession and consequent fall in prices and 
worsening of living conditions. % t  the connection 
between economic grievances and the readiness to engage 
in political activity became evident much earlier. 
Nationalist agitation in the countryside always com­
bined most easily with growing economic hardship.
On the one hand, then, CorLgress achieved a link 
with the peasantry via the historical occurrence of 
Gandhi, and on the other hand, the readiness of the 
peasants to be aroused was heightened by the worsening 
of economic conditions. This did indeed appear to 
create a unity of purpose and of feeling between the 
old-style middle-class Congressman and the peasant. But 
there was no guarantee that this was based on factors 
which would prove to be more than temporarily specific
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or sporadic in their effects.
The euphoria of the 19201 s. ‘^his uncertainty is really
the essence of the history of kisan-Congress relations
/
during the pre-Independence period. The crux of the 
matter was that, although middle class anti-Government 
agitation appeared at times to combine naturally with 
kisan unrest, and although the two could be channelled 
into protests in the same direction, the alliance was in 
some ways an uneasy and perhaps even a contingent one.
In the decade after 1920, the euphoria of Congress's 
new-found contact with the rural masses, which produced 
enthusiasms such as that displayed for the khaddar and 
spinning movements and also produced social action in 
the form of the Gandhian Constructive Programme, kept 
the alliance in action. r-^ he rank and file of middle- 
class Congressmen became aware of the peasant as they 
had not been before. Jawarhalal's reactions are typical 
of the rising generation of intellectual Congressmen:
"In 1920, I was totally ignorant of labour conditions in 
factories or fields, and my political outloofe was entirely 
bourgeois . . .  I was paying a little more attention to 
the peasant problem since Gandhi's agrarian movements"
(1958; 54). Gandhi's initiation of organised political 
work in the rural areas meant that Congress workers began
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to encounter rural poverty face to face. As Nehru says,
"Go to the villages was the slogan, and we trudged many 
a mile across fields and visited distant villages and 
addressed peasant meetings”' (75)*
All this activity generated a new feeling of concern, 
and a new identification with peasant grievances. But the 
point is that this feeling was, on the whole, an entirely 
undoctrinaire attitude. The political sentiments which 
were produced were first, a new emphasis on national unity; 
on the all-inclusive and participatory nature of nation­
hood, and secondly, an appreciation of the acuteness and 
injustices of rural poverty. This did not engender in many 
a political doctrine as specific as a Marxist or socialist 
exegesis in terms of class exploitation. It rather produced 
an outpouring of sympathy for the underprivileged, tinged 
with the inevitable guilt of the middle-class observer.
Again as Nehru puts it, "Looking at them and their misery, 
and overflowing gratitude, I was filled with shame and 
sorrow - shame at my own easy-going and comfortable life 
and our petty politics of the city which ignored this vast 
multitude of semi-naked sons and daughters of India" (1958: 
66-7)* The real problem was what kind of political solution 
would suggest itself to the average Congressmen as the out­
come of this kind of concern.
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At tlie beginning of the 1930*s, the impact of the
11slump gave the alliance a further suffusion of energy*
But the mid- and latter-19301s began to see the foundation 
of independent kisan movements which set themselves the 
task of formulating specifically peasant demands* This 
objectification of the peasant movement and its threatened 
removal from Congress1s immediate aegis, was inevitably the 
cause of increasing friction. Another development within 
Congress which heightened the process was the formation of 
the Congress provincial ministries after the 1935 Government 
of India Act. This meant that numbers of Congressmen now 
faced the peasants as wielders of authority and imple­
mentors of legislative programmes.
The conflicts of the 1930*s. In his presidential address 
at the Lucknow Congress in 1936, Nehru said: n0ur policies
and ideas are governed far more by a middle-class outlook 
than by a consideration of the needs of the great majority 
of the population. Kven the problems that trouble us are 
essentially middle-class problems ... This is partly due 
I think to a certain historical growth during the last 15 
years to which we have failed to adapt ourselves, to a 
growing urgency of economic problems affecting the masses, 
and to a rising mass consciousness which does not find 
sufficient outlet through Congress* This was not so in 
1920 and later when there was an organic link between Congress
8G>
and the masses, and their needs and desires, vague as they 
were, found expression in the Congress* But as those 
needs and desires have taken more definite shape, they have 
not been so welcome to other elements in the Congress, 
and that organisational connection has gone..*. The middle- 
class claim to represent the masses had some justification 
in 1920; it has much less today" (1958: 598).
It is evident that at this point Nehru at least was 
conscious of the growing rift between Congress and mass 
rural interests. Gone was the elation of the 1920*s, with 
its emphasis on national unity and participation, when Con­
gress workers "went about the rural areas with the new 
message, to which they often added, rather vaguely, a 
removal of kisan grievances, "and when "Swaraj was an all- 
embracing word to cover everything" (Nehru 1958: 61). It 
was becoming evident by the mid 1950*s that the Gandhian 
Constructive Programme, the encouragement of khaddar and 
even the peasant satyagrahas and the Salt March, were not 
enough to satisfy peasant demands, or the demands which 
were made on behalf of the peasants. In 1956, the Kisan 
Congress was formed by a mixed group of Congressmen with 
N.G. Ranga and Swami Sahajanand Sarasvati as General 
Secretaries. In 1957> suffix "Congress" was dropped 
and the movement renamed the All India Kisan Sabha.
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A.N. Dev, in a presidential address, in 1959> justified
the foundation of the separate movement “by arguing that
Congress was a multiclass organisation within which
peasants were not fully able to exercise their influence,
often because samindars controlled parts of the party
machine (Weiner 1962: 132-5)•
The left wing of Congress was reluctant to see the
Kisan Movement separate entirely from Congress. At the
1936 Congress, Nehru proposed a resolution supporting the
collective affiliation of both Trade Unions and Peasant
Leagues. But this was rejected, largely because of the
growth of socialist sentiment within Congress, which was
provoking a back-lash of more moderate opinion. There was
a general feeling that the affiliation of the T.U. and
Peasants* Movements would shift the balance of power towards 
12the left. The agrarian resolution passed at this Congress, 
often cited as symbolic of Congress * s increasingly social­
istic outlook, was in fact noticeably moderate. There was 
no specific solution offered to the land problem. Instead, 
what was rather vaguely advocated was "a thorough change 
of ... land tenure and revenue systems'*, and the Provincial 
Committees were asked, amongst other things, to recommend
ways of "safeguarding peasants* interests where there were
13int erme di ari e s *" ^
06
It was not long before the newly formed A.I.K,S* was 
coming into conflict with the agrarian policies of the new 
Congress ministries* The Congress Socialists had strongly- 
urged the non-acceptance of office by tho.se Congress can­
didates who had stood in the elections, and this had been 
proposed, but unsuccessfully, by J.P. Narayan at the Delhi 
meeting of the All India Congress Committee. Ministries 
were therefore formed by Congress in six provinces* The 
progress of these ministries was not only criticised by 
the Kisan Sabha. Left-wing Congressmen who had not stood 
in the elections recognised also that their position was 
ambiguous* As Nehru said: “What alarmed me was a tendency
to put down certain vital elements which were considered 
too advanced or which did not quite fit in with the pre­
vailing outlook” (194-1: 108).
There were accusations that the Kisan Sabha was all
too eager to create friction and to criticise Congress,
and in some places it was felt to function as an informal
14-permanent opposition to the local Congress. But there 
were real differences of interest or of policy too. In 
Bihar, for instance, it was claimed by the Kisan Sabha 
that the Government Tenancy Belief Bill had been watered 
down in committee to meet the objections of the local 
zamindars.1^ The Bihar Kisan Sabha agitated for zamindari
abolition, rent reduction, a moratorium on rural debt, 
and guaranteed higher prices for sugar cane* By the end 
of 1939> the Congress ministries had resigned, but Con­
gress never regained a close link with the Kisan Sabha, 
which became increasingly Communist-dominated. Congress 
in the end resorted to founding its own peasant organisation, 
the Farmers1 Forum (Weiner 1962: 14-4), but the Kisan Sabha 
remains the largest national peasant organisation.
The significance of the C.S.P. The .other major development 
of the 1930*s was the crystallisation and subsequent growth 
in influence of the socialist element within Congress, with 
the formation of the Congress Socialist Party in 1934-. This 
meant there was now a rallying point within Congress for 
those who were committed to definite views about the 
nature of the social structure and the nature of conflict.
The C.S.P. was by no means a homogeneous group. It con­
tained those of a Gandhian humanitarian socialist persuasion, 
as well as those who professed to be Marxists, and others 
who looked rather to.the social democratic parties in 
Europe* Nevertheless, in spite of the diversity of elements 
represented, its initial programme was, in the orthodox 
sense, a fairly obviously Marxist one, in that it was 
based on a class analysis, and advocated the ultimate 
“socialisation” of all institutions of production, distri-
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button and exchange, and the distribution of goods on 
the basis of "every one according to his needs." As far 
as agrarian policy went, the Meerut Statement advocated 
the "elimination of princes and landlords and all classes 
of exploiters without compensation", and "redistribution 
of land amongst peasants and the liquidation of peasant 
indebtedness" (Singh 1959 • 29)*
At this point, it is not the details of conflict over 
the content of policy between different groups within 
Congress which are of interest. Those must belong to a 
discussion of the role of socialist thought in the for­
mation of land policy. What is important is that the 
foundation of the C.S.P. marks the first formal concen­
tration of those amongst the middle class leadership who 
were prepared on doctrinal grounds to advocate a reorganis­
ation of the traditional pattern of ownership and control 
as much for the agrarian as for the industrial sector, and 
who saw such means as the fundamental way of attacking 
rural poverty, as opposed to the previously prevailing 
attitude of ameliorating the peasants1 lot by means of 
rent control, education, village reconstruction and the 
encouragement of cottage industry. This growth of socialist 
opinion within Congress was one of the main factors which 
eventually resulted in Congress becoming committed to the
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policy plank of zamindari abolition. But it also marks 
the entrenchment of a firm tradition of rural policy being 
debated by the middle-class and predominantly professional 
and intellectual leadership of Congress, with reference 
primarily to a body of ideals to which they subscribe, 
rather than with reference to an explicit mandate from the 
peasantry itself. In the 1930* s and 194*0* s, the C.S.P. 
became just one of the several political groups attempting 
to woo kisan opinion, and in this not achieving a very high 
degree of success. But the general tenor of the C.S.P. 
demands, although provoking in some quarters a violent res­
ponse, did eventually filter up, admittedly in a diluted 
form, to the level of official policy. However, the policy 
of zamindari abolition as it finally emerged in terms of 
concrete legislative proposals, was bedevilled, amongst 
many other things, by this very fact that it derived its 
formal justification and its immediate impetus from a 
middle-class intellectual socialist position.
In the post-Independence situation, with its absence 
of a powerful and united peasant movement to reinforce the 
demand from below, and with the more than negligible 
remaining power of the vested interests concerned, this 
has proved inevitably to be a fatally weakening factor, and 
one which has only been aggravated by Congress's continuing
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ambivalance towards the role and rights of propertied 
interests. Of course this is tied up also with the 
realities of power and the political constraints of legis­
lative operation within a democratic, and moreover federal, 
state, with its congeries of pressure groups. It seems 
that political realities and ideological inclinations have 
together meant that any relatively radical policy has had 
to be combined with some sizeable degree of concession to 
propertied interests, in this case the landlords, fhe 
outcome is liable to be a combination of the trappings of 
a radical policy with compensating gestures. The con­
troversy over zamindari compensation and over ceiling 
legislation on sir and hhudkhast bears witness to this. 
Conflict of interests among peasants. Whilst it is true 
that the late 1930fs saw the divergence of Congress and the 
official peasant organisations, and that this illustrated 
Congressfs inability to be identified with expressed peasant 
policy and demands, it would be naive to suppose that there 
was ever any such entity as "a peasant voicen or any such 
community of interest as could be described as "the peasant 
interestu with which Congress could have been identified 
anyway, fhe range and degrees of proprietorship and tenancy 
at the time of independence were extremely complex. Beneath 
the large landholders, the zamindars or talukdars, who formed
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a fraction of the cultivating population, there was a 
whole hierarchy of smallholders, major and lesser tenants, 
permanent tenants with some security of tenure and others 
with very little, as well are share-croppers and landless 
agricultural labourers* It could hardly be supposed that 
the interests of such a heterogeneous population could be 
identical. It was indeed far more likely that they were 
irreconcilable. So the peasant movement, apart from being 
as it were, vertically divided on organisational lines, 
was also horizontally stratified and divided on the grounds 
of interest. When the general policy plank was a blanket 
demand for reduction of rent and revenue, or postponement 
of periodical rent assessments, as it tended to be in the 
1920's, or when the demonstration was against a Government- 
imposed tax, such as the salt tax, it was more possible 
that a degree of unity would be achieved. However, when 
policy proposals became more specific and were directed 
towards furthering the interests of a particular section of 
the peasantry, it was more likely that interests would 
conflict* Myron Weiner points out, for instance, that in 
W. Bengal the A.I.K.S. succeeded in antagonising the class 
of cultivators who could be described as small-holders by 
trying to organise the bargardars, or share-croppers 
(Weiner 1961: 14-0).
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Quite apart from this difficulty of conflicting 
interests, there was also the problem of overlapping 
categories. A share-cropper or agricultural labourer 
might also be classifiable’ in the category of tenant* As 
the land records show, the majority of plots in any given 
area were of very small proportions. In U*P. for instance, 
at the time of Independence it was found that 58% of cul­
tivated plots were smaller than one acre, and another 20%  
were between 1 and 2 acres (Z.A.C.115: 6). In such con­
ditions, it was possible for instance, that a man who was 
for the most part an agricultural labourer, was also a 
small-scale tenant and even an employer of share-cropping 
labour. Ihis meant that, although there were conflicts 
of interest between different groups of cultivators, they 
would not necessarily fall along clear-cut or traditional 
lines of division, fhe conflict of interest existed, but 
did not always lend itself to formal political organisation*
How did zamindari abolition emerge as a slogan?
Ihe argument so far has been directed towards the 
conclusion that the nature of the Indian nationalist 
movement was such that any commitment to a coherent and 
radical land policy was unlikely to emerge during the pre- 
Independence period. The elite origins of the movement,
?5
the continuing middle-class nature of the leadership, the 
necessity to remain an umbrella organisation encompassing 
both zamindar and peasant elements, but, notwithstanding, 
the drift of formal peasant organisations away from the 
Congress fold, combined with the divided nature of the 
peasant movement itself, which prevented it from acting as 
a united pressure group; all these factors militated 
against an identification of nationalist demands whole­
heartedly with peasant grievances, as one might have expected 
to be the case if the Independence movement had originated 
in the countryside. The question must then arise, how was 
it that zamindari abolition became one of the first aims 
of the Indian Government after Independence, and indeed 
had become an acceptable political goal by .the time of the 
foundation of the Congress National Planning Committee in 
1958? The N,P,C,, moreover, was far from being a left- 
wing biased grouping, since it was meant to represent a 
cross-section of opinion and included representatives of 
all the provincial governments, not excepting the non- 
Gongress ones.
The zamindars and Congress, At a first impression, evidence 
concerning the role of the zamindars vis a vis Congress 
after the 1920's would seem to be conflicting. Prom several 
sources, there are references to the active influence of
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zamindars within Congress and the inhibiting effect this 
had, both on the general development of Congress agrarian 
policy and, specifically, on the legislation implemented 
by the Congress ministries* On the other hand, since the 
middle of the Nineteenth Century and certainly later, 
zamindars had grouped themselves into separate landlord 
associations which operated quite independently and some­
times came into conflict with Congress. The B.I.A., for 
instance, had been recognised by the Government as an 
electoral constituency in the 1919 Reforms.
Certainly many of the allegations that zamindars were 
dominant came from the left wing of nationalist opinion, 
which had an interest in castigating Congress as a 
‘‘bourgeois1 institution. The Communist Party of India, for 
instance, scorned the civil disobedience movements of 1950 
and 1932 in accord with the Stalinist line that it was the 
function of Communist Parties to isolate such bourgeois 
nationalist movements. A.N. Dev, as already cited, argued 
from the vantage point of the A.I.U.S. that the Congress 
machine was partially controlled by zamindari interests, 
and the Congress Socialist Party cited as one of the justi­
fications for its existence the need to espouse peasant 
interests, a move which, it was argued, would be bound to 
antagonise landlord interests in Congress. Nehru also
lays stress on the role of zamindars in Congress, at 
least in the 1930*s. He says of Congress that it was 
"as a whole ... a purely nationalistic body and included 
many middling zamindars and a few of the larger ones also.
Its leaders were terribly afraid of anything which might 
raise the class issue, or irritate the zamindar elements.
So, right through the first six months of civil disobedience, 
they avoided calling for a general no-tax campaign in the 
rural areas, although conditions for this seemed to be 
ripe1 (1936: 232).
A n incident at the 1928 Conference which was called 
at the initiative of Congress to, consider the Motilal Nehru 
Report on a proposed constitution, illustrates the point 
well, though admittedly this was an all-party conference. 
Jawarhalal at one point remarked that the men on the plat­
form, including talukdars such as the Maharajah of 
Mahmudabad and Raja Rampal Singh, were unnecessary members 
of society. This caused great ill-feeling and the following 
day, a resolution was passed to the effect that !IA11 titles 
to private and personal property lawfully acquired and 
enjoyed at the establishment of the Commonwealth are hereby 
guaranteed1 (Sitaramayya 1935s 552).
There seems then to be at least some evidence of the
*
existence of considerable numbers of zamindars within the
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ranks of Congress. We must therefore ask, first, what 
happened to the weight of zamindar opinion which was re­
garded as such an influential factor in the 1930fs and 
secondly, how and why did zamindari abolition become a 
major issue in debates about agrarian policy, so much so 
that it became a legislative priority after Independence.
(The first point is that zamindars were certainly never
a homogeneous group. (They were, on the contrary, quite
iq
markedly stratified. ' The majority of the largest and
most powerful zamindars and talukdars always remained aloof
from Congress, though some of them were at times involved
in the more moderate wing of the nationalist movement,
represented by the Liberal federation, and some of them
went as delegates to the Round Table Conferences. In this
capacity however, they were mostly regarded as reactionary
and unrepresentative of the mainstream of the nationalist
movement. At the 1931 Conference, for instance, Gandhi
was Congress1s only representative, the other delegates
being men such as the Aga Khan. It was Nehru* s opinion
that the Round Table Conferences in fact only served to
20consolidate the aristocratic-British alliance.
It was this top stratum of landlords to whom the 
British had looked at the beginning of the Twentieth Century 
as their possible political successors, and whose support
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they had consistently cultivated. It was also through 
this class that attempts had been made to counter-attack 
Congress. In the United Provinces in the 1920fs, for 
instance, at the instigation of the Government, aman 
sabhas, or anti non-cooperation leagues, were formed to 
combat the growing strength of the kisan sabhas. By 
August;, 1921, there was an aman sabha in each of the 48 
districts of the province. They tried to enlist peasant 
support by gestures such as the offer of cheap cloth, and 
the local talukdars were reputedly offended if they were 
not asked to join these groups (Peeves 1966: 268).
The Government in its turn habitually recognised and 
consulted talukdar opinion when land legislation was being 
considered. For instance, over the 1921 amendment to the 
Oudh Rent Act of 1886, which aimed to extend the protected 
tenancy period from 7 to 10 years, a condition still 
markedly inferior to the position obtaining in Agra, the 
Government ended up by conceding to new demands by the 
talukdars that extension of sir should be allowed, as 
should the eviction of sir undertenants and the acquisition 
of land for "development purposes" (Reeves 1966: 272).
It seems likely that such staunchly pro-British 
talukdar groups attracted larger numbers to their camp 
during the 1930*s and 1940!s as Congress policy became
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apparently increasingly extreme. As Erdman puts it in 
discussing the origins of conservative opinion in India, 
"from the 1950's onwards, the aristocrats viewed the Con­
gress with increasing hostility and alarm, turning more to 
the British to defend their interests" (1967: 18). In 
the process, the most weighty of the landed interests were 
"siphbned off" from the main body of the nationalist 
movement and drawn rather to the ranks of, for example, the 
National Agricultural Parties of Agra and of Oudh which 
opposed Congress, though somewhat unsuccessfully, in the 
1957 elections, t h e  main political objective being nothing 
more nor less than the retention of the status quo, and 
to the Zamindars* Union of 1946, whose object was expressly 
to oppose Zamindari Abolition (Peeves n.d.).
Insofar as zamindar interests were strongly represented 
in Congress, it was more the case that they were represented 
by comparatively small landowners, who after all formed the 
majority. W.C. Neale reflecting on the fact that, in U.P. 
at Independence, 98.5% of zamindars came into the Zamindari 
Abolition Committee's category of small zamindars, namely 
those paying under Es. 250 revenue per annum, concludes that 
most zamindars were not in a position to exploit anyone 
(1962: 252). Ihe great bulk of the 2 million zamindars in 
U.P* never associated with the Zamindars1 Union. It was
lo 1
to these smaller and middling zamindars that Congress 
was eventually able to appeal when zamindari abolition 
had become a policy plank. To such men, abolition was not 
such a threat as it was to the large talukdars. Many of 
them were men of commercial interests who had seen land as 
a business proposition. Provided they were adequately com­
pensated, and Congress never proposed not to give compen­
sation, they were not. seriously opposed to the measure. On 
the other hand, those who were cultivators were unlikely 
to be affected by any subsequent ceiling legislation. \^at 
they would lose was a small income from rent, against which 
could be set the receipt of compensation which was given 
in the form of Government stock. The Zamindars* Association 
of Muzaffarnagar which was made up predominantly of 
middling zamindars, went so far as to declare to the U.P. 
Government after Independence, that it would support 
zamindari abolition if compensation was guaranteed.
(Reeves n.d.;i 11).
The influence of nationalism. All this is not to say that 
there was not staunch opposition to abolition, both within 
and outside Congress. But the fact remains that, by the 
1940*s, it had become a possible policy objective for 
Congress and was supported by sections of opinion other 
than those which could be called left-wing. Part of this
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is surely attributable to the steady growth of anti- 
British feeling, which necessarily accompanied the shift 
of emphasis on Congress!s part from the politics of con­
stitutional parley to those of civil disobedience. In the 
context of increasing resistance to what is seen as imper­
ialist domination, it is to be expected, both in the 
natural course of ideological development and as a part 
of the tactical dynamic of a nationalist movement, that 
institutions which are associable xvith the dominating power, 
should emerge, or should be found, as targets of attack.
The institution of zamindari was an obvious candidate, 
its whole modern organisation being attributable to the 
British, and its most obvious representatives being, for 
the most part, visibly allied with the British. It could 
become a focus, however justifiably or otherwise, for all 
that was wrong with rural organisation. It was the im­
position of zamindari as an ownership right which was held 
to have destroyed the unity of the village and which had 
led to the oppression and exploitation of the tenant. F o r  
instance N.G. Ranga, writing in 1949 of the Nineteenth 
Century Santhal Revolt, describes it as a revolt "not only 
against the British Raj as such but also against the zamin­
dars who were invested with unjustified and undreamt of 
powers of ownership of land that peasants had customarily
considered and cultivated as their own for milleniums «...
The Santhals never thought that they could be evicted 
from their ancestral homesteads ... but that had come to 
happen" (1949: 57)* Of course many injustices had flowed 
from the British assessment of zamindari rights, but it 
was unlikely that there had not been oppression and exploit­
ation before the British period. However, zamindari as 
such now came to serve as a symbol of the evils of British 
imperialism.
This would seem to be a prime example of the way in 
which ideology may set constraints on, or help actually 
to define political situations. The tendency for a national­
ist ideology of itself to define contemporary issues, to 
"single out" objects of attack, is not of course an inde­
pendent or autonomous one. The alliances and policies which 
actually emerge are always influenced by conjunctions of 
many factors. In the Indian context, there were many 
other institutions and practices which could have been 
regarded by the nationalist movement as legacies of British 
imperialism, not least the institutions of parliamentary 
democracy themselves. The venom which was turned against 
zamindari was reinforced by other values and predominantly 
by the growing influence of what was labelled "socialist 
thinking" in Congress. In many cases this was rather a
leaning towards the advocacy of a humane rationalisation 
of the social structure. However, whatever its impulse, 
it permitted the limelight to be focused! on the evils of 
zamindari. The commitment to social justice and the 
antagonism towards a British-implemented and -supported 
institution was enough to carry Congress, through the 
process of achieving Independence, into legislation to 
implement this goal.
Conclusion.
The conclusion must be that the relationship between 
nationalism and agrarian policy before Independence was a 
complex one, and one with which no single interpretation 
of the nature of ideology can cope. In the early pre- 
Gandhian phase, it is clear that class or elite interests 
were a large component in the demands of the nationalist 
movement, and this clearly had repercussions on the attitude 
of nationalist leaders to agrarian problems and proposed 
policies.
A consideration of the social psychological effects 
of nationalism In both the early and the Gandhian phases 
is relevant mostly because it draws attention to the need 
to investigate the boundaries of felt national solidarity 
and the way in which such sentiments could, or could not,
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be made to mesh with sectional interests. It also draws 
attention to the possibility that the sentiments of 
national solidarity may be deliberately appealed to and 
deliberately sponsored, in which case their diffusion is 
less automatic than might otherwise be supposed, and the 
interests and motives of the leaders have to be taken into 
account.
In all these respects, the influence of nationalism 
tended to deflect attention and energy from a consciousness, 
and a concrete formulation, of the conflict-producing 
distributional problems of domestic policy. Ihis was a 
role which was more likely to be fulfilled by socialism. 
However, in the case of zamindari abolition, nationalism 
does seem to have contributed a reinforcing motive to the 
primarily socialistic demand for agrarian reform. It is 
the task of the following chapter to examine more fully the 
influence of socialism in this pre-Independence period.
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1. In the case of nationalist, the extent of the sentiment 
tends to be defined by Easton purely in terms of the non- 
fulfilment of demands* In other words, nationalism or 
separatism arises when the authorities are seen to deal 
inadequately with the specific demands of a group and the 
group can be identified no more specifically then by the 
non-fulment of its demands, i*he example of the American 
Negro is quoted. "In the U.S., for example, small but 
vocal Negro groups have periodically sought an independent 
political community as a result of their failure to 
obtain both a regime and other non-political conditions 
that they have considered necessary to meet their minimum 
expectations" (1965• 521). However, it is also recognised 
that sometimes the growth of nationalism cannot be related 
to the desire for a "new or modified regime" which would 
be more amenable to g?oup demands. In the case of, as it 
were, pure separatism, a group’s demands will be simply 
for ultimate "mastery over its own political destiny"
(52). In the case of the African dependencies for instance, 
"no transformation in regime is manifestly satisfactory 
today in the face of the perception among the political 
leadership  that freedom and formal political
independence from white and Western rule, and the
indignities associated with it, are the minimal conditions 
for self-fulfilment."
2. Or at least this has applied to Marxist theory as 
embodied in Soviet attitudes. Kautsky, in "Political 
change in underdeveloped countries" (1962), points out 
how ambivalent Russian foreign policy has been towards 
nationalist and anti-colonial movements in the developing 
nations. this partly stemmed from the USSR’s own 
insistence that the 1917 Revolution had been a proletarian 
one, in accord with Marxist expectations. Up till the 
mid-19301s, the USSR therefore maintained the line that 
only genuinely proletarian movements in other countries 
could be supported, 'thereafter, the emphasis changed and 
it seemed to be considered legitimate to support any 
movement which opposed colonialism and imperialism.
3. Desai argues that "it frequently happened in India 
that, where the Hindus were landlords and the Muslims
were peasants, often due to (the) instigation of communalists, 
economic class conflict between them assumed communal 
forms (1966: 190). 'the case is cited of the 1922 ■ Mopish 
Rebellion in Malabar, where Muslim Moplah tenants con­
fronted Brahmin landlords. It is interesting also to 
note Nehru's argument that greater unity could not have 
been achieved with the Muslim League in U.P. in 1937? 
because it was "largely representative of the big zamindars",
and this would have hindered the Congress ministry's 
ability to pass agrarian relief legislation (1959:1)#
4. Of the four original provisions in the Act which 
would have benefitted the ryot, three (limits on the 
enhancement of rent, provision for compensation after 
ejectment, and the granting of a right of transfer), 
were dropped, and one (acquisition of occupancy rights), 
was watered down (Chandra 1964: 157-8)*
5. 'this was officially opposed at the 21st Session of 
Congress at Kasi in 1905 (Sitaramayya 1935: 69)*
6. Bor the 1915 Bombay Resolution, see: Sitaramayya 
1935i 2U9, and for a list of other similar resolutions 
in this period, see: Sitaramayya: 59-61*
7« Bipan Chandra also discusses the Bengal Rent Bill 
of 1883 mentioned above, arguing that some sections of 
the British Indian Association and of nationalist opinion 
(e.g., Surendranath Banerjee and many newspapers, such 
as the Bengalee and the Mahratta) did support the 
tenant-biased clauses (1964: 158-161).
8. In defining Satyagraha, Gandhi said: "Satyagraha is 
literally holding on to Truth and it means, therefore, 
Truth-force. Truth is soul or spirit. It is, therefore, 
known as soul-force." (1951:3). ,J*‘he didactic and 
spiritual elements of Satyagraha are well illustrated 
in the remark: "In my opinion, the beauty and efficacy
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of Satyagraha are so great and the doctrine so simple that 
it can be preached even to children"(7)*
9. The text of the relevant Calcutta Congress resolution 
is given in Sitaramayya 1935: 340-2.
10. Although he is concerned to argue that the recession 
was not the main or only cause of the failure of the 
agricultural market mechanism, the effects of the Depression 
of the 1930's on agrarian conditions is described, in
the context of TJ.P. particularly, by W.C. Neale (1962:
176-8). "The burden of the Depression", he says, "fell 
upon the rural areas, and particularly upon agriculture" 
(176).
11. Nehru writes: "The civil disobedience movement of
1930 happened to fit unbeknown to its leaders at first, 
with the great world slump in industry and agriculture.
The rural masses were powerfully affected by this slump, 
and they turned to the Congress and civil disobedience.
Por them it was not a matter of a fine constitution drawn 
up in London or elsewhere, but of a basic change in the 
land system, especially in zamindari areas (1958:205).
12. Congress did however set up a "Mass Contact Committee", 
which aimed to bring the kisans and mazdoors into Congress. 
H.K. Singh (1959) reports that the C.S.p, regarded this 
as"a ruse by the Congress to play down the Socialists' 
demand for the collective affiliation of peasants and
workers organisations to the Congress, since the Congress 
leaders obviously thought any "Mass Contact" established 
would be under their supervision" (38). In any case, 
the Committee fizzled out without reporting.
13. Por the text of the Resolution, see Chapter 3 below.
14. Nehru suggested that "all manner of undesirables" 
used the Kisan Sabhas as a cover. Whether this was true 
or not, it seems clear that the Kisan Sabhas were very 
outspoken and not always tactically restrained. As 
Walter Hauser says of the demands made by the Bihar 
Kisan Sabha in the 193C!s, "the sharp divisions within 
the Congi*ess that came over these flowed as much from 
the vigour and impatience with which they were made by 
the Kisan Sabha leadership, as from the nature and extent 
of the demands themselves" (1963: 62).
15. H.K. ^ingh (1959: 39:40) reports the omitted clauses
as i) reversion of land to evicted tenants, ii) illegal
eviction to be a cognisable offence, and iii) the banning 
of sale of homesteads for failure to pay rent. Also, 
Hauser quotes Rajendra Prasad "who as leader of the Bihar 
Congress arranged the agreement with the zamindars", as 
saying that "They (the zamindar0 were rich and had 
resources and were capable of organising themselves."
Hence they "could certainly resort to dilatory tactics 
and delay successful operation of an Act" (1963: 53)*
Hauser reports that specific measures, such as a 3-year -* 
moratorium on rent arrears, were included in a report 
drawn up by the Congress, but the report was then withheld, 
and these measures did not appear in the subsequent 
legislation.
16. J.P. Naryan argued that because Congress was 
primarily middle-class in outlook, it was naturally 
geared more towards gaining seats in legislatures than 
to organising a mass movement, and that this was an 
aim which the C.S.P*, unfettered by bourgeois and 
landlord interests, must pursue (1946: 144).
17# Nehru undoubtedly spoke with a socialist bias, 
but not from within the C.S.P. itself. Although he clearly 
sympathised with it, his first allegiance was always to 
the parent body. As Brecher puts it, "Even though he 
acted as the C.S.P.'s godfather and continued to give 
it his blessing, Nehru never associated himself officially 
with this group" (1959: 218).
18. Walter Hauser says of Congress in the 1920's and 
193C1s, that it "was being transformed into a mass 
movement ..• But Congress appealed for the unity of all 
classes and interests in this struggle, including the 
zamindars who were an important influence in it" (1963: 58).
19. P. Reeves (1961) gives evidence of the stratification 
of zamindars in U.P. through a description of their
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grouping in separate associations.
20. Nehru says of the delegates, "As a whole, they 
represented, politically and socially, the most reactionary 
elements in India" (1958: 208).
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C H A P T E R  3
Socialism, Gandhism, and Congress Policy Before Independence
Socialism and theories of ideology .
Socialism and national unity. In the context of the
developing nations, it sometimes seems that socialism has 
become a vague but necessary part of national politics, an 
obligatory component of the whole ethos of progress and 
development. This would seem to support Apterfs thesis 
that socialism and nationalism tend to be functionally 
interchangeable in social psychological terms, and that 
socialism will take over from nationalism when "independence 
is no longer the issue" and when "the obvious act of changing
^authority from outside to inside turns out to be less simple
than appears" (1965: 335). Socialism is argued to be 
attractive in this situation because it ’"becomes the ethic for 
a system of political discipline emphasising science" (329).
In this sense, it is far removed from the specific economic 
and class doctrines of Marxism. "African socialism", for 
instance, often has strong nationalist or pan-nationalist 
undertones in terms of negritude, and, as Apter puts it,
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^prefers at present to delineate core values appropriate
to modernisation rather than limit itself prematurely to
particular economic forms." He even concludes that'‘quite
often...the socialism of .Africa is merely another name for
nationalism.1 Socialism in this sense seems to have become
a porous doctrine absorbing various strands of ideological
content, and in return effusing an aura of national
1togetherness and progress.
This is perhaps no new phenomen. Certainly socialism 
had been harnessed to strange and various causes before the 
emergence of '"the developing nations" as a group concept.
The employment of a segment of socialist ideas in conjunction 
with fascist ones to produce national socialism was perhaps 
the most bizarre alliance of all, epitomised by Hitler1s 
definition of socialism implicit in the remark "Whoever has 
understood our great national anthem, ’Deutschland,
Deutschland uber alles1 to mean that nothing in the wide 
world surpasses in his eyes this Germany, people and land, land 
and people, that man is a Socialist7" (Boepple 1934: 32).
Socialism then, like many ideologies which originally 
had a specific content, may well acquire other functions and 
levels of appeal, just as communism, envisaged by Marx as 
objective political theory, has itself become a normative
11?
and persuasive ideology. It may be that this process has 
affected socialism in the Indian context also, so that it 
has become today a. pro-lable, an accepted part of the, political 
and national heritage. It can even be argued that the
contemporary parties of the right have to argue within the 
vocabulary of socialist thinking. National planning, for 
instance, a tool originally associated with socialist ideas, 
is one which can hardly be explicitly rejected in toto by
any party wishing to participate seriously in the political
2debate.
Socialism and sectional interests. However, the possible
flexability and transferability of socialism admitted, and 
its versatility as an ideology recognised, it is still of 
course true that there have been distinct strands within the 
whole amalgam of socialist thinking which do represent more 
or less specific theories about patterns of social and 
economic organisation. In India the development of various 
streams of socialist thought, and their relative influence 
on Congress both before and after Independence, may be expected 
to have been of direct importance for the rural sector of 
society. All wings of socialist opinion, however vague or 
utopian, have had theories and attitudes of some variety 
towards agriculture, the landlord and the peasant. In a
lib
sense, and this is an aspect which Apter appears to deny, 
whilst nationalism directs attention away from sectional 
interests by canalizing energies into the channel of 
opposition to imperialism, and is thus bound to try and 
minimise internal conflict, socialism is committed to doing 
the reverse, in that its analysis necessarily starts from 
some sort of premise about group conflicts. Where socialism 
develops the cohesive function referred to above, it must 
use this conflict premise as a jumping-off ground for
urging the necessity for conciliation and harmony. This is 
the tendency wherever socialism becomes a national orthodoxy, 
and wherever the leadership has an interest in promoting
unity and solidarity on a mass basis, as in the African 
context. Accordingly, it may well be that the status and 
function of socialism in pre-Independence India will be 
found to contrast somewhat with its status and function 
after the achievement of Independence, since when socialism 
has indeed become part of a sort of national orthodoxy.
Apter1s account of socialism may well apply more aptly therefore 
in the post-Independence situation.
This is not to argue that some types of socialistic 
thinking did not have harmony-promoting tendencies even 
before Independence. Insofar as Gandhian thought produced
117
socialist offshoots, they tended very definitely towards an 
emphasis on conciliation rather than conflict, whether in 
terms of classes, groups or individuals. Nevertheless, even 
this more consensual brand of socialism can hardly by-pass 
a basic belief in the initial divergence of interests within 
society. It too must devote attention to the concrete 
problems of social organisation and social justice, the 
ownership of property and the distribution of goods, even 
if the solution it evolves may appear to be evasive. Insofar 
as Gandhism was evasive about these problems, there is a case 
for considering whether it was not, in general, more
3adequately described as anti - rather than pseudo - socialist. 
But clearly much depends on the definition of socialism 
employed, and judgment should perhaps be deferred until the 
various shades of socialist opinion have been more closely 
examined.
In seeking to discover how socialism has affected 
ideas about agrarian policy, it seems logical first to 
outline the various strands of socialist thought in India 
before Independence, and then to explore on the one hand 
the factors which stimulated or inhibited their tendency 
to produce concrete social recipes, and on the other hand, 
those which determined the degree of support each brand of
n a
thought could command; in other words, to discover first why 
and how concretely each type of socialist thought formulated 
policies, and specifically about the' rural sector, and then 
to assess how relatively influential such various socialist
arguments were. It will then be possible to see whether 
there was a change in the context of the debate after 
Independence, when the role of Congress altered from that 
of front-line opposition agitator to that of established 
government party. In terms of political support and 
opposition, the implications of any degree of adherence to 
socialist policies certainly might be expected to change at
'this point when the issues are no longer ones of theoretical 
debate but of practical implementation via legislation.
As well as forcing the programme into concrete terms, and 
terms which will meet the logic of the new national and 
international situation, this transition could also be 
expected to rally the opposition into concrete form* The 
prospect of a dissenting backlash becomes a real problem 
and a factor which itself may have a feedback onto policy
formation. The way vested interests affected by legislation 
eventually reacted is therefore of as much interest as the 
way in which Congress itself reacted within the constraints 
of its new role.
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The heterogeneity of socialistthought in India.
If one dubious point in Apter's analysis is thus the 
assumption that socialism and nationalism in developing 
counties will generally, and even before Independence, make 
similar contributions to the establishment of identity and 
solidarity, and so will tend to be complementary or sequential, 
another is the assumption that socialism in such contexts can 
be treated as a homogeneous entity. It is important to 
consider whether the general heading of socialism in given 
situations in fact includes different and possibly contra­
dictory ideological elements.
It is convenient to divide socialist thinking in India 
into three camps; Marxist, social democratic and perhaps, 
Gandhian. Meedless to say, this is a somewhat artificial 
process since many politicians are intensely eclectic in 
their outlook and manage to unite elements from several
sources into a. more or less consistent position, though this
is a tendency which is not unique to India. As Morris-Jones 
says of contemporary India, *}Bome part of Marxism forms an
element in the make-up of most members of the Indian
intellegentsia” (1964: 210), Perhaps this is an overstatement, 
but it serves to indicate how widely-diffused socialist 
elements of some kind can appear to be to the observer of
JZO
Indian politics.
How valid then is it to try and separate out the 
different strands of socialist thought? It may be that this 
is a more valid exercise in the pre-Independence era than in 
the later period. This may sound paradoxical, for there is 
a sense in which socialist ideas, if not ideology, were 
inevitably vaguer in the pre-Independence period. They 
were developed, as it were, in the political wilderness and 
their vocabulary was that of slogans and ultimate aims 
rather than concrete policies. However, precisely because 
of these factors, there was a sense in which the degrees of 
socialist thought were clearer and more clearly identifiable. 
Precisely because they were not attached to going policies and, 
for the most part, not even harnessed to the mainstream of 
the nationalist movement, with its middle-class interests, 
they were comparitively sharply expressed. Socialism was 
a means of expressing what could be and what ought ideally 
to be. It had not become a doctrine which is defiantly 
clung to in the face of opposition and which is used to 
justify policies which themselves are pragmatic and less 
than utopian. It is this which has made of socialism a
somewhat diffuse and, in a non-p.ejorative sense, a devalued 
or depreciated political label, since Independence. In the
1Z1 .
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1930s socialism was a suspect termfand the expression of 
socialist ideas enough to make the hackles of the Congress 
right-wing rise in indignation, as when the more conservative 
faction, led by Sardar Patel and Rajenda Prasad, threatened 
to resign after the Lucknow Congress because of what they 
called ^the preaching and emphasising of socialism*'. It is 
still of course the case that substantive socialist policies 
are liable to provoke fierce opposition in India, but they 
are unlikely to be opposed purely on the grounds of being 
socialistic. Mew stigmas have to be resorted to, such as 
those of Sovietism, communism or totalitarianism.
Marxism, social democracy and^Grandhian socialism. Such a 
tripartite division of socialist thought as this inevitably 
represents an over-simplification. The left in politics 
seems to be constitutionally subject to factionalism and 
splintering, and each so-called position could be finely 
sub-divided into a myriad other gradations of doctrine*.
However, for this purpose, these three labels may be held 
to represent gross differences of outlook which may be 
described in general terms. Perhaps all three would 
subscribe to similar broad long-term aims relating to 
human equality of status, and certainly a "more equal” 
distribution of material resources and a greater participation
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in the process of economic production. Where they differ most 
obviously is in terms of l) the social structural means 
which it is envisaged will best approximate to these aims, and 
2) the concrete methods by which both these structural 
prerequisites and the ultimate goals are to be achieved.
Again in highly oversimplified terms, it might be argued 
that Marxism 5and social democracy are relatively united over 
*- the social structure envisaged, and in this they both differ 
from Gandhian socialism, whereas social democracy and 
Gandhian socialism are united over the political means to 
be employed and in this they stand in opposition to the 
Marxists. It remains to specify in concrete terms what 
these differences amount to.
Marxist socialism. Marxism in India in the 1920s and 1930s 
was not a monopoly of the C.P.I. There were those in the
C.S.P., most noticeably J.P. Narayan and A.N. Dev,-who were 
essentially located towards the Marxist end of the socialist 
spectrum, Although only the C.P.I. was directly influenced 
by Moscow, Marxist thought of all brands was influenced by 
the Soviet example, and by orthodox Marxist ideology.
The first characteristic of the Marxist position tended 
to be an expectation that the revolution when it came would 
be a product of political consciousness amongst the
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industrial proletariat. In spite of the fact that the . 
revolution in Russia had not been, by any stretch of the 
Imagination, the product of outworn capitalism, it continued 
to be the orthodox Marxist line that revolution could only 
originate in the industrial sector. Secondly, .the anti­
imperialist and the class struggle were believed to be inevitably 
linked, since the interests of the exploiting classes were 
identified with those of the colonial power. This made for 
acute ambivalence, within the GPI particularly, over its 
attitude to Congress as a ” bourgeois" nationalist 
movement.^ Finally, the reconstitution of society could 
only be achieved on a macro level by the liquidation of 
capitalism and the capitalist alike, and by the totally 
common ownership of the means of production. On the Soviet 
model, agriculture too must beugroletarianised" and 
communalised by state ownership and collectivisation.
Social democracy, or democratic socialism . Social democracy 
is potentially difficult to characterise. If it is united, 
with Marxism in a belief in the inevitability of class 
conflict and the desirability of a radical restructuring 
of society, but yet it sympathises with Gandhism in its 
adherence to voluntaristic and gradualist methods, then the
124
end policy product must to s&me extent be equivocal or 
conditional. This of course is the acute difficulty which 
always faces a social democratic jiarty; namely that of how 
to implement its goals without resort to force and violence.
This dilemma also lays such a party open to the charge cf 
of not really believing in the gaols which it so earnestly 
advocates before coming to power, but which it may find itself 
powerless to implement. And in some cases this may be a 
relevant query. Indeed some social democrats may admit to 
being dubious about a radical restructuring of society in 
terms of the reorganisation of institutions and property 
relations. It could be argued that the English Eabians 
were not radicals in this respect, that writers such as Shaw 
and the- Webbs were not really advocating abrupt change of 
this kind. Social democracy, then, covers a range of positions,
from those who advocate radical reorganisation but hesitate 
to impose it, to those who merely advocate the marginal 
changes which are more.likely to be implemantable by more 
voluntaristic methods.
Within the C.S.P., Ashok Mehta and Minoo Masani were 
the most obvious representatives of the social democratic 
outlook. Mehta was an active Trade Union worker and was 
influenced by European social democratic thought (Singh 1959:
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20-1), whilst Masani had been a.t L.S.E. and had there 
acquired a generally Fabian attitude. Surely also Nehru*s 
socialism, insofar as it is categorisable, must be 
classified as social deomocratic. His ideas were modified 
with the years, but the writings and speeches of the 1930*s 
were clearly influenced by Marxist class and economic doctrine. 
Perhaps, it is true, "Marxism was too complete, too coherent 
a doctrine to contain Nehru'** and perhaps he "used its 
concepts when it suited him1* and "was a Marxist without the 
logic of Marxism'*' (Morris-Jones 1964: 211). But the Marxist 
influence was undoubtedly there. As early as 1926, with 
the formation of the Indian workers and Peasants Party in 
Bengal, as Nehru puts it '"We even tried....to draw up a 
mild Socialist progranime. We declared that the existing 
land system must go and that there should be no intermediaries 
between the State and the cultivators'" (Nehru 1958: 159).
In the 1930*s, Nehru*s espousal of Marxist-based theory 
became much more explicit. Just before the War, he wrote 
"The Marxian philosophy appeals to me in a broad sense and 
helps me to understand the processes of history...Laissez- 
faire is dead... Today the community has to be organised 
in order to establish social and economic justice. This
1ZG>
organisation is possible on the fascist basis, but this 
does not bring justice or equality, and is essentially 
unsound. The only other way is the Socialist way.
Liberty and democracy have no meaning without equality, 
and equality cannot be established so long as the principal 
instruments of production are privately owned” (1941: 117). 
Clearly Nehru at this stage regarded the nationalist 
struggle as an integral part of a fight to reconstruct 
society along Marxist socialist lines. His attitude,.to 
agriculture is revealed in a view he put forward at a 
meeting in London in 1936: 111 think that nothing short of 
large-scale collective or co-operative farming will deal 
effectively with the land question...The whole basis 
should be, in my opinion, not the profit motive, but 
producing for consumption'” (Bright 1950: 322).
These then could loosely be called Marxist aims. The 
specifically social democratic aspect is the unpreparedness 
to countenance violence in the process of achieving such 
aims. Mehta was always opposed to'Russian*tactics in the 
fight for Independence, and he and Masani were both 
leading opponents of the C.P.I. - C.S.P. United .Front 
between 1936 and 1939, and both threatened to resign from 
the Executive when Nara,yanfs list, conceding a third of
the seats to the communists, was accepted in 1938 (Singh 1959 
63-6). But the social democratic position not only rejects 
violence in the quest for power, but also in the 
implementation of 'policy. Here again, Nehru puts the case 
clearly. On the one hand he writes, nthe problem of 
achieving freedom (becomes^) one of fbvising vested interests 
in favour of the masses., " but on the other hand, mwe do not 
wish to injure any class or group, and the Cdiiresting} should 
be done as gently as possible and with every effort to avoid 
injury” (Bright 1950; 187). Much later, in fact after 
Independence and the abolition legislation, Nehru remarked 
quite consistently in the course of a speech in the U.S.A., 
”We are putting an end to the big landlord system, the 
zamindari system...We are doing it peacefully and more or 
less co-operatively, with compensation. It is rather a 
burden,the business of compensating landownefs, but anyhow 
it avoids conflict and probably is cheaper in the end”
(Norman 1965 II: 496).
Gandhian socialism. Gandhi's economic and social theories, 
or rather those which are built on Gandhian premises, can 
only be described as having conflicting implications in 
terms of the left-right political spectrum, at least if the 
use to which they have been put by successive politicians
1Z8
is anything to go by. In many ways, Gandhian ideas seem 
to have presented only obstacles and hindrances to what might 
be imagined to be socialist policies. Doctrines of class 
harmony and deferring to the interests concerned have stood 
in the way of economic regulation, as in the concession to 
the business community!s pressure for the decontrol of food 
prices in 1947, which was a major contributing factor in the 
ensuing inflation.** The theory of trusteeship was an obvious
threat to zamindari abolition, and the whole cottage industry 
obsession created obstacles in the path of large-scale 
industrialisation.
Nevertheless, there were those who managed to extract 
from Gandhism, ideas and values which could be regarded 
as an inspiration towards socialism, or which could be 
reconciled with socialist ideas from other sources. And 
perhaps this was not so difficult in the context of the 
guild-craft William Morris socialist traditiop, with which 
the Gandhian emphasis on village self-sufficiency and the 
virtues of simple production techniques has much in common. 
Also in Gandhifs ideas there was of course a supreme emphasis 
on equality and improvement in the humanitarian sense, even 
if this sometimes seemed to a frustrated Nehru more like an 
attempt to reduce the whole of society to the subsistence
1Z?
level of the peasant, rather than ah .urge? to-enable all to 
share in the material benefits of an industrialised society 
and its higher standards of living. (As Nehru wrote in 
prison in 1934, ‘"He has no desire to raise the standards of 
the masses beyond a certain very modest competence, for 
higher standards and leisure may lead to self-indulgence 
and sin" 1959: 319).
But the humanitarian elements were clear.’yhis 
commitment to the poor and underprivileged, his agitation 
on behalf of workers1 and peasants1 grievances, and above 
all, the campaign for the advancement of the Harijans.
Perhaps these elements in themselves can hardly be claimed 
as entailing a commitment to socialism. Nehru certainly
felt the label was misused in this sense. As he said of
\
Gandhi, "Sometimes he calls himself a socialist, but he 
uses the word in a sense peculiar to himself which has 
little or nothing to do with the economic frame-work of 
society which usually goes by the name of socialism.
Following his lead a number of prominent Congressmen have 
taken to the use of that word, meaning thereby a kind of 
muddled humanitarianism" (1958: 318).
But even if these attitudes themselves amounted only 
to a diluted or fringe kind of socialism, in the minds of
1J0
some they nevertheless became firmly associated with the 
label. Those who were attracted to the .socialist camp
but lacked a Marxist basis, found in the aura of village 
reconstruction an alternative vision to that of the 
collectivised centralised society* But the alternatives 
were not always as clearly divided as this, and many managed 
to subscribe simultaneously to elements of both models. ' The 
complicated fusions and allegiances are illustrated by the 
vacillations which have occurred in the careers of more than 
a few politicians, as individuals have shifted from one to 
another element in the conjunction of ideas which has 
been associated with socialism. Achyuta Patwardham, for 
instance, could have been called a Gandhian socialist in 
the 1930*s, with his theosophical upbringing and education 
at Benaras Hindu University. But he joined the G.S.P. with 
its predominantly Marxist-based economic programme, and 
left Congress with the party in 1948 (Singh 1959: 1920).
However, he finally withdrew from party politics to work 
with J. Krishna Murthy's movement for New Education. This 
must surely represent a return to the most simple level of 
humanitarian Gandhian socialism.
Purthermore, the £act,jthat parts of the Gandhian outlook 
could be allied with more orthodox socialist views seems even
to have provided a possible means of ti'ansit for some lapsed 
.socialists towards those elements in Gandhism which 
definitely worked against what might be called classical 
socialist policies. In their different ways, both Narayan 
and Masani have made this kind of transition, Harayan moving 
from an originally Marxist position to a final advocacy of 
a~factional decentralisation,^ and Masani having moved 
from a Fabian outlook to a modern anti-planning, anti-state,
pro-private enterprise position. Hence perhaps Masanifs
7
status as a Gandhian is disputable; being a Parsi and a 
"modern” man, he is unsympathetic with traditional Hindu 
institutions such as the joint family, but he is certainly 
part of the anti-centralisation nexus which derives prestige 
and impetus from the Gandhian aura. It may of course be 
simpler to say that these men have just changed camps 
completely, but the influence and availability of Gandhian 
thinking, with its ambivalent implications, may well 
facilitate the process.
Relative influence of the jstrearns of socialist thought. 
Differences of time perspective. The Gandhian wing of 
socialism has thus been the most porous and the most 
doctrinally unstable. It certainly bequeathed to Congress
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policy, insofar as socialist goals were accepted, an 
ambivalence which perhaps still persists. This was partly 
because Gandhian activities had already taken root in the 
pre-Independence period, and this in itself was a product of 
the fact that Gandhism, in terms of policy and visions of 
society, lay a.t the small-scale end of the socialist spectrum. 
The more far-reaching and large-scale were visions of the 
socialist society, the less likely were the seers of such 
visions to be able to begin to put them into practice in 
the immediate environment, and the more likely were they to 
be thrust back onto formulating slogan-governed blueprints 
whose implementation could only be deferred. This is in 
no sense an accusation of tactical ineptitude on the part 
of any particular brand of socialist thought. It is just 
an inevitable fact and one which in a sense gave the 
Gandhians an advantage, in that-their policies could take 
concrete form and become accepted as part of the means of 
political action.
!k11 this applies most acutely to rural policy. Whilst 
the communists could only formulate ultimate demands for 
abolition and collectivisation, and all their energies 
were channeled into achieving the end state, the Gandhians 
could plod steadily on with khadi and spinning and village
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reconstruction. There was of course no guarantee that the
here-and~now policy would prove to be more politically
acceptable then the construction of long-term visions, to
the rural populace themselves. There was merely a
likelihood that these methods would become established as
a political idiom enhanced by the prestige of Gandhi, and
would thus gain a footing in the attitudes of legislators
to rural policy. The Marxists could argue, as those in
the C.S.P. did, particularly after Independence, that such
methods were reactionary and only served to prop up the 
8old regime, but by then they were too entrenched and too 
much a political and ideological ’'habit*1 to be easily 
discarded. Not only were they entrenched, but there were 
other factors which were liable to reinforce their persistence. 
This leads on to the whole debate about which sectors of 
the peasantry have really benifited most from the 
i^gricultural Extension end Community Development programmes, 
whether the balance of power has really been disturbed in 
the villages, and to what extent the new programmes have 
merely provided a new currency of patronage, all questions 
which relate rather to the actual implementation of agrarian 
policy after Independence. It is sufficient to point out 
here that the more extreme was the socialist thinking before
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Independence, the less likely it was to be expressed in
concretely worked-out policies. Independence found the
more Marxist elements with more slogan than detail, and
it can be argued that the post-Independence socialism of
Congress has in some ways and for many reasons, continued
more on the level of slogan than of substance.
Engrossment with strategy. This gradation of the
concreteness of social recipes is evident in a comparison
of the records before Independence. At one end of the
spectrum, the C.P.I. was most engrossed with the question
of whether the nationalist movement should be espoused at
all. In the 1920*s, Laninfs sympathy with Asian nationalism
had led to the founding of a Par Eastern Bureau in Shanghai
to work in the colonial East. But this phase ended with
Stalin*s domination of the International and general suspicion
of ^bourgeois1" nationalist movements.^ Hence the C.P.I.
kept aloof from the civil disobedience campaigns of 1950
and 1932. This was followed by a period of cooperation and
attempted infiltration within the C.S.P. after the 7th
Congress of the Communist International in 1935 when
Dimitrov had emphasised the isolation of the colonial
communist parties. But the Communists were again isolated 
by their support for the ter effort in 1941 when the
wGermans attacked the U.S.S.R., and by their support for 
partition, influenced this time by the Soviet theory of 
nationalities.
During the War, with most of the Congress leaders in 
gaol, the C.P.I. did gain ground at the grass-roots level, 
and especially in the A.I.K.S. (Weiner 1962: 134) but this 
was not reflected in its influence on Congress policy, 
which remained minimal*
Such socialist ideas as did percolate up to the 
Congress official level were more directly due to the 
influence of the G.S.P. as a pressure group and to 
individual intellectual social democrats such as Nehru 
who exercised, power within the Congress Executive, But 
the C.S.P.’s energies and priorities also were affected 
by its concern with the relative merits of socialism and 
nationalism. In general it accepted that the nationalist 
struggle must take priority, and it was therefore not 
opposed to the main body of Congress, but it often 
showed a frustration with Congress tactics. In the Quit 
India movement of 1942, Narayan, who had always given only 
qualified support to Gandhian tactics, hoped for a violent 
revolutionary wave to overthrow imperialism, and when the 
All India Congress Committee was arrested, he andlLhhia
13&
set up a guerilla organisation known as Azad Dasta (Singh 
1959: 80-83),
Their concern with tactics was again manifest in the 
wrangles over the Cabinet Mission proposals of 1946, when 
the socialists favoured outright rejection, and they were 
also opposed to participation in the Constituent Assembly 
and the Interim Government, The correla/bion between 
adherence to Marxist economic theory and advocacy of more 
violent tactics was a gairly firm one. This meant that 
the more Marxist wing of the C.S.P. was consistently at 
odds with Congress on both counts. But of course neither 
Gandhians nor, on the whole, social democrats diverged 
from Congress on the issue of tactics, and in 1942 the 
C.S.P. gave birth to another agency called the Satyagraha 
Samiti, which disapproved of violence and which functioned 
in rivalry to the Azad Pasta.
Of all the brands of socialist thought, Marxian ideas 
were thus the least likely to gain influence in Congress, 
both because of their economic implications and because of 
their conjunction with violent tactics, and Gandhian ideas 
the most likely to gain sway because of their opposite 
attributes. Marxist and social democratic influence in 
Congress, insofar as it did grow, was likely to do so in 
spite of Gandhi*s influence. The Gandhian influence in
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Congress, as regards receptivity to Marxist-socialist ideas, 
served to reinforce the effects of its class composition.
Socialism and Congress policy.
The growth of socialism in Congress? In spite of these
inhibiting factors, to what extent had socialist ideas of 
whatever brand filtered into Congress policy by 1947? How 
successful were the various pressure groups in getting 
socialist ideas into the official doctrine? As early as 
1928 Nehru1s Independence League declared itself in favour 
of ma Social Democratic state...and State control of the 
means of production and distribution. More specifically, 
it called for steeply graduated income and inheritance taxes; 
universal, free and compusory primary education; adult 
suffrage; a minimum living wage; excess profits taxes; 
support for T.Ufs; unemployment insurance; an 8-hour work­
day; the abolition of untouchability; equal status for 
the sexes; and far-reaching land reforms - removal of 
intermediares, partial annulment of debts, creation of small- 
holdings” (Bracher 1959: 130). This was a relatively radical 
programme, but it is interesting to note that there was 
no mention of cooperative ownership and the emphasis was 
rather on peasant proprietorship.
But it was not until 1931 that any vaguely socialist 
tenets appeared in the Congress creed. The emphasis on 
economic matters in the 1920*s was limited to the boycott 
of foreign cloth, and the advocacy of spinning and khaddar. 
Bor most Congressmen, these were enough, and acceptable as 
symbols of the political motives behind the swadeshi 
movement. As Nehru said in Court in 1922, ”the salvation 
of India and of her hungry millions demands the use of the 
charkha and the wearing of khaddar1' (Gopal 1962JlG^But by 
the I930fs conflicts over the doctrinal direction of 
economic ideas were beginning to crystallise. By 1934,
those who called themselves socialists had decided it was 
necessary to band together in a distinct group, but their 
decision to remain within the confines of Congress was
symptomatic both of their desire not to detract from the 
nationalist cause and of their hope of pressing socialist 
ideas within Congress. Nehru1s importance in this respect 
was that he remained a part of the central Congress 
leadership and thus became- a mouthpiece for socialist ideas 
though he was nearly driven to resign by the ambiguity of 
the position in 1936. ^
It was an uphill fight to gain any sort of acceptance 
for Marxist-socialist ideas. Congress, under the influence
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of Gandhi and its natural middle-class inclinations, had so 
far striven £0 combine eidvocacy of social welfare measures 
with ideas of class harmony and cooperation. The Swaraj Party,
the constitutional wing of Congress which was re-established 
in 1924, had held the attitude that "On the one hand we must 
find out a way of organisation by which we can prevent the 
exploitation of labour by Capitalists or by landlords, but 
on the other hand we must be on our guard to see that these 
very organisations may not themselves be the sources of
■‘11
oppression by nursing extravagant and unreasonable demands."
The Cawnpore Congress of the following year adopted a 
Constructive Programme which "shall include the capture of 
Local Bodies, the organisation of villages, the promotion 
of education on national lines, the organisation of Labour, 
both industrial and agricultural, the adjustment of relations 
between employers and workmen, and between landlords and 
tenants; and the general advancement of the national, 
economic, industrial and commercial interests of the 
country" (Sitararaayya 1935: 499). The phrase "the adjustment 
of relations" seems a typically Gandhian one.
As Congress followed Congress, the only advance that
was made in such resolutions was that they became slightly 
more explicit about the social improvements desired. The
1928 Calcutta Resolution on s. Buture Programme, for instance? 
declared that "measures shall be taken to rid the country 
of social abuses; it will be the duty of all Congressmen, 
being Hindus, to do all they can to remove untouchability 
and help the so-called untouchables in every possible way 
in their attempt to remove their disabilities and better thei 
conditions. Volunteers shall be enlisted to take up work 
among the city labourers and in village reconstruction, in 
addition to what is being done through the spinning wheel 
and khaddar; such other work as may be deemed advisable in 
order to advance nation-building in all its departments 
and in order to enable the Congress to secure the cooperation 
in the national effort of the people engaged in different 
pursuits5" (Sitaramayya 1935; 562).
1931, however, saw the first shift in emphasis towards 
the socialist end of the spectrum, with the acceptance of
the Karachi Resolution on Pundament^l Rights. It was a 
very mild step and possibly even "This was not socialism at 
all and a capitalist state could easily accept almost 
everything contained in that resolution" (Nehru, 1958: 197).
Nevertheless, tahen together with the 1936 Lucknow 
Resolution, it was an important move in that it began to 
advocate remedies in structural terms rather than in terms
of ameliorative readjustment within the system. This is
1/H
sometimes an unclear distinction; does steeply graduated
taxation, for instance, effect a structural ehange or does 
it not? However there is clearly a difference of principle 
between "the adjustment of relations between employers and 
workmen" and "the nationalisation of key industries'".
Extracts from the Karachi and Lucknow Resolutions are given 
below:
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1951 Karachi Resolution on Fundamental Rights and the Economy. 
Taxation.
7, "The system of land tenure and revenue and rent shall 
be reformed and an equitable adjustment made of the burden 
on agricultural land, immediately giving relief to the
smaller peasantry, by a substantial reduction of agricultural 
rent and revenue now paid by them, and in the case of 
uneconomic holdings, exempting them from rent so long as 
necessary, with such relief as. may be just and necessary
to holders of small estates affected by such exemption or 
reduction in rent, and to the same'end, imposing a graded 
tax on net incomes from land above a reasonable minimum,"
mEconomic and Social Programme.
15. 5,1 The State shall own or control key industries and 
services, mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping 
and other means of public transport.
16. Relief of agricultural indebtedness and control of 
usury, direct and indirect.1'
131936 Lucknow Resolution on the Agrarian Programme.
’"Congress is of the opinion that the most important and 
urgent problem of the country is the appalling poverty, 
unemployment and indebtedness of the peasantry, funfamentally 
due to antiquated and repressive land tenure and revenue 
systems, and intensified in recent years by the great slump 
in prices of agricultural produce. The final solution of 
this problem inevitably involves the removal of British
imperialistic exploitation, a thorough change of...land 
tenure and revenue systems and a recognition by the ;State 
of its duty to provide work for the rural unemployed 
masses..."
These two resolutions provide an interesting, if 
somewhat pale, foreshadowing and echo of the C.S.P.*s 1934 
Meerut declaration, which was much more outspoken, advocating 
as it did "The socialisation of all institutions of
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production, distribution and exchange.” In the agricultural 
sphere, it supported the 11 elimination of princes and landlords 
and all classes of exploiters without compensation « and 
"the redistribution of land amongst peasants and the 
liquidation of peasant indebtedness" (Singh 1959: 29).
Reasons for the change of emphasis in Congress policy. Looked
at in relation to the C.S.P1s programme then, the Congress 
resolutions look fairly mild, but they undoubtedly represent 
a change of direction. This was the product of a combination 
of forces. First, there was the general quickening of 
interest and sympathy for economic problems and grievances 
in the era of the Depression, which made it increasingly 
clear to many that measures such as khadaar, could not 
permanently alleviate such basic distress. Furthermore,
economic demands began to be formulated in more specific 
terms by bodies such as the C.S.P. and the A.I.K.S., and
Congress was dragged in a leftwards direction in an effort 
not to be shorn of large segments of support or potential 
support. In this it was largely unsuccessful since the 
main body of Congress was unwilling to make more than token 
gestures of sympathy. Any more concrete moves such as the 
proposed group affiliation of T.U.fs and peasant 
organisations smelt too much of a take-over bid to meet the
144-
approval of the Congress right wing. But Congress was 
nevertheless left with the trappings of these left-wing 
gestures, pioneered mainly by Nehru.
There was indeed strong resentment of these tendencies, 
as the 1936 letter of threatened resignation from the 
Working Committee by Prasad, Rajagopalachari, Doulatram, 
Bajaj, Patel, ICripalani and Dev indicates. "We feel*1, they 
wrote "that the preaching and emphasising of socialism 
particularly at this stage by the President and other 
socialist members of the Working Committee while the 
Congress has not adopted it is prejudicial to the best 
interests of the country....We feel....that the Congress 
should still follow the ideals and the line of action and 
policy which it has been following since 1920 and which we 
consider to be best suited to our country particularly in 
the present conditions and which have already shown great 
results." In a second letter they added; "you have been 
acting more as the mouthpiece of the minority of our 
colleagues on the Working Committee as also in the Congress 
than as the mouthpiece of the majority which we expected 
you as Congress President to do" (Norman 1965 I: 454-5).
The 1950fs then, brought the beginning of a face-to-face 
confrontation of differing ' economic and social theories
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within Congress. Until then, the debate about economic 
policy had been sufficiently embryonic, vague and 
peripheral to the main impetus of the national movement 
for it to avoid becoming a controversial issue. The C.P.I. 
had remained quite separate and had not tried to infiltrate 
into Congress, so there was no take-over bid for Congress 
policy from that direction. There had been some early 
signs of differences of opinion, as for example between 
Hehru and Gandhi, but these had been conducted as it were 
on the side lines and between individuals. It was the 
economic climate of the 1930fs and the emergence of the 
C.S.P. that brought the debate within the era of Congress.
The last ten or so years before Independence was thus, 
from the point of view of Congress ideas on domestic policy, 
a period of more overt confrontation than any previous 
decade. By the time of Independence this had widened the 
scope of proposed policy, but it had also high-lighted a 
series of unresolved conflicts and given birth to a kind 
of pluralism of thought which issued sometimes in compromise, 
but at other times in contradiction. To some extent this 
was masked by the apparent single-mindedness of Congress 
resolutions, but sometimes even these were obvious attempts 
to encompass varying view-points.
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It is therefore easiest to look at this period in 
retrospect, rather than trying to trace the developments 
chronologically. What mattered from the point of view 
of future policy was nthe state of the parties'1 within the 
Congress doctrinal debate at the point of Independence,
It will emerge that the tensions which were evident on the 
broad policy front were reflected also in attitudes to the 
specific problem of agrarian policy.
Reasons for Congressfs plurality of policy commitments by 1947, 
There would seem to be at least four characteristics of the 
Congress debate about domestic policy in this last decade, 
First, there was the apparent shift in terms of official 
policy resolutions towards the acceptance of what sounded
like explicitly socialist measures. Secondly, this was 
undoubtedly accompanied by some degree of continued support
for Gandhian economic and social policies. To assess quite 
how widespread this was would require a detailed analysis 
of the various segments of Congress and national opinion 
during the period, but it is clear that such forces were 
strong enough to exert sufficient pressure on official 
policy for the pluralism of thought to appear not only 
lower down in the echolons but'at this higher level also.
There are two other factors which it seems feasible to
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suggest were influential during this decade, and which 
reinforced each other* First there was the beginning of a 
premonition on the part of the business community in 
particular, that the industrial growth which it was hoped 
would follow Independence would itself require or even 
engender new administrative and organisational patterns; in 
other words, the emergence of support for the whole ethos 
of rationalisation and co-ordination which, it can be argued,
is the necessary concommitant of large-scale industrial 
growth.
This is a point of major importance, for it may be 
that this development foreshadowed the tendency after 
Independence for the whole socialist debate to be swallowed
up and certainly blurred by a diffusion of attitudes which 
were themselves more the product of the modern industrial 
growth-oriented society and its offspring the welfare state, 
than of "pure” adherence to socialist ideology. This state 
of society seems to be one in which the persistence of 
capitalism leads not, as Marx envisaged, to its own demise 
via immiseration and class-consciousness on the part of the 
proletariat, but leads rather, admittedly via its own 
modification, to a certain degree of redistribution of 
income and improvement of living standards and the evolution
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of a new ethos of welfare-equality which is sufficient in 
itself to obviate strongclass consciousness and an attack 
on the capitalist system per se. If this is the case, it 
means that Marx underestimated the flexibility and 
adaptability of capitalism and the capitalist. The relevant
point here is that attitudes and attributes which might at 
first sight be regarded as socialistic may appear almost 
autonomously in the modern industrial state.
This is not just socialism in its non-doctrinaire, or 
as Apter puts it, its "set of unified development goals" 
form, for it describes an attitude which may even be 
manifested by people who deny that they are socialists.*1*^”
It is nearer, in fact, to what Apter calls "the ideology of 
science", since it appeals to the values of pragmatism and 
efficiency, but tempers them with a regard for social 
welfare.
The case can be overstated and it is certainly true 
that the development of central planning and the welfare state, 
as against laissez-faire and free enterprise, is very much 
a matter of degree, as the case of Pakistan illustrates. 
However, it seems that India is located towards the other
end of the spectrum in this respect. It remains to be seen 
from the post-Independence period to what extent this is
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attributable to the acceptance of notions about'the need 
for rationalisation .and cbeordination\in; .the modern 
industrial state, rather than to a commitment to socialist 
goals and methods. To the extent that it is the former, 
it is more likely that such attitudes will be open to 
revision in the light of experience, since they are motivated 
more by an interest in pragmatic economic efficiency in 
terms of growth, productivity and expansion, than by zealous 
adherence to ideology.
A final influence at work on Congress policy before 
Independence was almost certainly the;Wear.if a "premonition 
of rationalisation" did in fact gain ground in the 1930fs 
and early 1940fs, it must have been reinforced by the war 
period, with its rapid growth of industry and the stimulus 
which this gave towards central co-ordination and control.
The policies themselves.■
General principles. The first and most noticeable feature 
of Congress domestic policy by 1947 was, then, the apparent 
shift which had taken place in the direction of explicitly 
socialist commitments, and this as compared not only with 
the Gandhian days of the 1920fs but also as against the 
Karachi and Lucknow Resolutions. Already by 1938, only
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two years after the Lucknow controversy, the National 
Planning Committee was calmly embarking on the task of 
drawing up a ten-year national plan, and the members of this 
body, set up at the instigation of Congress, were not only 
rarified academics and idealistic intellectuals,but 
"industrialists, financiers, economists, scientists, as well 
as representatives of the Trade Union Congress and the 
Village Industries Association*" furthermore, "the non- 
Congress provincial, governments (Bengal, Punjab and Sind) 
as well., as some of the major states (Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, 
Travancore, Bhopal) cooperated with the committee" (Nehru 
1946* 336)* Twenty-nine sub-committees were appointed by 
the main Committee, eight of these being for agricultural 
problems, several concerned with industry, five for commerce,
and finance, two for transport, two for education, two for 
public welfare, two for demographic relations, and one for 
"womanfs role in a planned economy". These sub-committees 
contained in all about 350 members (Nehru 1946; 341-2).
It was this variegated body which came to the conclusion 
that■a large element of state intervention was required over 
a wide area, the focal point .for this being the statefs role 
in industry. As Nehru puts it, reporting not his own view, 
but the conclusions of the Committee, "The very essence of
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this planning was a large measure of regulation and 
co-ordination. Thus while free enterprise was not ruled 
out as such, its scope was severely restricted. In regard 
to defence industries it was decided that these must be 
owned and controlled by the state. Regarding other hey 
industries, the majority were of [the] opinion that they 
should be state-owned...Any planning would involve a close 
scrutiny of the development of industry in all its branches 
and a periodical survey of the progress made. It would mean 
also the training of the technical staffs necessary for the 
further expansion of industry" (Nehru 1946: 339-40).
Nehru goes on to say "We, or some of us at any rate, 
hoped to evolve a socialised system of credit. If banks, 
insurance etc. were not to be nationalised, they should at 
least be under the control of the state, thus leading to a 
state regulation of capital and credit. It was also 
desirable to control the export and import trade" (340).
Ill these declarations read as evidence that Congress 
at this stage and in terms of official policy, had entered 
the realm of what sounded like commitments to socialist- 
type aims, or at least aims which had been associated with
socialism and moreover with the Marxist-social democratic, 
a„s opposed to the Gandhian end of the spectrum. With this 
tendency came the inevitable concomitant of policy-goals
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formulated in terms more of ideological blueprints and 
slogans, than in terms of concrete organisation. The 
characteristics which had belonged to the parties of the 
left, the C.P.I, and the C.S.P. were now extended to Congress 
el SO.
The second feature of Congress policy in this period, 
that of the continuation of a commitment to Gandhian economic 
and social goals in some quarters, had two immediate results.
It led, on the one hand, to some attempts actually to unite 
the two types of recipes, to evolve policies which would 
reconcile the apparently conflicting aims. On the other 
hand it reinforced the likelihood, evident for imany other 
reasons, that social democratic methods would be employed 
to implement the socialist goals which were accepted, and this, 
as pointed out earlier, might well open the way for a feed­
back onto and a tempering of the original goals themselves.
The most obvious attempt to reconcile Gandhian policies 
with the official line was in terms of the large-scale 
versus small-scale industry argument. Gandhi had always 
stood for small-scale village industry. He was antagonistic 
to the vision of large-scale heavy industry and the necessity 
this would create for factory employment and urban living. 
as Nehru points out, this attitude was rooted in a particular
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kind of anger against inequality. The ™vast difference 
between the few rich and the poverty-stricken masses seemed 
to him to be due to two principal causes: foreign rule and
the exploitation that accompanied it, and the capitalist 
industrial civilisation of the West as embodied in the big 
machine. He reacted against both. He looked back with 
yearning to the days of the old autonomous and more-or-less
self-contained village community where there had been an ..automatic 
balance between production, distribution and consumption;
where political or economic power was spread out and not
concentrated as it is today; where a kind of simple
democracy prevailed; where the evils of great cities were
absent and people lived in contact with the life-giving
soil and breathed the pure air of the open spaces™ (Nehru
1946: 345).
Again, this was not just an exaggeration of Gandhifs
attitude on Nehru1s part. As late as Oct. 1945 Gandhi
wrote; ‘"Crowds of people will never be able to live at peace 
with each other in towns and palaces. They will then have
no recourse but to resort to both violence and untruth. I
hold that without truth and non-violence there can be nothing 
but destruction for humanity. We can realise truth and non­
violence only in the simplification of village life and this
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simplification can best be found in the Charka and all that 
the Oharka connotes" (Norman 1965 II: 178). And again. "No 
one can or should ride on another’s back. If we try to 
work out the necessary conditions for such a life, we are
forced to the conclusion that the unit of society should be 
a village, or call it a small and manageable group of people 
who would, in the ideal, be self-sufficient (in the matter 
of their vital requirements) as a unit and bound together 
in bonds of mutual cooperation and inter-dependence"(Nehru . 
1958b: 496).
These statements were made in the context of a 
correspondence between Gandhi and Nehru which attempted to 
resolve or clarify their differences, and Nehru was intent 
on making the incompatible elements of their attitudes 
evident. In reply to Gandhi, he wrote, "it seems to me 
inevitable that modern means of transport as well as many 
other modern developments must continue to be developed. 
There is no way out of it except to have them. If that is 
so, inevitably a measure of heavy industry exists. How far 
(will that) fit in with a purely village society?...If two 
types of economy exist in the country there should be either 
conflict between the two or one will overwhelm the other" 
(Norman 1965 II: 17 9).
But at the official level, these contradictions were 
made less apparent. The motive behind the setting up of 
the N.P.C*, for example, was that i!,as a step towards... indus­
trialisation, a comprehensive scheme of national planning 
should be formulated.” But this scheme was to provide for 
'"the development of heavy key industries, medium scale 
industries and cottage industries*’ (Nehru 1946: 337)* Prom 
the pure Gandhian point of view of course, the admission of 
such variety in itself was a major compromise, but the main 
point is that the N.P.C. as a body chose -to see no conflict 
between the various proposed scales of industry. Nehru 
in fact was later driven either to explain away Congress’s 
commitment. to cottage industry as a temporary expedient 
pending the coming of Independence and the emergence of a
national government which was free to undertake large-scale
15industrialisation, or, as he had done in the past, to
justify the adherence to cottage industry with reference to
the Chinese example and on economic grounds, which meant
that mit would be more profitable to use more labour power
and less specialised machinery*’ since ”it is better to
find employment for large numbers of people at a low income
level than to keep most of them unemployed.” ”The experience 
of China”, he wrote, ”is of inestimable value to us, and I
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am sure we can learn much from it'” (Borman 1965 II: 113).
In the long term, however, these elements were not so easily
reconciled, as the influence of the small-scale industry lobby
16and the resistance to centralised industry, has shown.
The other influence of Gandhian ideas, the reinforcing 
of a reliance on voluntaristic, consensual or social 
democratic methods, and the effect which this in turn was 
liable to have on the actual political goals themselves, is 
illustrated by the attitude to private enterprise. The N.P.C. 
clearly committed itself to the nationalisation of ”key 
industries”, a commitment specifically reaffirmed by 
Congress*s announcement immediately after Independence of 
its proclaimed goal of ”a socialist democracy in India”
(Cong. Bull. 1947: 16-21), but considerable room was left 
for the operation of free enterprise in that ”in regard to 
other important and vital industries, no special rule was
laid down1”, although ’“cooperative ownership and control 
were also suggested for industries.” finally, in all the 
commitment to nationalisation and control, there was
inevitably a large evasion of the problem of how the 
transfer of ownership and the continuing control were to be 
effected in the face of possible resistance. It was on the 
whole assumed that voluntary cooperation would be forthcoming.
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Agrarian policy. It remains to be seen how these multiple 
impulses and influences had affected Congress policy on 
agriculture by Independence.
First and foremost, the tendency towards the acceptance 
of socialist slogans, combined with the growth in receptivity 
towards central planning and co-ordination, had led to an 
extension of the nationalisation argument to land. As. Nehru 
puts it, ‘"the original idea behind the Planning Committee
had been to further industrialisation.. .But no planning 
could possibly ignore agriculture, which was the mainstay 
of the people5" (1946: 337). The N.P.C, accordingly reached 
the somewhat startling conclusion that "Agricultural land,
mines, quarries, rivers and forests are forms of national
wealth,ownership of which must vest absolutely in the people
of India collectively", and.'"the cooperative principle
should be applied to the exploitation of land by developing
collective and cooperative farms" (340), The N.P.C^s position
on agriculture was, in terms of socialist doctrine,
apparently a good deal more radical than its attitude to
industry. In laying down that "no intermediary of the type
of talukdars, zamindars, etc, should be recognised after 
the transition period was over,1} the N.P.C. was in effect 
declaring that all land should by right vest in the state
1?8
and no private leasing was to be allowed.
But once again the policy of this blueprint level 
sounded infinitely more radical than it was at the time 
in many; quarters actually conceived to be, and certainly 
more radical than it has proved to be in the event. Both 
the influence of zamindars within Congress and the influence 
of Gandhian ideas on trusteeship combined to recommend a 
comparatively respectful treatment of the zamindars. The 
logic of Gandhi*s trusteeship notion, namely that the 
possession of property and wealth was a trust that should 
be administered for the communal good, was really against 
abolition altogether. In 1934, addressing a deputation of 
large zamindars he is reported to have said ml  shall be no 
party to dispossessing propertied classes of their private 
property without just cause. My object is to reach your 
hearts and convert you so that you may hold all your 
private property in trust for your tenants and use it 
primarily for their welfare’^ Nehru 1958: 325). But assuming 
that abolition was in fact decided upon, the logical 
conclusion was that the ownership of property should be 
justly recognised by means of compensation, and this 
accorded well with a social democratic desire to secure 
the voluntary cooperation of vested interests. As Nehru
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wrote in "Towards Freedom", "Even talukdars and zamindars 
would welcome an end of the system, provided, of course, 
they got sufficient compensation therefore " (1958: 295),
Accordingly, Congress never advocated abolition without 
compensation. Nehru puts his finer on this essential general 
difficulty of what amounts to the "buying out" of vested 
interests; "Such a change" Q'the establishment of a 
socialist order...with a controlled production and 
distribution of wealth for the public goodn3 "may partly 
be forced or expedited by world conditions, but it can hardly 
take place without the willing consent or acquiescence of 
the great majority of the people concerned. They have 
therefore to be converted and won over to it... Naturally 
efforts must be made to win over even those who profit by 
the existing system, but it is highly unlikely that any 
large percentage of them will be converted" (322). The 
implication of these remarks is that such interests will 
finally have to be bribed to conform.
As with the industrial policy, the vision of agrarian 
change continued to operate on a dual plane, at one level 
paying official court to large-scale collectivisation or 
co-operativisation, and at another relying heavily on the 
ideas of village self-sufficiency and self-help, which
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were later to be embodied in the Community Development
programme. The general movement of opinion in favour of 
national coordination and even planning created a willingness 
to accept the notion of state intervention in the rural 
sector, but the manifest ambivalence between planning as an 
instrument of economic efficiency and planning as an ideological 
tool, left open the whole question of precisely what the 
nature of rural organisation was to be. Socialist slogans 
pointed to communal ownership of some variety, Gandhian 
values pointed to peasant proprietorship or even tenancy 
but with some sort.of cooperative infrastructure, and it was 
not clear where economic efficiency criteria pointed, since 
virtually no research had been done on the relative merits, 
in terms of productivity, as between tenancy, proprietorship or 
cc->operatively-owned cultivation.
Moreover, since planning was as yet such a vague concept, 
and since the motives for its advocacy were considerably 
mixed, it was highly unclear how the whole rural sector was 
to be integrated into the national economy. The galaxy of 
problems concerned with the relative priorities of industrial 
and agricultural production, and the possibility of draining 
off a rural surplus to subsidise industrial development-,
could hardly be dealt with or even conceived, in the context
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of 1938 or the years immediately after. But the conflicts 
and difficulties created by these ambiguities of commitment 
as between the various schools of socialist and non-socialist 
thought within Congress, were to become amply evident after 
Independence. The years after Independence brought exigencies 
of their own, but they also highlighted these earlier 
Ambivalences and vaguenesses.
Conclusion: socialism and its role.
In general,then, it seems too simple to describe 
socialism as either nationalism converted into a concrete 
recipe for development, or as an ideological theme which 
necessarily subserved the same unifying and solidarity- 
promoting functions as nationalism appeared to do. These
s t
aspects may well apply muOh more aptly to socialism as 
employed by an independent government faced with concrete 
organisational problems.. They draw attention to the 
manipulative and mobilisational aspects of ideology.
Insofar as the role of Congress as an organised movement 
with specific goals did affect the nature of ideological 
tendencies in the pre-Independence period, the main product 
seemed to be a tactical placing of emphasis on the need for
unity, and therefore, a playing down or a resisting of
emergent socialism. Internal conflicts and the future 
division of domestic resources were problems which were 
constantly being pushes into the background. That socialist' 
sounding doctrines did emerge at all was certainly due 
partly to the increasing imminence of Independence and the 
consequent need to face precisely these problems. But it 
was also due to the divisions of interest and more strident 
demands which were beginning to become evident within 
Congress during the 1930's and which presented a challenge 
to the traditional nationalist emphasis on unity. If
socialism did not become manifestly divisive or conflict-
producing in this period, this was mainly because the
impetus of nationalism continued to predominate, rather
than because socialism inherited its unity-promoting role. 
Bfctt the divided nature of socialist counsels themselves,
together with the ambiguities of policy-intentions produced
by the conflict between socialist, Gandhian and conservative
elements in Congress, all gave evidence of probable future
conflict in the period after Independence, and it is with
this period that the subsequent chapters will be concerned.
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NOTBS. Chapter 3.
1. The case of Tanzania is an interesting one. The T.A.
N.U. wCreedifl and the Arusho Declaration of 1967 do set forth 
specific economic tenets in that they describe one of the 
principal aims of the party as being ;,,to see that the 
Government exercises effective control over the principal 
means of production and pursues policies which facilitate 
the way to collective ownership of the resources of this 
country.”* (j) But this socialist creed also contains the 
objective "'To cooperates with all political parties in Africa 
engaged in the liberation of all Africa'15 (d), and "’To see 
that the Government cooperates with other States iij Africa 
in bringing about African Unity,(k). The economic policy 
advocated is also heavily geared to the goal of achieving 
self-reliance through renouncing foreign aid, for 
"’Independence cannot be real if a Kation depends upon gifts 
and loans from another for its development.tn
2. In 1962, for example, Indian Pinanee wrote that
"The Swat antra Party has travelled a long way since the days 
when Planning was anathema to its founding fathers. Since 
then, the Party has learnt at the hustings that a Plan for 
economic development is an essential ingredient of an
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election manifesto11 (Sap. 8th, 1962).. This remark was 
provoked by Swatantra’s setting up a Working Group under 
Lobo Prabhu, of the Forum for Free Enterprise, to draw up 
a "counterblast to the 3rd Five Year Plan." But the "plan" 
in fact included such measures as greater freedom for private 
enterprise, tax reduction, and the denationalising of state 
enterprises.
3. The Communist Party had no doubts about the political 
complexion of Gandhism. As Overstreet and Windmiller put 
it, KS&ndhism was both theoretically reactionary and 
tactically menacing to the Communists" (1951: 509). The only 
doubt lay in identifying Gandhi*s class affiliation. In 
1929, a Russian Encyclopaedia, (citing M.N. Roy ,and' Palme 
Dutt), referred to Gandhi as a "spokesman of petty- bourgeois 
ideology" (513). But an article in 1 Communist International1 
in 1933 stated that "Gandhism... is the philosophy of the 
bourgeoisie and the landlords" (514).
4. Initially the C.P.I., and particularly Roy, actually 
took a more purist line than Moscow. In 1920, Lenin’s draft 
on colonial policy for the 2nd Congress of the Comintern 
referred to"the necessity of all Communist Parties to 
render assistance to the bourgeois-democratic liberation 
movement in such countries", whilst Roy’s view was reported
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as being tha/t "the Communist Party of India must devote 
itself exclusively to the organisation of the broad 
popular^masses for the struggle for the class interests of 
the latter ” (Overstreet and Windmiller 1959: 28). In 1928, 
however, the outlooks converged when the Report on the 
colonies at the 6th Comintern Congress spoke of the ^national 
reformist’' and the anti-proletarian policy of the Indian 
bourgeoisie. When the Comintern again changed course in 1955, 
under the threat of German fascism, the C.P.I. this time 
conformed with Moscow*s view and supported bourgeois collaboration
and infiltration,
5. See: Chapter 4 below.
6. Morris-Jones suggests that in Narayan's later position, 
’’Marx, Rousseau and Ghandi are all discernible as influences** 
(1964: 215). Narayan*s vision of the remodelled political 
society is described in his booklet *A plea for reconstruction 
of Indian polity.* '”The foundation of this polity,” he says, 
'■’...must necessarily be self-governing, self-sufficient, agro­
industrial, urbo-rural, local communities'” (85).
7. However in 1962, in discussing whether Swatantra was 
aptly described as a conservative party, Masani said: ”1 think 
a more accurate description of the Party would be to say
it is liberal and Gandhian. The policy of minimum 
government and of maximum individual liberty comes directly
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from Gandhijifs teaching” (Masani 1962: 10).
8. The P.S.P. itself instituted a rural work programme 
with the slogan "Ek Ghanta Desh Ko", which advocated helping 
villagers build roads, bunds, wells, etc., and also held
a Village Reconstruction Conference in Bihar in February,
1957. But, "ever since the birth of the C.S.P., the
Marxist majority in the Party had regarded the constructive 
village programme of Mahatma Gandhi as essentially "reactionary”., 
they were quite opposed to the adoption of Gandhian techniques, 
because they regarded them as basically non-socialist in 
character"(Singh 1951: 110).
9. Overstreet and Windmiller quote an "Open letter to 
Indian youth, workers and peasants" which was published in 
the Soviet paper, fImprecor' in 1950, which stated that 
"the National Congress...actually retards the revolutionary 
movement" (140).
10. In a letter to Gandhi, Nehru wrote "my approach, 
mild and vague as it was, is considered dangerous and 
harmful by my colleagues. I was even told that my laying 
stress on the poverty and unemployment in India was unwise,,. 
Presumably the result of this will be that i shall retire 
and a more homogeneous committee will be formed" (Norman 
1965 I: 459).
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11. From a statement of 1924-, by R.C. Das and Motilal
Nehru (Sitaramayya 1935: 462).
12* The Karachi Resolution is quoted in full in Norman
1965 Vol.l; 248-251.
13. Quoted in Nehru 1941: 408-9.
14. V.K. Narasimhan represents this position well. 1 If
we substitute for the word Socialism1, fmass welfare*, it 
is easy to see that the combination of technology and 
democracy has transformed almost all the Western democracies 
into Welfare States,...Even more significant is the built-in 
inarch toward greater equality that is inherent in a society 
in which mass production is intimately linked up with mass 
consumption.*1 (19). He goes on to suggest of the Indian case 
particularly, "it is clear that the complexity of a modern 
technological economy does call for a good deal of social 
regulation. * But "much more perhaps than state regulation 
what we shall be needing in an increasingly complex economy 
is what Gandhiji advocated as the principle of trusteeship."
15. Nehru is quoted by Hanson as arguing to the N.P.C. 
that "Congress considered it unnecesaary to push large-scale 
industries through its organisation and left this to the state 
as well as to their own resources...Now that the Congress is
to some extent, identifying itself with the state, it cannot
ignore the question of establishing and encouraging large- 
scale industries" (1966: 33).
16. For evidence of this, see Chapter 5, note 12 below.
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C H A P T E R  4
Ideology and policy in the first period after Independence
1947 was, from any point of view, a crucial landmark 
in India's development. In terms of self-government the 
dividing-line was admittedly somewhat blurred since what 
had really taken place was a protracted process rather 
than one single event: a process which extended from
the early reforms to the election of provincial governments 
and finally to the Interim and then the fully independent 
National Government. Even so, the actual event of 
Independence was a crucial divide, not least in terms of 
the development of ideology. This was the psychological 
moment, the fulfilment of the ambition which had been 
Congress's one dominant and professed goal. Independence 
removed at the same time both the immediate driving force 
for Congress as a political organ, and the main focus of 
opposition. All the domestic policy issues which had 
perforce been regarded as peripheral, even though some 
groups and individuals had attempted to make them less so, 
became central and imperative. It is important to con­
sider how this "shock" affected the nature and role of 
ideology.
1 Jo
The complementarity of the various theories of ideology.
The effect of looking at the main pre-Independence 
areas of ideological debate, has been to suggest, or 
perhaps to confirm, that none of the individual explanatory 
approaches to ideology specified in Chapter I, can serve 
to provide an adequate coverage of the changing nature 
and role of ideology and its relation to policy intentions 
in the various phases of Congress development* Social 
psychological theories are useful in helping to account 
for the appeal of nationalism in specific situations* But 
they are vague about the boundaries at which nationalist 
sentiments will settle, and they can hardly bring any 
evidence to bear, either for or against, in the debate 
about nationalism as a possible vehicle for elite ambit­
ions. With this level of possibility interest theory 
deals well, and it certainly produces concrete suggestions 
about the relation of class interest to successive phases 
of Indian nationalism. But it, in turn, fails to account 
for the nature of Congress as a strategic movement and 
for the subtler influences which tactical considerations 
might have exercised. Again, this is something which 
functional social psychological theories do hint at, for, 
as in Apter*s account, they tend to stress the effects 
of ideology, perhaps at the e^ense of its content. This, 
however, seems an inadequate approach without an elabora-' 
tion of the manipulative aspects of ideology, which
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turns attention back again to power theories.
Combinations of theories, and ideal-types. It thus becomes 
apparent that these various approaches, far from being 
mutually-exclusive rivals, may more often be complementary. 
They may represent many aspects of the total situation 
or they may be dissected and their constituent elements 
combined to produce ideal-types for the phases of a 
society*s development over time. At one stage, for 
instance, it may be most appropriate to think of the going 
body of ideology as the sum of demands being made on 
a central authority. In such a situation, there will be 
secondary aspects of ideology to be investigated, such as 
the degree of its cohesive effects, the interest content 
of the demands made, and the way in which the demands 
themselves may be modified by being linked to the goal- 
oriented strategy of an organisation or movement.
Schurmann, in his study of ideology in China, suggests 
that "there are ideologies of organisation in addition 
to those of classes and individuals." He goes on to 
argue that organisationas such "must have a body of 
ideas that is explicitly goal-oriented and teleological", 
and that organisational ideology is "a systematic set of 
ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creat­
ing and using organisations" (1966: 18-9)* This may
apply to governments, considered as organisations, but 
it applies particularly to movements with specific 
strategies and aims whose ideologies themselves constitute 
a set of demands on the central authority*
At another stage of historical development, however, 
circumstances may arise such that the central authority 
becomes more powerful and itself could be described as 
dominating the situation through its role as a generator 
or disseminator of ideology, and hence as an imposer of 
policy on the nation at large. This is the kind of 
configuration of influences which becomes a possibility 
in the Indian context after Independence. Whether or not 
such a situation can be said to have actually materialised 
must be the subject-matter of this chapter and the next.
Finally, at some stages and in some conditions, a 
national polity may be most adequately described as a 
bargaining ground for interest groups with ideological 
formulations expressing the interests of each. In this 
situation, as in the previous one, a major secondary 
consideration will be the way in which the nature and the 
current role of ideology, and particularly of "embedded 
ideology" or "basic political norms" in Apter1s sense, 
sets constraints on the range of possible policy decisions.
This serves to stress the point that the role of
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Ideology itself must be borne in mind even whilst substantive 
ideological themes are being examined for the light which 
they throw on the conflicts and uncertainties which 
occurred within Congress, both vis a vis its own goals 
and in relation to the rest of the country* Each phase 
of political development and policy formation, both 
before and after Independence, includes ideology as an 
active ingredient, whether more as cause or product 
remains to be decided.
The State of Congress Ideology at Independence.
To return then, to the substance of ideological 
debate and conflict at Independence: the broad themes
of nationalism, socialism and Gandhism have served to 
identify particular ranges of political issues and the 
problems which they raised, in relation especially to 
agrarian policy. These issues can now be summarised 
before attention is turned to post-Independence develop­
ments.
The main issue which was raised by the growth of 
nationalism was the difficult and recurrent one of whose 
interests were being served by the movement for Inde­
pendence and in whose name self-government was being 
advocated. The origins of Congress clearly suggest 
that the earliest goal was the displacement of one 
elite, the colonial one, by another elite, the native
middle-class and educated one. Prom the 1920's on, 
there was an ostensible change in that the movement 
became more broadly-based, more socially inclusive and 
more popular in image. But the leadership continued 
to be firmly middle-class, and this was reflected in 
Congress attitudes over a range of issues; in its fear 
of being too firmly tied to the peasant movements and 
the Trade Unions, and in its reluctance to be drawn away 
from its traditional adherence to paternalistic welfare 
measures and into the dangerous waters of structural 
reform as applied to social and economic institutions.
A logical outcome of this situation was the 
emphasis on conciliation, national unity and a humani­
tarian populism which was the dominant note of Congress 
ideology before the C.3.P. began to make the socialist 
voice more trenchantly heard, and perhaps even after 
this too. Socialism or a quasi-socialism, did make 
inroads into Congress in the 1930's and 1940's but, 
insofar as it reached official policy level, it did so 
without ever e:xplicitly facing the problem of basically 
conflicting interests which socialism necessarily 
implies. It seems to have been assumed for instance, 
that industry would be a fairly willing partner to a 
degree of central planning, whilst the main proposals 
for agrarian reform were in a sense a special case
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since they were on the whole supported by the sentiments
of nationalism itself, in that the zamindars had come to
be identified as bastions of the colonial regime.
Divergences of interest clearly existed, as the conflicts
of the Kisan Sabhas with the Congress provincial ministries
showed, but these remained fairly submerged and were
increasingly masked in the 1940fs both by the greater
absorption of Congress energies in the concrete task of
negotiating independence, and presumably also because
explicit conflict became more and more cannalised into
1religious bitterness.
The issues brought into play by socialist debate then, 
were precisely those from which nationalism tended to 
distract attention, namely the whole problem of how 
society and its institutions were to be reformed when 
independence was achieved, and how much redistribution 
of property, if any, was to be attempted. Within the 
compass of socialist thought there was the inevitable 
divergence of views about what remedies should be applied 
and by what methods, the more humanitarian, gradualist 
and social democratic being at odds with the more 
extreme and doctrinaire. This divide in turn drew 
attention to the fact that the more left-wing socialist 
groups, and this applied to Congress insofar as it accepted
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relatively left-wing measures, could only formulate 
plans in broad slogan terms, whilst smaller-scale less 
radical policies, such as the humanitarian Gandhian 
ones, could begin to be implemented in the immediate 
situation. Again, the formulation of socialist policies 
was further complicated or confused by the persistence 
of support for Gandhian economic ideas, and the necessity 
this created for an attempt to amalgamate the two types of 
policies.
Finally, the emergence of apparently socialist 
attitudes in Congress was certainly influenced by a 
growing desire for economic development, especially as 
this became more emphatically a part of the vocabulary 
of international prestige. What has here been called a 
"premonition of rationalisation", which implied on 
the part of industry a willingness to consider techniques 
of planning, was not necessarily a commitment to 
socialism, but rather the beginnings of a search for the 
best recipe for economic growth*
Possible future developments. These then are the issues 
which came within the compass of these ideological debates, 
and they describe some of the ambiguities, uncertainties 
and inconsistencies which were a feature of declared 
Congress policy at the time of Independence. The questions
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which they suggest as being crucial to the course of 
events after 1947 are, first of all, what would happen to 
the relative unity which had prevailed within Congress; 
was it likely that Independence would bring a splaying 
out of interests and a new vociferousness of interest 
groups, whether on a class, occupational or regional basis? 
Since Independence represented the final withdrawal of an 
old elite, and the consequent availability of positions 
of authority and control of resources, was a greater clamour 
of sectional claims to be expected?
The second suggested query would seem to be, what 
would happen to the official, but vague socialistic Congress 
policy plans when the party was faced with the concrete 
exigencies of government? On the one hand,- could the more 
doctrinaire commitments be translated into legislation, 
and, on the other, could the alliance between these and the 
more Gandhian-influenced ideas, continue to seem viable?
Finally, to what extent would the formulation of 
policy be affected by the whole paraphernalia of economic 
techniques and the need for rational co-ordination in an 
industrial society? Would the arena of economics, both 
academic and applied, infiltrate its own value premises 
into policy-making, or would economics merely provide 
another level, an extension -of the ideological one, at
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which the same kinds of conflicts could he fought out?
If these are the questions which raise themselves most 
obviously in the context of the transition to independence, 
and in the light of the path by which Independence had 
been reached, it is clear that the answers to them must 
be inter-related ones. They deal with a series of 
connected variables. For instance, the ambiguities and 
shifts in content of official policy will clearly be 
dependent to some extent on the strength of pressure groups 
and hence their ability to forestall or dilute unwelcome 
legislation. But the strength of such groups will 
iJsself be affected by the relative security and unity of 
the Government and its consequent ability to take initiatives. 
At this point the ability of the Government to use ideology 
as a tool for ordering priorities and even redefining 
situations-;.., may be very important, though it must be 
noticed that the degree and intensity of the Governments 
"output" of ideology is not necessarily an index of its 
real ability to impose priorities in this way. In some 
circumstances, a frenzy of ideological profession may 
indicate a position of defensiveness and weakness, an 
attempt to cling to professed but threatened goals which 
manifests itself in "protesting too much". So we may 
expect to find feed-backs and chain reactions between
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the relative strengths of Government and interest 
groups, which will both affect the explicit ideology and 
also itself be expressed through ideological debates.
Congress, ideology and policy after Independence: three phases
As noted earlier, by the mid-40fs Congress had arrived 
at a position in which it was relatively identified with 
socialistic policies. Against resistance from the right 
wing and against the primary impetus of Congress as a movement., 
commitments had been made to tenets of domestic policy 
which were not merely describable as necessary outcomes 
of the nationalistic movement as such. This had come 
about mainly at the initiative of the C.S.F. and Nehru, 
who themselves certainly did see a close connection 
between socialism and the fight against colonialism. 
Nevertheless, whatever the causes, the Congress domestic 
policy position by Independence was apparently a relatively 
doctrinaire one, committed as it was to central planning, 
nationalisation, zamindari abolition and land reform.
The fate of these policy commitments and the fate of 
Congress as an initiator of policy must be examined in 
relation to the inter-related factors mentioned above.
From this point of view, the post-Independence 
period seems to fall naturally into three phases, the first 
extending to the mid-50fs and in which a multitude of 
factors conspired to sap the Government1s initiative
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fairly drastically. The pressure of external circum­
stances served to reinforce the inhibiting factors 
within Congress, in terms of policy ambivalence and 
factional disunity, and the whole period was consequently 
somewhat of a holding operation. (This is not to say that 
there were not large areas of Government legislative 
initiative and reorganisation. There certainly were, but 
those measures which won through had, as it were, to be 
filtered through various nets before they emerged. In 
some ways this was less crucial for agriculture than for 
industry, since more innovations could be made in the rural 
sector without irrevocable long-term commitments. In 
other words, the first stages of land reform could be 
embarked on, and obviously remedial steps could be taken, 
without this involving a firm commitment to long-term 
aims. This was in general less true of industry.
The mid-50's presents itself as the beginning
of another phase, because it was at this point that
there was an apparent upsurge in Congress's ideological
determination or initiative; a new spurt of socialism
was explicitly injected into policy statements and
seemed to find its way into actual policy, most
2
noticeably in the 2nd Plan, the 1955-56 Budget and 
the 2nd Industrial Policy Resolution. To what . .
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extent this represented a real shift in Congress policy 
emphasis is perhaps debatable, but it certainly looked 
like one, and was taken as such by potentially dissident 
elements both inside and outside Congress* By 1959 
and the Fagpur Resolution on co-operative farming, such 
elements were ready to make the apparent increase of applied 
socialism in Government policy the immediate justification 
for attempting to gather together a new and more cogent 
opposition*
This in turn can be held to mark the beginning of a 
phase leading to the electoral decline of the 1960*s, 
during which Congress has been put back firmly onto the 
defensive. Again, external events have played their 
part and have certainly contributed to the grind-down in 
the impetus of planning and the still-birth of the 4-th 
Plan. But the fanning out of interests has also played 
its part. From here onwards this chapter will be concerned 
with the first phase after Independence* The next 
chapter will deal with the second and third phases.
Congress, ideology and industry up to 1955*
These three phases may be cited as marking the rise and 
fall in Congress strength and fortunes. They also seem 
important from the point of view of the course of policy in 
both the agricultural and the industrial sectors. A brief
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survey of industrial policy will serve to sketch in 
the background against which agrarian developments 
occurred.
As far as industry was concerned, the two major events 
in this first period were the industrial policy announced in 
194*8* and, in 1950, the setting up of the Planning Commission, 
followed in the next two years by the 5-y©a^ Plan Outline,
The main characteristic of these two moves was that neither 
represented a really large-scale or radical step, as com­
pared with the type and scope of policy to which Congress 
was apparently committed at Independence, Since as early 
as 1951? it had been pledged to a policy of state owner­
ship or control of key industries, and in the immediate 
post-Independence situation of January, 194*8, the 
Economic Programme Committee of Congress set down the general 
lines of recommended policy, This was to include the 
nationalisation of public utilities and all defence and key 
industries, the public ownership of monopolies, the 
dismantling of the management agencies, and a maximum 
profit on venture capital of 5% (Charka II, 4-: 5),
But when the Government * s policy was actually 
announced in April of the same year, it turned out to be 
a very pale reflection of these principles# Only three ‘ 
industries were to be publicly owned; munitions,i
atomic energy and railways. In six others the Government
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reserved tlie right to undertake new investment, but the 
existing plant was to remain free from government 
control. Nationalisation was to be postponed for at 
least ten years, and as the Hindustan Times reported,
"the rest of the industrial field will normally be left 
open to private enterprise" (Hindustan Times, 8th April, 
1948),
At this point, Nehru developed a theory of what 
Brecher calls "socialisation of the vacuum" (1959• 512), 
according to which state initiative would be taken in areas 
as yet unexploited by private enterprise. This could be 
justified by arguing that such areas were likely to be 
ones in which private and social benefit and incentives 
did not tally since the profit margin might be initially 
low and the pay-off period lengthy. But radicals both 
in and out of Oongress were-intensely disappointed with 
the minimalness of the reorganisation and with what they 
regarded as the.sweeping concessions to private enterprise .
Congressfs commitment to planning did not begin to 
be implemented until 1950, and then partly under the 
influence of a report by Nehru's personal economic 
adviser of the time, an American, Solomon Trone. The 
setting up of the actual machinery of planning was a very 
important achievement, creating a considerable potential 
for the future, but the first Plan itself was:*.not very
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ambitious. It was of fairly small proportions and 
certainly did not concentrate on heavy industry. It 
was in fact "hardly a plan" but more "an amalgam of 
specific projects" (Brecher 1959: 521).
Constraints on policy. Why then was there this immed­
iately obvious and somewhat blatant contrast between the 
policy pronouncements before and after Independence, 
and the policies pursued up to the mid-50's? The 
hesitancy and moderation of policy is in many ways not 
surprising, given the events of these years. It would 
perhaps have been more une:xpected had the Government 
succeeded in approaching more closely the pre- 
Independence plans. The initial catastrophe, against 
which the Industrial Policy of 194*8 was formulated, was 
the chaos and violence of Partition and the rioting and 
mass migration which followed. This in turn was 
succeeded by the Kashmir dispute. The period of 194-7 
to 194-9 was inevitably a time of threatened economic 
crisis, when fears began to mount that a false step could 
send the economy totally out:of balance.
So the political and resource constraints were 
very real ones. For instance, Brecher suggests that one 
obvious reason why more widespread nationalisation was 
impossible was solely the non-availability of an
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adequate bureaucratic framework and the requisite number 
of trained personnel (1959: 11-2). But there were
other constraints besides the turmoil created by 
Partition and the scarcity of resources, constraints 
which were located more obviously within Congress itself. 
First, there was the old ambivalence about methods, 
compounded of a social democratic belief in voluntarism, 
and a Gandhian emphasis on conciliation, both ideological 
elements which were obvious candidates for natural selec­
tion in a situation which reduced the power of the 
Government to introduce major changes anyway. Con­
gress's declarations in support of nationalisation had 
not included clauses about how this was to be achieved 
in the face of resistance. When it came to the point, 
this meant there was hardly a real choice to be made 
between commandeering industry or adopting a 
gradualist and compromise approach, quite apart from 
the exigencies of the national situation.
As for Gandhian conciliation, the incident of the 
194*7 price controls was a revealing one. The Commodity 
Prices Board, which included the well-known economist 
Prof. Gadgil, recommended the retention of controls on 
food and other essential consumer goods as a vital 
preventive measure against runaway inflation. However,
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voices within industry strongly contested this policy, 
and Gandhi swayed the argument in their favour "by 
pronouncing that Cabinet Ministers should not assume 
greater knowledge than "those experienced men who do not 
happen to occupy ministerial chairs, but who hold the 
view strongly that the sooner the controls are removed, 
the better" (Karaka 1950: 220). The removal of
controls did lead to spiralling inflation and in a few 
months the general price level rose by 30% (Brecher 
1959: 510).
The battle over price controls highlights another 
element in the situation, namely the vociferousness of 
vested interests and, in particular, the business 
community. As Brecher puts it, "Independence brought 
to the fore myriad sectional interests which had been 
submerged in the communal.;- struggle for freedom" (1959:
509). As suggested earlier in the context of nationalism 
the whole logic of the independence fight had. tended to 
distract attention from the distributional problems of 
domestic politics.
Before Independence, industry had been relatively 
docile. A number of industrialists had cooperated with 
the National Planning Committee in its pre-War sittings and. 
though there had been no unanimity on basic principles,
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a large element of government control over industry 
had been generally agreed* In 1944 moreover a group of 
industrialists had drawn up and published the Bombay Plan/*" 
envisaging the development of large-scale industrialisa­
tion* However, this may be seen as an attempt to fore­
stall socialistic central control rather than to anticipate 
it* It seems that industry, which had of course developed 
relatively rapidly during the War, only began to grapple 
with the prospect of state control when it became an 
immediate threat in the guise of Nehru1s premiership 
and the feared onset of socialism. This manifested itself 
in a crisis of business confidence or a "strike of capital”, 
which brought the economy to a standstill in the period 
before the announcement of the Governments Industrial 
Policy in 1948 (Brecher 1959 • 5'10). The threat became 
evident that industry in the future was likely to use its 
sanctions in opposing any drastically socialist proposals, 
a situation which again could only have been circumvented 
by the impracticable strategy of a total Government 
takeover of the main industries.
The Congress right wing* Another aspect of this particular 
expression of sectional interests, and one which is typical 
of this first decade after Independence, was that opposition 
to Congress policies did not come from a formally separate
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camp. Sardar Patel, then Home Minister, was a constant 
rival to Hehru during this period and frequently functioned 
as a spokesman for the business community. He had, for 
example, given full backing to the 1947 drive against price 
controls. In fact up to his death in 1950, he provided a 
general rallying point for the Congress right wing, and 
this in itself draws attention to a point of major import­
ance for Congress policy during the period; many of the 
rightist elements which were later to realign themselves 
in Swatantra or the constellation of smaller parties which 
Swatantra progressively absorbed, were at this stage still 
contained within Congress. As Erdman says of the period 
before 1959 > "We may ask those who emphasise the weakness of 
the Indian right, how many Conservative parties does India 
need? The contemporary Congress is quite enough to satisfy 
a good many Conservatives, and some of those whom it did not 
satisfy still remained in the party, paying lip service to 
socialism and boring from within, because of Fehrufs 
commitment to socialist positions and because of the appar­
ent futility of fighting him openly1 (1967: 60-1).
The separate parties which did spring up in this period 
tended to be local and specific, and did not represent a 
general rallying of conservative forces* The one exception 
to this was perhaps the Jan Sangh, founded in 1951 by
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S.P. Hookerjee, an ex-member of the cabinet. But its
over-riding raison d fetre was the religious issue and Hindu
nationalism. Its economic policy is in fact mixed and
pragmatic, and it even advocates the nationalisation of key
industries (Erdman 1967: 54*.).^ It aims at lower middle
class support rather than the mass backing of industrial
interests. But in any case its showing at the 1952 and
1957 elections indicated that it was not seriously siphoning
6off support from Congress and it was certainly not a 
magnet for middle-of-the-road conservatives, but rather for 
religious extremists. It left a good segment of right wing 
opinion within the ranks of Congress.
The moderateness of the 194-8 industrial policy was not 
the only evidence of the strength of the right wing. It 
manifested itself also in the debates on a range of issues, 
such as, for instance, the 1950 Hindu Code Bill, which was 
introduced by Nehru but seriously whittled away in the 
process of legislation. Erdman argues that the political 
complexion of later defectors from Congress is further 
evidence of the strength of the right. The left had made a 
major move of self-assertion in the 1950fs and this was the 
basis for the emergence of the Praja Socialist Party and 
the final break with Congress in 194-8. There were some 
slight moves towards reconvergence subsequently in the
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form of the Ashok Mehta argument for coalition and reduced 
7opposition, but this proved to be a passing phase and did 
not affect the continuing distinctness and independence of 
the P.S.P. By contrast, there had been no such major 
exodus of right-wing opinion, and so the potential existed 
for a series of later rightist splinterings. In the first 
decade of Independence, however, such congeries of opinion 
remained entrenched within Congress, and this undoubtedly 
chipped away at Congress unanimity and dissipated much of 
the eagerness for implementing earlier policy statements.
Congress, ideology and the rural sector in the early 1950*s.
The same kinds of situational constraints as were 
cited in the case of industrial policy had their effect also 
on the development of agrarian policy, thus reinforcing the 
impression that this period amounted more to a holding oper­
ation than to one in which coordinated strategy for the 
whole of the economy could be formulated. Any major rural 
reorganisation was put out of court in the immediate future 
by the disruption of Partition. As V.P. Pande says, of the 
1952 scheme for community development, nThe programme could 
hardly have been launched earlier as just after independence 
all the resources of the Government were mobilised for post­
partition reconstruction, especially for the rehabilitation
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of refugees from Pakistan. It was only in September, 1952, 
that the Central Minister in charge of Displaced Persons 
from Pakistan could say that the 'culminating task of re­
habilitating the displaced persons has been reached'”
(1967s 167)* Furthermore, conditions of food shortage and 
inflation had continued up to and beyond the 194*9 cease­
fire in Kashmir^, partly because of the effects on prices 
of the Korean War. This combination of factors could be 
cited as a deterrent against the launching of any major 
agrarian reform.
But once again, the difficult economic and military 
situation only served as a reinforcing factor for the 
ambiguities and imprecisions of Congress policy aims. The 
main points of commitment at Independence were to "a thorough 
revision of the system of land tenure1 (1956 Lucknow Reso­
lution), cooperative farming (Report of the H.P.C.), and the 
abolition of zamindari with partial compensation (194-6 
Election Manifesto). These were aims which had been acquired 
somewhat haphazardly and in response to a variety of pressures, 
rather than by a process of logical accumulation. The 
measures proposed were thus a mixture of extended traditional 
remedies and of new, more radical solutions. Zamindari 
abolition was ambivalent in this respect, in that it could 
partly be seen as fitting into the trend of earlier demands
192
and legislation, and partly as a completely new departure*
In the last decade before Independence, the trend of 
rural legislation, even under the Congress ministries, had 
still been very much in the remedial tradition, with the 
emphasis on rent control and increasing security of tenure. 
There was a sense in which zamindari abolition represented 
merely the ultimate degree of security of tenure since it 
meant that most holders would now become the direct and pro­
tected tenants of the state. In the context of the 1950's 
and 194*01 s therefore, all forms of peasant grievance seemed 
to lead eventually, by a kind of inevitable logic, to the 
ultimate demand for zamindari abolition. Grievance with 
the levels of rent, together with frustration at the lack of 
security and even the maldistribution of land, could all be 
pinned onto the zamindari system itself, and this was all the 
more effectively a point of focus because the modern system 
was directly attributable to the British. It could be 
argued that "the British system of 1772 onwards meant prac­
tically the farming out of not only the revenue, but also 
the land itself" and that "some writers have regarded this 
as amounting to the confiscation of the peasants' proprietary 
rights on a scale the world had never seen "(Driver 194-9 •* 56). 
A final reason for the odium inspired by the zamindars as a 
class, or at least by the large zamindars, was the fact that
19?
they were -visible allies of the contemporary colonial 
regime •
But on the other hand, zamindari abolition could be 
justified as a component of a more radical approach in 
that it sought to undermine "feudal" power, and to remove 
the profit-making, or exploitation, potential of private 
property rights in land. In this light, it was more akin 
to the policy goals of land nationalisation, cooperativis- 
ation or even collectivisation, elements which derived their 
impetus from a rather different source and which fell into 
an ideological camp which was distinct from that of earlier 
legislation, Whereas rent control and tenure reform and 
even zamindari abolition could be classed as remedial-social* 
justice or humanitarian types of measure, the advocacy of 
cooperative, and to an even greater extent, collective, 
farming was a step into quite other territory, since it 
represented a solution in terms of a reorganisation of the 
whole institutional framework. Perhaps these were policies 
which were less ideologically specific than they at first 
seemed, since they could be advocated on the grounds of any 
one of the variations of socialist and Gandhian thought 
which were in evidence in India at the time. But it was 
nevertheless a type of policy which represented a break with 
the earlier trends of legislation and it was this element
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in Congress policy which was therefore likely to provide 
the largest test of determination and consistency for the 
new Government, on the criterion of adherence to previous 
policy pledges. Cooperativeisation was to the agrarian 
sector as nationalisation was to the industrial. Would it 
therefore be the case that agrarian socialistic aims would 
issue in a compromise similar to that embodied in the 194-8 
industrial policy?
Continuation of ideological ambiguity# Oddly enough, there 
was a sense in which the pressures on the Government to 
honour its stated intentions in the agrarian sphere, were 
less intense than they had been in relation to industry.
This may seem surprising since before Independence, Con­
gress's attitude to agriculture had seemed, if anything, 
and at least in theory, more radical than its attitude to 
industry, and it therefore seemed to have set itself a more 
ambitious goal to be judged by. Although it was not at all 
clear what was meant by the phrase, Congress had advocated 
the "collective ownership" of all land, whereas never more 
than the nationalisation of key concerns had been advocated 
for industry. But the point is that pressures on the 
Government to reveal its hand in agrarian policy were 
arguably less great, for the major reason that the issues 
were less clear-cut, there being a much greater possibility
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of dealing in short-term measures which were relatively 
open-ended and which would leave unresolved the final 
course of policy* The crucial question, as far as industry 
was concerned, was that of the locus of ownership and con­
trol, and the relative power positions of the private and 
public sectors. Because of the ideological build-up before 
Independence, the debate had come to be seen in terms of 
degrees of nationalisation. The Government had in practice 
attempted to retain its aim of widespread nationalisation 
as a long-term one, but because the target had been severely 
cut back in the short-term, and because a new theory of 
nationalisation, which really amounted to the acceptance of 
a mixed economy, had been put into currency, it was clear 
that an important de facto compromise had been made and 
that the lines of a possible future policy had already been 
laid down. The future extension of nationalisation and 
enlargement of the planning function did not really alter 
the basic principle of a mixed economy, with a large degree 
of state initiative, but with considerable power in the 
private sector also.
In agriculture, the case was very different, for the 
first issue with which the Government was pledged to deal 
was that of zamindari abolition, and this was precisely the 
kind of measure which carried no essential implications for 
future policy. It was intermediate between the two camps
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of remedial humanitarian legislation and radical struc­
tural or institutional reform. As such, it allowed the 
ambiguity and plurality of Congress extant policy to 
project itself into the future. The only point of ideo­
logical import which could not be avoided was the method 
of implementation.
The question of compensation. This problem of compensation 
is a prime example of the meeting point of ideological
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rationalisation and concrete political constraint. Driver, 
writing in 194-9* illustrates this well. On the one hand he 
argues that Congress "represents all the elements of our 
national life, the rich as well as the poor; and it would 
be just wishful thinking to expect it to throw overboard 
its commitments'1. Furthermore, "whilst others might say that 
we cannot destroy an exploiting class without violence, the 
reply of Congress theorists and workers like Sri Kripalaniji 
is that violence even if it leads to quick results is use­
less for it is bound to create new classes." Here we have 
a picture of Congress choosing to honour its "commitments" 
to all classes, and motivated by an ideological belief in 
gradualism and non-violence. However, Driver also goes on 
to remark that "the influence of the rentiers is very un­
fortunate indeed" and to explain that "the difference of 
opinion among the different Provinces regarding the basis
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of compensation is clear enough and is largely due to the 
relative influence or strength of the Zamindars in the 
different parts of the country'1 (194*9: 176-7)*
(These latter statements contain a somewhat different 
emphasis, and represent Congress, both centrally and locally, 
as being involuntarily buffeted off course by the power of 
vested interests. This again is the crux of the social 
democratic ambiguity; namely, whether the Government 
chooses to proceed by persuasion and compromise, or whether 
it has no real alternative. (The question which remains un­
answered is whether Congress, even if it had wanted to, 
could have expropriated the landlords without compensation* 
What it did have a little more latitude over, was the 
magnitude of the compensation to be paid, though even here, 
as Driver indicates, room for manoeuvre was limited by the 
influence of the zamindars themselves. A wide range of 
different criteria were adopted locally as the basis for 
fixing compensation rates. Even where the same initial 
criterion was adopted, such as net income, the multiple of 
this figure which was actually paid varied greatly. For 
example, the figure was 15x in Assam, whereas in U.P., for 
landholders in the same category, it was 28x.
There are several grounds on which the U.P. rate in 
general can be argued to have been over-generous. Neale,
for instance, argues that, on the basis of the zamindars1
own testimony, the compensation could have been fixed at a
much lower level. In evidence to the Zamindari Abolition
Committee, they had argued that, from the 1930's on, actual
rental collections ran at under 2/3 of the rental demand
(1962: 239)* It was further claimed that net receipts had
been under half of nominal income, since 15% of rents were
spent in the process of collection (Eastern Economist,
March 28th, 194*7)* On this kind of basis, Neale claims the
Committee would have been justified in paying a total sum
of compensation of around Rs.20 crores or even less, as
against the estimated sum of Rs. 93*4-3 crores actually 
9payable * (Progress of Land Reform 1963 5 4-). But this 
would no doubt have been "politically unacceptable".
Against this kind of background, debates about the 
ideological rights and wrongs of compensation begin to seem 
somewhat meaningless. Nevertheless the Congress record and 
the history of its progress towards accepting zamindari 
abolition as a policy plank, suggests that, quite apart from 
the matter of expediency, the main body of the party, in 
contrast to the C.S.P., never regarded uncompensated ex­
propriation or expropriation with merely token compensation 
as a desirable goal, since this would have been totally 
opposed to the Gandhian train of thought. Once again, the
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ideological and the expedient converged to recommend 
gradualist or social democratic means for the implement­
ation of more radical goals.
But, leaving aside the question of methods of imple­
mentation and returning to the main theme, it can be argued 
that the aim of abolishing the zamindars was in any case not 
necessarily as radical as it sounded.
Zamindari abolition and ideology. Zamindari abolition is in 
itself "ideologically flexible" because it is the kind of 
measure which is open to many interpretations and justi­
fications. It can be regarded as being an end in itself, or 
merely a means to a variety of other ends. Raj Krishna makes 
the point that measures of land reform can be categorised 
on the basis of their intended effects (Froehlich 1961:
215-7)* He distinguishes four types of reforms which he 
suggests tend often to be adopted in a chronological 
sequence. These are successively, liberative, distributionary, 
organisational and developmental. The last three of these 
may well be less distinct or sequential than Krishna suggests, 
but there is certainly a case for analysing any given 
measure in the light of such a break-down. Zamindari abol­
ition clearly falls into the liberative class, since it is 
primarily an attempt to overthrow a system which is regarded 
as outdated and repressive and "feudal" in character. The
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removal of this "agricultural cancer of absentee land­
lordism and social parasitism" (Driver 19^9• 55) may be 
regarded as sufficient in itself to root out the main in­
justices of rural life.
However, as Krishna implies, such measures may be seen 
merely as the pre-conditions for other paths of development, 
and this has certainly been the case in India. Moreover, 
the more far-reaching the path envisaged, the more specific 
it tends to be in terms of ideological commitment. This is 
not, of course, to say that all long-term plans for land 
reform are "ideologically motivated". It is rather to argue 
that each successive step, whatever its justification, 
reveals more clearly the pattern of rural structure which 
is felt to be ultimately desirable, even if merely as a by­
product. In other words, many schools of thought could 
agree on the desirability of zamindari abolition, but at 
each subsequent point of decision thereafter, there would 
tend to be a greater divergence of opinion, and often on 
ideological grounds.
It seems, for instance, that the Government and the 
Planning Commission took a more far-reaching view of abol­
ition than the minimal social justice version outlined above, 
for they recommended abolition theoretically in conjunction 
with "the principle that there should be an upper limit to
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the amount of land that an individual may hold11 (1st Plan: 
188). Ceilings and redistribution can thus be regarded as 
a further stopping point along the policy path and, if taken 
as ends in themselves, will tend to be advocated by those 
who accept the slogan of ‘’land to the tiller” and hold to the 
goal of equitable peasant proprietorship as the final object­
ive. Prom the Congress point of view, this might well have 
the added advantage, besides liquidating the landlords as a 
source of political opposition, of creating a ”huge class of 
strong opponents of the class war ideology” (Singh 1958 • 41).
But to carry the argument one stage further, even 
ceilings and redistribution may be regarded as intermediary 
tools, the end envisaged this time being a reunion of plots 
into collective or cooperative units. This is of course the 
Marxian-socialist vision, though such a doctrine may take 
a shorter route and omit the redistributionary stage.^
The listing of these various possible sequels to 
abolition serves to illustrate the way in which, at least 
in the short term, it was possible for the Government to 
satisfy a fairly wide range of political opinion, except of 
course the most extreme of the zamindars themselves, by 
advocating these initial liberative measures. Members of 
the Government undoubtedly had their own fairly concrete 
perspectives for future policy. The point was that the
2.02.
ultimate pattern, unlike the structural pattern to be 
created in industry, could be left conveniently vague.
But could this vagueness of the intended long-term 
effects of policy persist in the early 1950's when the 
necessity for planning was accepted? Surely the 1st Plan 
found it necessary to be explicit about the end goals of the 
land reform measures which had been embarked on? In fact 
it can be argued that the 1st Plan, although it certainly 
did present specific plans for future agrarian development, 
did so through a formula which was itself derived from, 
and which managed to combine, a variety of ideological 
strands. Even if the range of support which this goal, 
the idea of cooperative village management, could command, 
was not as extensive as that commanded by zamindari aboli­
tion, the explicitness of the final aim was somewhat 
mitigated, on the one hand by the fact that the ultimate 
reorganisation was deferred to an unspecified future, and 
on the other hand, by the fact that the Plan period also saw 
the instigation, on a national basis, of some very concrete 
and much less controversial measures in the form of 
community development and the National Extension Service.
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The 1st Flan, ideology and rural policy*
If the 1st Plan was a modest precursor to the later 
Plans, it was still very important from the point of view 
of the rural sector in that it laid heavy stress on agri­
culture (including community development, irrigation and 
power) allocating to it over 40% of total public investment 
(Lipton and Streeten 1968: 86). Perhaps paradoxically
after the moderateness of the 1948 industrial policy, which 
had itself been influenced by economic uncertainty, the 
approach to planning was largely stimulated by the con­
tinuing gravity of the economic situation, a large component 
in which was the stagnant state .of agriculture, the con­
sequent severe food shortage and the pressure this exercised 
towards inflation through rising prices.
The drawing up of the Plan provided the opportunity for 
outlining strategies in the crucial area of increased 
agricultural production and productivity, and also for 
gathering together the various proposals on land reform.
The planners professed to see no conflict between these 
two sets of objectives; under the heading "Land Policy", 
they addressed themselves to the problem of a "social 
policy for bringing about those changes in the pattern 
of production and distribution and in the structure of the 
rural economy which will serve to establish increasing
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equality of status and opportunity and, at the same time, 
help fulfil the targets of agricultural production which 
are central to the success of the Five Year Plan" (1st Plan: 
184).
This is perhaps the most outstanding assumption in the 
1st Plan's land and agricultural policy; namely, the 
supposition that the dictates of social justice and those of 
economic efficiency went hand in hand, that "between the two 
aspects of policy there is no conflict of principle" (185)* 
This was a highly optimistic assumption, slighly belied 
even by the Plan itself, which simultaneously advocated on 
the one hand, a ceiling on individual holdings and manage­
ment, with redistribution of the excess, and on the other 
hand, in seeking to encourage the pooling of small plots 
into larger-scale cooperative units, observed that "economies 
which cannot be availed of by small farms are available to 
large ones. By its very nature a larger unit of operation 
and management can secure more credit and finance and can 
aPPly these to greater advantage, can diversity its economy 
and can make a relatively greater contribution to the 
solution of the country’s food problem"(194)•
The crucial factor here is perhaps one of time-scale, 
since the Plan seemed to be advocating redistribution prior 
to eventual amalgamation, but this might still entail
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economic disadvantages in tlie short term, a fact which the 
Plan did in fact recognise by alluding to those larger 
farms "which are so efficiently managed that their break-up 
would lead to a fall in production" (191)* A second example 
of the planners1 optimism appeared in their hope that the 
amalgamation of land into cooperative units would help the 
position of the landless labourers* But it was equally 
possible that the very economies of scale in which faith 
was placed might entail a reduction in the employment of 
labour. These kinds of conflict which might well exist 
between socially just and economically efficient remedies, 
were to become much more evident in the future.
Cooperative village management* Through the medium of the 
Plan, the Planning Commission and the Government made it 
clear that they did not regard zamindari abolition as an 
end in itself. What was more, they appeared to commit them- 
unequivocally to a radical and coordinated plan for the 
restructuring of the village economy in the form of eventual 
cooperative village management. It was boldly stated that 
the magnitude of the problems to be faced in terms of mal­
distribution of resources and basic land shortage meant that 
"the possibility of achieving greater social justice through 
regulation of contractual terms between different constituent 
elements in the village is soon exhausted" (195)* Especially
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because marginal redistribution would hardly affect the 
position of landless labourers, it was ‘‘necessary to con­
sider the problem in terms of institutional changes which 
would create conditions of equality for all sections of the 
rural population" (193). It was concluded that "the essence 
of these changes lies in working out a cooperative system of 
management in which the land and other resources of a village 
can be managed and developed so as to increase and diversify 
production and to provide employment to all those who are 
able and willing to work."
The ideological derivations of this scheme were recog- 
nisably various. First, the scheme seemed to have some 
socialist overtones, in that it relied on some notion of 
substantive equality in its emphasis on redistribution. It 
seemed to place itself in the radical camp both by its stress 
on structural or institutional as opposed to marginal 
within-the-system reforms, and by its apparent conviction 
that cooperative farming was the desirable end goal. How­
ever, although cooperation in itself had a socialist ring 
to it, it was abundantly clear and has become even clearer 
since, that the label of cooperation could be applied or 
interpreted in a multitude of ways. As Prof. Driver wrote 
in 194-9, "there is a general feeling among many that we 
should encourage cooperative farming but this phrase has
zoy
been used with a great deal of latitude not to say ambiguity 
and has evoked mixed reactions of all kinds - the reactions 
depending upon the meaning and motives of the reformers 
themselves *.♦. There is at present no universally acceptable 
definition of Cooperation and it is difficult to arrive at 
one unless we can all agree on a question like the relation­
ship between Socialism and Cooperation" (194-9• 234— 5)*
But such a relationship was very difficult to clarify, 
not least because socialism as well as cooperation was 
somewhat of a blanket term, and provided no unambiguous 
remedies. The Plan was, for instance, a little ambivalent 
in its attitude towards private property. The ultimate 
object was a cooperative management of all the lands owned 
by the members of a village, even though private property 
rights were to persist to some extent in that "the rights of 
ownership are determined by the land reforms legislation of 
a State", and "even after a system of cooperative management 
is established, the rate of rent or ownership divident to be 
allowed to an owner in respect of his land will be deter­
mined on the basis of the tenancy laws of a State" (197)*
But one of the explicit objects of abolition was precisely 
to establish a wider incidence of ownership rights. The 
Plan was thus involved in advocating an increase of indi­
vidual or household ownership as a prelude to a subsequent
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modification of these rights. In this process, it could 
be argued, there was an inherent psychological danger-point• 
If the first stage was achieved and allowed to become entren­
ched before the second was set in motion, the end goal of 
cooperativisation might well become increasingly remote. At 
the very least it had to be "admitted that considerable tact 
and caution will be necessary in handling this delicate 
problem", since "the illiterate peasant's love of property 
in land is a strong factor" (Driver 194-9• 289)*
Thus if the 1st Plan's vision of cooperative village
management contained some socialist elements, it contained
also enough moderating influences to make it clear that the
socialism was not of a Marxian or extreme left-wing variety,
11although Nehru's earlier interest in the soviets and the
12P.G.'s later studies of the Chinese commines might have 
suggested that these had served as models or part-models.
The socialist elements in the Plan were, in the first place, 
strongly tempered by Gandhian influences which pulled the 
rural vision onto more of a Guild Socialist - William Morris 
axis, and secondly and predictably, reliance was again placed 
firmly on social democratic methods of implementation, which 
in this case seemed to mean voluntarism rather than the 
provision of inducements.
The main evidence of the Gandhian influence was in the
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role to be assigned to the re-established panchayats, 
rather than in the notion of cooperative management as 
such, since if anything Gandhi's views had tended to shore 
up approval of private property rights and even an inegali­
tarian distribution of property.^ But the faith placed in 
the panchayat and in its ability to resolve the problems of 
the village and reorganise its structure was very much a 
product of populist ideas of grass-roots democracy. Through 
the theory of trusteeship, Gandhi had implied that harmony 
and cooperation (in a non-technical sense) were possible 
where there was considerable inequality of wealthy. The 
planners therefore seemed to be taking a less extreme view 
in imagining that the "welfare of the village community" as 
a whole, was a viable concept where attempts had at least 
been made to even the distribution of resources. But they 
were equally optimistic about the benefits of local self 
government. "It has become imperative" said the Plan,
"that at the village level there should be an organisation 
deriving its authority from the village community and charged 
with the main responsibility for undertaking programmes of 
village development" (195)* The panchayat was to be both the 
short-term implementor of land reforms and the long-term 
organ of village management, "so that the village may become 
a vital progressive and largely self-governing base of the
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structure of national planning, and the existing social 
and economic disparities resulting from property, caste 
and status may be obliterated" (197)*
The Soviet case. It may not be immediately self-evident that 
this emphasis on the cohesiveness of the village community 
and its capacity for self-government was a characteristically 
or specifically Gandhian view. Both the Russian and the 
Chinese rural programmes, for example, have utilised ideas 
of local self-government in describing the structure of the 
communes or state farms. Prof. Driver appealed to this fact 
in arguing the possible reconciliation of cooperation and 
democracy. Writing of the Soviet kholkhoz, he argued 
that "Today most of the collective farms are run as local 
bodies with directly elected management boards .•. Stalin 
himself has spoken of 'leaving all decisions to the 
Kholkhozes themselves,1 and of his desire 'not to substitute 
administrative bullying and bossing for guidance1" (194-9:298).
But by any account, this seems a rather simplistic 
interpretation of the Soviet situation. In the first place, 
collectivisation had been instituted by a process of deter­
mined compulsion. Secondly, the degree of self-determin­
ation which was allowed to develop in the collective and 
state farms, grew up within the general context of strict 
control from the centre, both through the institutional
211
framework and through the deployment of highly-motivated
14cadres and party members. This was a kind of framework 
which would never have been politically viable, quite apart 
from desirable, in post-Independence India. Without such a 
background, the formula of local self-government was bound 
to have rather different implications from those it had in 
the Soviet Union. The distinctive element in the G-andhian 
idea of local self-government was thus a belief in its 
practicability in a comparatively traditional setting. It 
combined a basic populism with an absence of belief in 
basic structural reform.
The very impossibility of a background of firm central 
control such as existed in the U.S.S.R. was made evident by 
the tenor of the Plan itself and its advocacy of a gradual­
ist approach to the ultimate pattern. The immediate steps 
recommended, apart from abolition, were the categorisation 
of farms into those which were economically efficient and 
those which were not (the latter to be subject to a ceiling), 
the setting up of panchayats to control any land which 
became available, and the encouragement of voluntary co­
operative ventures between small and uneconomic plots. Any 
suggestion of compulsory cooperation was rejected. The 
emergence of a new rural society was to be inevitably 
attendant on the cooperation of a multiplicity of agencies
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between the Planning Commission and the peasant# More­
over, no time periods were marked out for the approach to 
cooperative village management# It was held up rather as a 
hoped-for but somewhat remote goal#
Perhaps in the circumstances, as with abolition, no 
other solution but a gradualist or compromise one existed.
The danger was that, in the absence of relatively rapid 
progress towards the end goal, the fine balance of ideo­
logical elements in the proposed path of development would be 
upset, and time itself would lend support to one aspect or 
aspects rather than others* This was a prospect which was 
foreseen by the most idealistic or the most impatient 
immediately after Independence. It could with justification 
be said 11 If cooperation is evolutionary ..... one may well 
ask what time limit can be fixed for such evolution?
Do present times allow us to think in terms of slow evolution­
ary changes? ... it is extremely unpractical and dangerous to 
expect miracles from voluntary cooperative effort" (Driver 
194-9: 251-3) • If such rallying cries astutely envisaged 
the pitfalls inherent in a policy of voluntary cooperation, 
they also, by implication, grossly over-estimated the 
powers, or potential powers, of the national Government* 
Community development and the National Extension Service*
There was a sense in which the Gandhian vision of self-
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sufficient and sacrificial harmony within the traditional 
village community received an impetus from the other tools 
of rural policy during the First Plan period, even before 
the dangers of gradualism and the time factor itself began 
to errode the prospects for the establishment of institu­
tionalised cooperation as the general pattern. This happened 
through the medium of the Community Development and National 
Extension Service programmes, which, whatever the intentions 
of the planners, had the perhaps inevitable effects of 
helping to entrench the goal of individual peasant pro­
prietorship without linking it in any way with the long­
term goal of cooperative village management. It only began 
to be realised in the later 1950fs that the effects of 
community development were often turning out to be an exten­
sion of additional benefits to the relatively wealthy cul­
tivator and, in many cases, a reinforcement of the power of 
the village elite, factors which were rapidly contributing 
to "the creation of a rural petite-bourgeoisie" (Hanson 
1966: 555).
The mechanisms through which this occurred remain to 
be described in the context of a later period in the 
following chapter. It is more appropriate here to consider 
the relationship between the community development programme 
and the controversies about degrees and types of socialism
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before Independence.
It was argued earlier that the more extreme were the 
socialist policies advocated, the more likely were they to 
be phrased in doctrinaire and somewhat remote terms, and the 
less likely were they to be applicable in the immediate 
situation. The Gandhian Gonstructive Programme which even­
tually issued in the community development movement, is a 
case in point* Before Independence, Congress workers, the 
Gongress itself and in due course, the Congress Provincial 
Ministries, all engaged in rural reconstructive work of one 
kind or another. After the War, when the Provincial Minis­
tries returned to office, three provinces inaugurated 
specific projects. The Madras Pirka Development Scheme of 
1946 and the Bombay Sarvodaya Scheme of 1948 were both 
directly inspired by the Gandhian Constructive Programme, 
and concentrated on the setting up of khadi and cottage 
industries, "harijan uplift" and sanitary and health im­
provements. (The 1948 U.P. Etawah Pilot Project, although 
designed by the American, Albert Mayer, was essentially 
very similar, though it laid greater stress on "inner 
democratisation" and team spirit, and gave the village level 
worker a higher salary and status on the basis of more 
training. ^
These projects were the fore-runners of the national
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Community Development and Extension Services launched in 
1952 after the conclusion of the Indo-lmerican Technical 
Co-operation Agreement* The national scheme was thus in the 
main-stream of Gandhian inspiration. However, as with 
panchayati raj, it may not he apparent that the scheme was 
distinctively Gandhian. Was such a programme not perfectly 
compatible with, and perhaps even the most appropriate tool 
for, a socialist approach to the rural sector? Were not 
the gram sewaks merely the counterparts of the Russian 
"proletarian missionaries" of the 1930's? Eor many of the 
Government and the planners this was certainly the inten­
tion, but once more the critical factors were the time 
element, the maintenance of a balance between the various 
intended parts of the whole rural programme, and thus the 
institutional background against which community development 
was to have its effect. If more resources and more 
efficient methods were channelled to the villages, as was the 
intention of community development, but without there being 
effective accompanying measures for the redistribution of 
land and power, then the end goal of greater equality was 
bound to be jeopardised. Insofar as community development 
was not backed by institutional change, it was likely to 
approximate more closely to the Gandhian model of recon-
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struction which had an essentially paternalistic element.
This might well produce very tangible benefits for the
rural sector as a whole, but it would not amount to what
the socialists in the P.S.P. and in Congress itself had,
16at their most idealistic, envisaged.
The long-term significance of this first period after 
Independence.
Undoubtedly this period was a critical one for the 
newly-independent Government, both because of its commit­
ments to the past and because of its responsibilities for 
the future. Prom the policy point of view, the outstanding 
characteristics of the earlier part of the period were, in 
the first piace, the moderateness of actual policy as com­
pared with previous pronouncements (a trend which applied 
particularly to industry), and secondly, a continuation, 
notwithstanding, of the ideological plurality which had been 
apparent in the proposed policy at Independence.
But these trends themselves provided no completely 
unambiguous grounds for predicting the direction of future 
policy; on the one hand because the moderateness of policy 
was accompanied by a professed retention of more radical 
goals for the future (more extensive nationalisation for 
industry, and cooperative village management for agriculture),
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and on tlie other hand because it could not be clear which 
elements in the continuing ideological policy-mix would 
f i n a l l y  emerge as dominant. This applied particularly to 
the rural sector, where abolition was itself ideologically 
flexible and where the actual outcome, as opposed to the 
stated intentions, of so many other components of rural 
policy, such as the role of the panchayats and the nature 
of cooperation, depended on a background of institutional 
change. The relative rates of progress of each part of the 
whole policy would inevitably affect the total outcome. The 
factors which would therefore prove to be crucial were, 
first, the balance and degree of impetus from the centre 
and, secondly, the process of implementation at all levels. 
On these would depend both the effects of the policies 
already set in motion, and the outcome of the ideological 
plurality which had so far been manifest at the policy- 
informing level.
i
Notes. Chapter 4
1. The socialists tended to argue that there was a 
direct connection between religious and economic conflict, 
and that Congress’s refusal to come to grips with the 
problem of economic inequality was a contributing influence 
on the increase in religious tension. Narayan, for 
instance, argued that if Congress had taken up the cause
of the Muslim peasants, Muslim communalist feeling would 
have been nipped in the bud (Narayan 1946: 111).
2. See chapter 5 below, note 2.
3. D.F. Karaka, for instance, wrote scathingly of Congress 
that "its policy since freedom has borne no resemblance 
whatsoever to that revolutionary or democratic socialism
to which it was pledged. It has, in fact, in the first 
two years of its assumption of power proved itself more 
reactionary, more intolerant, more corrupt, more capitalist . 
that the administration of the British" (1950: 242).
4. The Bombay Plan (1944) was designed by a group of 
prominent industrialists, including J.D. Tata, A.D, Shroff 
and D.G-. Birla. It envisaged a quintupling of industrial 
production in fifteen years. Heavy industry was to take 
priority, but small-scale industries were also to be 
developed for consumer goods production (Hanson 1966: 41).
5. Erdraan suggests that support for nationalisation may
be motivated by the desire for "a greater disciplining 
of the national economy" in the interests of national 
unity, or by the anti-monopoly and anti-corporate interests 
of its lower middle class supporters (1967: 54).
6. In 1952, the Jan Sangh gained 0.6% of seats and 3.1% 
of votes in the Lok Sabha, and in 1957 the figures were 
0.8% and 5*95% (Morris-Jones 1964: 163)*
7. Ashok Mehta developed this argument in the context of 
the discussions between Nehru and the P.S.P. in 1955 on 
the subject of cooperation at all levels between the two 
parties. The talks actually broke down, but Mehta continued 
to argue for some kind of institutionalised joint action 
and reduced conflict, since a "constant tug-of war might 
weaken the springs of cooperation and make people apolitical" 
(P.S.P. Convention Report 1953: 168-9)*
8. This comparison requires further elaboration. The 
rate quoted was for the smallest category of zamindars, 
and several states in fact adopted graded scales. The 
rate therefore seems particularly high for U.P. A 
progressive principle was applied through variable re­
habilitation grants over and above the basic compensation 
paid at a fixed multiple of 8. This suggests that the 
distribution of the compensation varied locally as well 
as its total amount, and that in some cases, as in U.P., 
the state might have more leeway in influencing the 
distribution than in determining the total amount. In 
others, the determination of the distribution too was
probably highly responsive to the relative influence of 
groups of zamindars.
9. This is the lowest ideiatifiable total of compensation 
payable. If the sums payable in interest and in re­
habilitation grants are also included, the figure rises to 
Rs. 198.36 crores (Progress of Land Reform 1963: 4).
10. Baljit Singh (1961) seems to arrive at a compromise 
between these two positions, by suggesting that on economic 
grounds, there is a threshold of efficiency at 15 acres 
for family cultivation. He goes on to argue that a 
ceiling at this level would make available 10% of all 
cultivated land which would make it possible for a 
cooperative farm of 100 acfes to be set up in every second 
or third village. He thus seems to support both limited 
private cultivation and the establishment of large-scale 
joint farming, at least in the short term.
11. After his first visit to Russia in 1927? Nehru wrote
"The Soviet system has become so much identified with 
Bolshevism and Russia that it is difficult to think of it 
apart from them, let it is conceivable that it may exist .. 
without communism ... the village soviet is said to be the
soul ', of the village. The word "soviet” means sabha and
a village soviet would correspond to a panchayat elected 
by almost all the residents of an Indian village" (1927: 23)
12. See chapter 5 below.
13* In 1931? Gandhi said "I am inviting those people who 
consider themselves as owners today to act as trustees, i.e
owners, not in their own right, but owners in the right of
those whom they have exploited. I will not dictate to 
them what commission to take, but ask them to take what is
fair" (Young India Nov* 26th, 1951: 568)* As late as 1947?
Gandhi told a group of landlords that "they had a bright 
future if they became the trustees of the poor kisans.
Such trustees would take nothing for themselves that their 
labour and care did not entitle them to. Then, they would 
find that no law would be able to touch them" (Harijan 
May 4th, 1947: 154). It is thus clear that any reform 
or redistribution which was to occur was to be dependent 
on voluntary restraint.
14. It was not until about 1954 that the peasants really 
accepted the new system. Between 1930 and 1934, some 
50,000 "proletarian missionaries" were drafted to the 
villages to help with the work of transformation. From 
1933-34, local control over agriculture was vested in 
the Machine Tractor Stations under the direct'.co.ntro 1 
of the Central Committee, and from then on, authority was 
shared between the M.T.S. and the local Party. The M.T.S.1 
were finally abolished in 1958. As a result, the farm was 
to become an independent planning unit, "with the district 
party secretary as the focal point of Party control". A
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description of these developments is to be found in 
L. Schapiro 1963; 455-9 and 577-9*
15* Details of these various schemes and their fore­
runners are given in V.P. Pande 1967*
16. The P.S.P.'s support for community development was 
expressly qualified by its fear that background reforms 
were not pi*oceeding fast enough. A resolution on the 
P.C.'s Progress Report of the 1st Plan, for instance, 
warned that "schemes like Community Development Projects 
and National Extension Service ... are gravely threatened 
by administrative cumbrousness and the absence of land 
reforms and of effective cooperatives and panchayats"
(P.S.P. Convention Report 1953: 122). Another possible 
reason for the P.S.P.'s lack of enthusiasm for community 
development was its current engrossment with the equally- 
Gandhian-inspired but apparently more appealing Bhoodan 
Movement, described by Mehta as "the most dynamic 
movement to emerge recently" (171).
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C H A P T E R  5
Ideology and Policy in the Mid-50s and After
Phases in Congress Bevelopment.
If the successive phases in Congress history are seen 
as characterised by shifts in the nature and functions of 
ideology, as related to changes in the role which Congress 
itself was playing, then the period of the mid-50s may be 
seen as a kind of crescendo of ideological activeness and 
initiative, after which the 1960s have emerged through a 
process of reaction and feedback, as a period of comparative 
ideological passivity or receptivity.
The division of Congress history into phases such as 
these begins to make apparent the way in which the suggested 
ideal types for the role of ideology in given situations, 
may be applied in the Indian context. In the pre-Independence
period, so far as Congress's dominant tenet, that of 
Swaraj, was concerned, ideology can be represented as having 
been primarily a demand "input1* into the political system.
At this stage, again as far as Congress was concerned, the 
competing interest group aspects of ideology, although
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evident, were relatively peripheral, mainly because of the 
movement's remoteness from control over domestic policy.
Such conflicts as did arise tended to make for the adoption 
of somewhat vague and comprehensive policy slogans, rather 
than for direct or prolonged ideological confrontations.
But if the pre-Independence period was one in which. 
Congress ideology fulfilled a predominantly demand function 
in the guise of nationalism and nationalist demands, then 
the immediate post-Independence period was one in which it 
was caught in a phase which was transitional, to carry the 
analogy further, between demand and supply functions. As 
Congress underwent the fairly abrupt transition from rebel 
to establishment, the raison d'etre of its attacking impetus 
was removed and the whole organisation was turned back on 
itself and reoriented towards dealing with the mass of the 
nation. This meant that the balance of pressures acting 
on Congress ideology underwent a radical change. Congress 
was now essentially concerned with domestic policy, with 
"cutting up the national cake" and so with inveighing 
against or reacting to, vested interests of various kinds.
This was reflected ideologically in the appearance of a 
series of pronouncements and measures which amounted to a 
considerable modification and redefinition of earlier slogans,
^ 2.>f
but yet carried forward much of their ambiguity.
The encounter with interest groups within the party 
and within the national community thus provided the main 
moulding pressure on Congress policy-making in this period. 
But the original slogans and the emphasis on solidarity 
which had been engendered by the attacking role, did not, 
or were not allowed to, wither away. They were an essential 
ingredient in Congress's continuing leadership role, and a 
backing for its task of holding the new nation together in 
the face of internal pressures. Hence there was a 
continuing emphasis on the symbols of national unity, and 
a continuing appeal to the avowedly traditional sentiments 
of solidarity and equality. Where these appeared to impinge 
too specifically on the content of actual policy and hence 
possibly to conflict with the new compromise formulas which 
were appearing, the disjunction was sometimes justified by 
drawing a distinction between short and long-term policy­
making. The exigencies of the immediate situation, it 
was implied, might demand compromise, but the larger aims 
would be adhered to in the long run. nationalisation could 
only be undertaken now in part, but a period of ten years 
was cited as the point of postponement.
There was, then, little attempt at this stage to use
socialism as a rallying cry. The Industrial Policy and 
the 1st Plan seemed to endeavour to pay enough cognisance 
to the earlier socialist formulas to keep the left wing 
loyal, hut the Plan purported to he guided by the 
constitutional Directives of State Policy which advocated, 
less specifically, "that the ownership and control of the 
material resources of the community are so distributed as 
best to subserve the common good". The task of the 1st 
Plan was thus to appeal to those desires for equality and 
redistribution which had formerly begun to find expression 
through socialist formulas, however embryonic, without 
actually committing itself to socialism. Because of 
divided counsels within Congress and crises in the country 
at large, such an extreme ideological initiative would have 
been out of the question. The ideological supply function 
at this stage was one of dealing in modifications and 
compromises rather than in plans for major reconstruction.
Congress in the mid-50's: a rise in Government initiative.
It is another change of ideological gear on Congress's 
part which can be argued to mark the onset of a second 
post-Independence phase in the mid-1950's. The very 
leadership role which had been held somewhat in abeyance
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in the early 1950*s suddenly seemed to "be thrust to the fore, 
as Congress and the Planning Commission attempted to assume 
a muoh greater initiative on the ideological front. A 
succession of incidents seemed to herald a major injection 
of socialist principles into the guidance of policy. The 
Congress Avadi Resolution in favour of a "socialistic 
pattern of society" and the acceptance of a similar 
resolution by the Lok Sabha in 1954^ could both be inter­
preted as the forerunners of an increasing tempo of
recognisably ideologically-motivated proposals. This bore
3fruit most obviously in the 1955-56 Budget, in the 2nd 
Plan Draft Outline which began to be prepared in 1954, and, 
as far as agriculture was concerned, in the Report of the 
Delegation to China on Agrarian Cooperatives in 1956 and 
the subsequent Congress Nagpur Resolution on cooperatives 
of 1959.
Needless to say, there are many ways in which this 
apparent increase in ideological tempo can be explained, and 
many factors which can be cited as relevant. The most 
obvious, and the simplest, kind of explanation is one which 
appeals to the personalities involved, and specifically of 
course to the influence of Nehru. It is suggested that 
this was^ the earliest point at which Nehru, having previously
been frustrated by the constraints of the political 
situation, was able to harness the machine of government 
to explicitly socialist aims. As Hanson puts it, "Pew of 
the political elite were socialists in any meaningful sense 
of the word, but Nehru had by this time achieved that degree 
of eminence where his own public approval of socialism 
virtually became an act of policy" (1966: 123).
Nehru as the driving force? It is unquestionably true that 
Nehru himself was very influential in the apparent stepping 
up of socialism, as he had been at earlier crucial points,
such as the 1936 Lucknow Congress and the deliberations of
0
the N.P.C.. It is also true that, since the death of Patel 
and the defeat of Tandon for the Congress presidential 
election in 1950, the right-wing faction had been severely 
weakened, and Nehru's power considerably increased. Until 
then, the G-overnment had really been headed by a duumvirate, 
but henceforth there was no serious challenged to Nehru. 
However, it is surely inadequate to isolate only this 
factor, thereby suggesting that Nehru produced a new policy 
orientation out of his own ideological leanings and 
virtually imposed it on a passive or unperceptive following. 
Writing of a relevant speech of Nehru's to the National 
Development Council in 1954 in which he described the
proposed "socialistic picture of society", Hanson suggests, 
for example, that "no one chose to challenge him on the 
subject either because they "thought that so vague a concept 
would make little real difference to the actual practice 
of economic planning", or because they "felt that a plan 
described as 'socialistic1 would win wider approval than 
one not so described" (1966: 124). This seems, at the
least, a somewhat superficial explanation, which ignores 
the possibility that the mooted socialistic pattern was 
capable of arousing some sort of active emotional response, 
even from those who were well short of being doctrinaire 
Marxists or socialists.
It is worth looking at the Nehru-imposition argument 
more closely. To writers such as Hanson, taking a 
retrospective view of Indian planning, its more ideologically- 
inspired components and their advocates stand out 
predominantly as obstacles to economic efficiency and 
distorters of economic rationality. From this point of 
view, Nehru's "greatness was always somewhat diminished by 
his enthusiasm for ideologically-inspired panaceas" (Streeton 
and Ljjton 1968: 37). In similar vein, contemplation of
the Plans arouses the "suspicion that much of time the 
Commission is engaged in bowing before idols whose clay feet
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are becoming ever more obvious11. Such idols, it is 
pointed out, are not fathered by the Commission itself, 
but are "the work of its political masters" (35).
The drawing of a contrast between "ideologically- 
inspired" and "pragmatic" proposals has now become a common­
place in economic debate about India, as in partisan 
political argument. Such debates are clearly in the realm 
of value judgment, and it would seem more useful in the 
context of an examination of the various roles of ideology, 
to attempt to assess some of the factors which might account 
for the appeal of such "ideologically-inspired" policies, 
and which specifically made for an apparent increase in 
this element in 1954*55. Explanation in terms of the 
misplaced idealism or "regrettable enthusiasm for 
ideologically-inspired panaceas" of individual politicians, 
leaves unanswered the further questions of why these 
panaceas engendered such enthusiasm and why, if they were 
foisted on the Grovernment machine by a small segment of 
the leadership, they did not provoke wider opposition at 
the time.^
The wider appeal of the mid-50fs policies.
The incidence of a socialistic phase in Grovernment 
policy, in the mid-50*s must surely be examined in relation
to the whole tenor and course of Congress's leadership 
role, and not merely in relation to the political dis­
positions of Nehru's immediate circle. It must also he 
seen in the light of the current economic state of the 
country and, deriving from this, the image of the national 
situation which was held by those involved in government. 
Their assessment of the present situation, together with 
their aspirations for India's future development were likely 
to affect fairly radically their perspectives on policy 
alternatives. The final factor which must be considered 
is the way in which proposed policy might appeal, not only 
to national aspirations but also to sectional interests. 
Hanson himself mentions that, at the relevant meeting of 
the Standing Committee of the National Development Council 
in May 1955, several Chief Ministers in fact "demanded an 
even 'bolder and bigger plan*". Whether they were moved 
by national aspirations for expansion or, as seems more 
likely, by regional interests, this would seem to be evidence 
that at least here there was support for large-scale 
planning. The N.D.C. explicitly decided that "the Second 
Pive-Year Plan should be drawn up so as to give concrete 
expression to the policy decisions relating to the 
socialistic pattern of society" (Hanson 1966: 130).
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On closer inspection, it also appears that these 
policies of the mid-50*s did not in any case represent such 
an unqualifiedly new or doctrinaire departure from previous 
policy as Hanson implies. The fact that they coexisted 
with, and were tempered by, more traditional policies, was 
another reason why there was less controversy than a 
radical resurgence might have been expected to provoke.
What many of the "symptoms" did more nearly represent was 
an intensification of ideological elements already evident 
in previous Congress policy; namely the emphasis on re­
distribution and social justice typical of a modern welfare 
state oriented society, and here expressed, for example, 
in the findings of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, which 
recommended a statutory ceiling on incomes (which was not 
implemented), and by the impetus behind the Eural Credit 
Survey, which reported in 1955, and which was concerned 
with the problem of peasant indebtedness.
Perhaps the major factor responsible for creating the 
impression that there had been a radical doctrinal shift, 
was the form taken by the 2nd Plan. This clearly seemed 
to accept for itself the typical Marxist-Soviet model in 
terms of sectoral balance, long term growth aims and inter- 
generational distribution of benefits. This type and
scope of plan could be seen to have immediate structural 
effects, in that it entailed a greater emphasis on the 
public sector, and this, together with the nationalisation 
of the Imperial Bank of India in 1955, seemed to constitute 
a marked change of emphasis. But the terms of the 2nd 
Industrial Policy Resolution showed that there was no radical 
new departure here. Air transport was to be the only new 
state-owned industry, and although the list of ’reserved 
industries1 was increased from six to seventeen there was 
still to be room for "the expansion of the existing privately 
owned units, or the possibility of the State securing the 
cooperation of private enterprise in the establishment of 
new units when the national interests so require" (2nd Plan: 
4). It was a change of degree rather than kind, and the 
principle of a mixed economy was still to prevail.
The apparent ideological extremeness of Mahalanobis1s 
plan-frame was further modified first by its Gandhian 
emphasis on small-scale industry, which could be justified 
on anti-inflation and employment - promotion criteria, but 
which also coincided conveniently with Candhian preferences, 
and secondly by the fact that it lacked one major ingredient 
of the communist model, namely the collectivisation of 
agriculture. This could even be argued to be an essential
part of the model, for it provided the efficient means for 
commanding the rural surplus and providing the vital 
resources for large-scale investment in the industrial 
sector. Thus the 2nd Indian Plan was, in one sense, firmly 
in the social democratic tradition in that it adopted 
socialist, or at least socialist-by-association, ends, but
was incapable of countenancing a form of reorganisation
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which would entail compulsion. What it has also in 
practice failed to do is to provide an adequate substitute, 
for this particular ingredient, such as an effective system 
of rural taxation.
Furthermore, although the plan looked like a socialist 
instrument in some ways,there were many aspects of it which 
industrialists and business interests could find appealing. 
The emphasis on heavy industry was one which would in many 
ways benefit the private sector, since the manufacturing 
targets were to be far too large for the public sector alone 
to fulfil, and the public sector would often be operating 
at a disadvantage anyway, at least initially. The 
infrastructural effects of large-scale government investment 
in the industrial sector would also be beneficial to 
private enterprise. This was likely to appeal to the 
predisposition for rationalisation and expansion which had
been evident in industry earlier, in its cooperation, at 
least in part, with the Congress National Planning Committee, 
and in the formulation of the Bombay Plan. The crucial 
difference between 1947, which had seen a "strike of 
capital", and 1954, was that industry’s confidence had 
been buttressed by the moderateness of Congress policy.
Thus, although the policies of the mid-50's may be 
described as representing a resurgence of ideological 
initiative within Congress, this resurgence is not susceptible 
to simple explanation. The most immediate cause was 
certainly the relative eclipse of the right-wing faction 
within Congress which followed the death of Patel and the 
defeat of Tandon. This left the way clear for an expansion 
of Government initiative to express itself through socialist- 
tending policies. But this very initiative was not simply 
the emergence of a latent force which had previously been 
held in check by the Patel faction. It seems feasible to 
suggest that it had also gathered support precisely because 
of the checks and setbacks of the period of internecine 
conflict.^ Another predisposing factor may well have been 
the anticlimax of the clearly non-p,topian post-Independence 
situation itself. In the 1952 elections, Congress received 
45^ of the popular vote (Morris-Jones 1964: 163). In
absolute terms, this seems a high figure, hut it is less 
impressive when compared with Congress1 reception of 91$ 
of the non-Muslim vote in 1946 (Brecher 1959: 305) • The
drop may have been partly due to a sense of frustrated
expectation in the country at large.
In a sense then, the inner circle of the Congress 
leadership, the lower ranks of the party, and even the 
electorate, were in a psychological state which was 
conducive to accepting a "big push", or at least a bigger
push than had previously been attempted. The 1st Plan had
been too small and too limited to satisfy many that a 
planning experiment had really been tried, but at the same 
time it was successful enough to encourage hopes that 
planning had great potential. Thus the policies of the 
mid-50's bore a socialist imprint, certainly because of 
the transcendence of the left wing of the party, but also 
for far more contingent reasons, such as that growth theory 
was at the time dominated by capital accumulation models, 
of which the Soviet pattern was but the clearest example; 
that aspirations for national economic development were 
inevitably high, and rapid industrialisation seemed a 
sine qua non both for this and for an increased degree of 
economic independence; and that private enterprise
welcomed increased government investment, even if it was 
not very happy with the expansion of the public sector.
The mid-50's policies were not as doctrinaire, nor was the 
party and the planning machinery as passive a vehicle for 
the Nehru faction, as has sometimes been supposed.
Altogether, these policies are best described as the 
product of a phase of increased Government initiative, 
which was made possible by a conjunction of predisposing 
factors, and which for a variety of reasons was characterised 
by seemingly socialist patterns.
Impact of the mid-j^Q’s policies
The irony of these policies was that they were in a 
sense self-defeating, for they set in motion a chain of 
reactions which in many areas produced a backlash of 
opposition. The backlash has naturally directed itself 
against the original policies themselves, or aspects of 
them, and because they laid themselves open to the charge 
of having been ideologically-inspired, the logical outcome 
has been a heightening of counter-ideologies. However 
undoctrinaire the policies originally were, they have been 
most vocally opposed precisely on the charge of ideological 
dogmatism. This has created all the conditions for a
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period of manifest pluralism and comparative Government 
defensiveness, since the opposition to a much greater extent, 
has ceased to accept the constraints of the Congress umbrella 
and has become far more explicitly assertive. Some of the 
links in this chain of reactions must now be examined. Its 
impact on agriculture has been especially important. The 
starting point must be a consideration of some of the 
problems inherent in the logic of the 2nd Plan.
One of the major features of the 2nd Plan, as compared 
with the 1st, was the predominant emphasis which it placed 
on the industrial sector, as revealed by the relative shares 
of public investment which were devoted to industry in the 
two plans. The 2nd Plan proposed to devote 18.5$ of total 
investment to industry and minerals, as against a figure 
of 7.5$ for the 1st Plan. Agriculture, Community 
Development, irrigation and power suffered a corresponding 
fall in shares of investment, from 45$ to 51$ (2nd Plan:
51-2).
It has often been pointed out that such value judgments 
about sectoral priorities are a function, not only of 
political and economic structure, but also of ideological 
bias. Sjoberg, for example, suggests that '‘development 
ideologies may be categorised on the basis of combinations
of the two co-ordinates, type of political structure and 
sectoral priority. The totalitarian "but rural-biased type, 
for example, was manifest in Nazi G-ermany with its emphasis 
on "folk culture". The pro-urban but also totalitarian 
structure is the typical Communist pattern. Sjoberg 
suggests that India would fit into this scheme under the 
heading of the pro-rural and anti-urban democratic model 
typical of the "key nations in the third world" and those 
whose development patterns are heavily influenced by 
W. European, and more particularly, American sponsorship 
(Smelser and Lipset 1966).
The obvious sense in which this assessment would seem 
to fit India is of course in relation to the uncompromising 
G-andhian stress on the value of rural life and, conversely, 
on the evils of urbanisation. But this represents only 
one segment of Indian ideology, and the 2nd Plan is surely 
the embodiment of a quite different set of values. Whilst 
not necessarily anti-rural, the logic of the Plan, by 
virtue of its emphasis on heavy industrialisation, was 
essentially pro-urban. It was this sector which was held 
to contain the all-important growth points. Apart from 
anything else, this was bound to affect the relative status 
of rural and urban life. As Industry has expanded, factory
workers have increasingly become an enviable elite within
7the labour force. Urban life has apparently had its 
attractions for a long time, but the expansion of the 
industrial sector is bound to enhance this.
This raises the whole problem of the concealed 
distributional values of large-scale national planning.
There is no doubt that the Soviet model presumes that 
sacrifices by present generations in the form of consumption 
foregone are justified in the cause of long-term growth 
which will ultimately benefit future generations. This 
is deferred gratification on an intergenerational scale, 
and insofar as the 2nd Plan subscribed to a capital 
accumulation model, India too was involved in this pattern. 
What was far less clear was how the burdens of stepping up 
the rate of investment were to be distributed between 
sectors. Again, the logic of the Soviet model implied 
that the rural sector must be the main source of resources, 
and this seemed to be essential in the Indian case too, for 
the rural sector accounted for at least 75$ of the 
population. The draining off of a ’’rural surplus’1 both 
in physical terms (food for the towns) and in financial
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terms (through taxation and savings) was an essential 
component of this kind of plan. But, as was suggested
above, the Indian system could hot countenance any kind of 
enforced collectivisation such as had mobilised resources 
in the Soviet Union. - Nor could it impose differential 
burdens on sections of the population, even by means other 
than regimentation or force, without being affected by the 
waves of disgruntled protest this was certain to arouse.
This complex of problems related to the distributional 
elements of planning had at least three kinds of effect, either 
intended or unintended, in the Indian context. The first, 
arising from the problem of implementation and mobilisation, 
was an elaboration or reinforcement of a whole ideology of 
corporate participation which could draw on G-andhian 
sources, and which might be labelled a forced-mobilisation 
surrogate. The second result was a recognition on the 
planners* part of the need for short-term action to reconcile 
the overall distributionary logic of the Plan with notions 
of welfare which had already raised expectations of growing 
equality in the near future. Insofar as these latter 
actions were unsuccessful, there was a third type of result, 
which was the creation of a set of new "underprivileged1 
groups, such as the kulak or substantial peasant class.
In many cases these were not in fact new groups or 
configurations of interests. In was rather that they
found a new vociferousness and sense of grievance in claiming 
that they were either exploited or under-rewarded by the 
actual process of planning.
The problems of mobilisation. To take first of these three, 
the problem of mobilisation, it is as well to note that 
there is here a definitional difficulty. In some quarters 
of political theory, there is a tendency to locate processes 
of mobilisation only within so-called "command" economies,^ 
the implication being that the term is to be limited to 
contexts in which some type or degree of coercion is applied 
in order to make individuals and groups cooperate, or rather 
conform, with the priorities of the central G-overnment.
If mobilisation is used only in this limited sense, then 
one is forced to describe a process which seems akin but 
which occurs in a democratic nation such as India, as a 
mobilisation-surrogate. Alternatively, if the term 
mobilisation is more widely applied, one can describe such 
a process as a sub-type of mobilisation.
This latter view seems to be born out by J.P. Nettl's 
usage of the term, which describes mobilisation as taking 
effect "by evoking particular structures and by giving 
people common goals and reference groups." (1967; 115).
There is here the implication that mobilisation is both,
or either, a means of external structural organisation of 
individuals and/or a reorientation of their motivations and 
goals. It would thus seem that, whilst the totalitarian 
political process employs both, and the democratic concentrates 
on the latter, both systems may be described as employing 
types of mobilisation. This indeed is the conclusion which 
Nettl comes to in suggesting that "manipulated mobilisation" 
(e.g. "Ghana, Bgypt or Tanzania'!} and "a mobilisation decked 
out with the myths and symbols of participation" (e.g. "a 
British or Swedish general election'0 are both "essentially 
products as well as means of mobilisation as much as 
institutionalised occasions for making rational choices"
(111).
Hence, whether the process of organising individual 
and group action within a non-totalitarian state is 
classified as a type of mobilisation, or as a substitute for 
it, it can at least be recognised as employing some of the 
same elements as the more coercive process. It then becomes 
relevant to ask, first, how such elements are employed 
without a coercive backing, and, secondly, how effective 
such a process can be. In answer to the first question, 
the means employed in the Indian context, would seem to be 
at least partly the promotion of a philosophy of
participation which operates not only at the level of 
official exhortations in favour of national cooperation, 
but also, and more concretely, through the provision of an 
institutional framework which is intended to stimulate 
participation.
A prime example of the first phenomenon, that of 
exhortation towards voluntary cooperation and participation 
is provided by the Report of the Delegation to China on 
Agrarian Co-operatives of 1956. Most of the members 
returned from China full of enthusiasm for Chinese methods, 
and fully convinced that "cooperative farming is necessary 
from economic as well as social conditions" (Delegation 
Report 1957s 180). They consequently recommended a
specific programme for the organisation of 10,000 cooperative 
farming societies over the next four years. It might 
therefore be supposed that this report falls more into the 
category of reorganising the institutional framework of 
motivation, rather than relying on mere exhortation. The 
point is that the Report assumed a wave of voluntary action 
could be initiated first in order to produce the 
institutional reorganisation* Although the Delegation 
took pains to point out that they "were aware that the 
political system obtaining in China has a certain advantage
in influencing a particular pattern of behaviour from the 
people," they nevertheless advocated that "the principle of 
voluntariness should be scrupulously adhered to" (184-5).
In fact this very reference to the Chinese "advantage" 
makes plain the pressures which lead to reliance on 
exhortation and to optimistic thinking about the development 
of an "atmosphere ... in which social values and outlook 
will progressively change to more egalitarian non- 
exploitative social and economic order." It was hoped 
that the participatory impetus, once underway, would be 
cumulative and self-reinforcing, since "co-operative 
farming ... will provide opportunities of working together 
for the various groups of people now held apart by social 
and communal divisions and thus bring about increasingly 
an emotional integration of the people into a living 
entity" (182).
This is the kind of language which still abounds in 
the planning l i t e r a t u r e a n d  which Hanson suggests may 
be partly "speech-day stuff", but in which he also professes 
to detect and to deride a serious hope that such 
exhortations will have a material impact on the attitudes 
and priorities of the people at large. There is, he 
suggests, "the persistent suggestion that, if the right
words are spoken to the right people at the right time,
'the masses' can he mobilised for plan fulfilment" (Streeton 
and Lipton 1968: 41).
But once again, this is s u r e l y  not an arbitrary or 
merely escapist tendency on the part of the planners, but 
springs from the very nature of the Indian planning dilemma, 
and the very real problem which any non-totalitarian regime 
faces in attempting to rally support for measures which do 
not immediately appeal to motives of sectional gain. It 
is a problem which is also not unique to India. The 
prolonged economic difficulties of Britain, for instance, 
have called forth lamentations about the unwillingness of 
individuals to identify with the crisis, and to modify their 
behaviour accordingly. As the Economist put it, the 
country "wants the economic ends of increasing prosperity 
all right, but it is adamantly reluctant to will the 
means ... The country has sought and still seeks, a painless 
economic miracle to be performed with biblical speed and 
precision" (Davis 1968: 14-5).
Of course the implication here is not that it would be 
sufficient in itself if people's motives were to change.
The chain of reaction is assumed to be more complex, in 
that changed public attitudes would give the Government
more scope for tighter management of the economy and in 
this sense, would only be a precondition rather than an 
efficient cause. But similarly in the Indian case, it is 
seldom implied that increasing willpower and public­
spiritedness will, of themselves, produce results. The 
implication is rather that such attitudes will provide the 
catalyst for making Government-sponsored changes more 
effective. This is not to deny that such hopes may well 
seem naive. It is rather to.point out that such modes of 
thought are not the monopoly of Indian planners, and that 
they are an expression of the fundamental mobilisation 
dilemma.
Institutional provisions for participation. The Indian 
philosophy of participation goes further than mere 
exhortation, in that it has been embodied in attempts to 
institutionalise participatory sentiments and hence to 
essay the difficult task of "stimulating spontaneity" 
through the medium of the panchayats. The beginnings of 
this structure of course pre-dated the 2nd Plan, and its 
roots were much older even than the 1st Plan. The notion, 
or myth, of the traditional village panchayat has been a 
powerful and nostaligic one, often related to what Thorner 
calls a "Bousseauian" view of village life (1953: 209).
Whether or not they were undermined by the British, there 
was little evidence of such institutions by the Nineteenth 
Century* In 1909, the Royal Commission on Decentralisation 
recommended their revival, and this theme was taken up 
enthusiastically by Congress, especially under Gandhi's 
influence* Between 1919 and 1926j most provinces passed 
enabling legislation, although by 1947, not even 10$ of 
villages had panchayats (Srinivasan 1956: 206).
The logic of planning, calling for participation and 
the expression of 'felt needs' from below, eventually 
converged at least superficially, with the older tradition 
which holds in veneration the whole idea of local self- 
government, and which produced, quite independently of the 
plans, post-independence legislation to support the re­
establishment of panchayats* All states had passed such 
legislation by the early 1950's, and the panchayats were 
generally charged with local welfare functions, such as
street-maintenance and sanitation, though their budgets
11and resolutions were subject to state approval.
Interestingly enough, the planners had at first been 
reluctant to invest too heavily in this particular syndrome, 
apparently hoping that participation-stimulation could be 
combined with a fairly high degree of centralisation.
When the Community Development (C.D.) Programme was 
initiated in 1952, the administrative structure devised, 
although allowing for processes of consultation at all 
levels, did not seek to incorporate the panchayats at all 
closely. It paid cognisance to the need for local involve­
ment and participation, but relied on a centralised 
organisation, running from centre to village, via state, 
district and project or block levels. This was embodied 
in an official hierarchy which partly overlapped with the 
old executive functionaries, incorporating the Collector, 
or Deputy Commissioner, at district level.
There was clearly a tension here between the role of 
the authoritative official as innovator, and the welfare 
worker as participator, and the role of the panchayat was 
in consequence not well defined. The Commission's aim was 
apparently to attempt to ensure the effective injection of 
initiative into the local situation by constructing clear 
lines of communication and authority with the centre, but 
to invest also in the possibility of enlisting local 
enthusiasm through processes of consultation.
However, by the mid-50fs it had become evident from 
many sources that the C.D. Programme was underfulfilling 
expectations, both in development and in redistributive
terms. Dube, for instance, in his study of two villages 
in Western U.P., came to the conclusion that nearly 70$ 
of the benefits from extension work were going to the 
village elite, and that the projects had initiated no 
schemes to help either the poorer cultivators or the land­
less labourers. The motives of the participants he gauged 
to be predominantly economic advantage, prestige, and 
compliance with the wishes of officials and village leaders.
The main obstacles were held to be apathy, suspicion and a 
failure of communications (Dube 1958: 82-4).
The deficiencies of the concrete results of C.D. began 
to be seen as symptomatic of a fundamental organisational 
malaise. The 3rd and 4th Reports of the Programme 
Evaluation Organisation (P.C., 1956 and 1957) on C.D., laid 
the foundation for a mounting suspicion that the whole 
emphasis of the C.D. structure was misplaced. The former, 
for instance, concluded that one of the major defects was 
a lack of understanding of "the objectives and responsibilities 
of panchayat membership and (jLaek of a) readiness to use 
panchayats for planning and executing village development 
programmes" (19). The Report of the U.P. Panchayat Raj 
Committee, speaking of panchayats, also expressed the view 
that their "role in economic development is negligible"
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(1954: 14).
The most interesting points about this tide of dis­
illusion and criticism are that, in the first place, it 
highlighted the inherent tension between the two notions of 
'directed innovation* and 'voluntary participation' and the 
kinds of administrative structures these implied, and 
secondly, it led to a shift of emphasis from the former to 
the latter, however rational or otherwise this could be 
argued to be. When the 2nd Plan Report came to the 
conclusion that the whole question of G.D. administration 
should be reviewed, and suggested that the National 
Development Committee set up an enquiry for the purpose, 
the final outcome was a strong recommendation for "democratic 
decentralisation". The Balvantray Mehta Report (1957) 
suggested the setting up of a "representative democratic 
institution" at block level, to be called the panchayat 
samiti, which should be linked with the gaon panchayat by 
elections, and whose powers should be "concentrated in the 
field of development." The aim was thus to increase local 
self-government and at the same time to mesh it in more 
closely with development activities. All the failings of 
C.D. seemed to be concentrated on the scapegoat of the 
organisational structure.
This shift of emphasis seemed to he the joint product, 
first of a reaction away from the attempted centralism of 
the original C.D. structure, and secondly, of the wave of 
enthusiasm for participatory techniques which was itself 
engendered by the increase in the scale of planning. The 
rural sector thus found itself in the somewhat anomalous 
situation of experiencing, whilst the nation at large 
embarked on a large plan, both a decreased share of resource 
allocation and a movement even further away from the 
organisational structures which were characteristic of 
those nations whose plans seemed most akin to the Indian 
model, both in scale and in emphasis; namely the Soviet 
Union and China.
Indeed, as was suggested earlier, the very contrast 
between the two types of power structure seemed to provoke 
the Indian planners into laying a greater stress on 
voluntarism and participation. This is particularly clear 
in the case of the Delegation to China, since the whole 
theme of their report was the desirability of adopting 
Chinese programmes and patterns, but explicitly without 
the coercive centralism which was a major feature of the
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Chinese system. Only two members of the delegation, 
in a minority report, questioned the possibility or
desirability of such an operation in India, and thus hinted 
at the crucial difference between a participation ideology 
which is backed by coercive means, and one which is not.
Of course the disagreement was not only about the inevitable 
association between particular policies and their means of 
implementation. This minute of dissent argued that the 
cooperativisation of farming was in any case intrinsically 
undesirable. But these members also argued that it was 
naive to suppose such a policy could be implemented within 
a voluntary framework. "We grant", they said, "that 
developments in foreign countries should be viewed with 
sympathy, but we cannot ignore the background of their 
respective political systems and means adopted in achieving 
their objectives ... If we isolate the Gommunist ideology 
and the agrarian policy followed by the Chinese Government, 
we would give an erroneous impression that a similar policy 
can be followed by our country without adopting similar 
means" (Delegation Report; 195)*
In the long term, it seems that the dissenters made 
the more realistic assessment of what was politically viable 
for Indian agriculture, given the constraints on 
implementation which were set by a democratic system.
The Nagpur Resolution of 1959 ratified Congress's approval
of joint farming as the desirable pattern for the whole
rural sector. Of course the passing of such a resolution
gives a spurious impression of unity within Congress, and
the non-emergence of widespread cooperativisation has
undoubtedly been partly the product of opposition and
indifference at a level much higher than that of peasant
or kulak resistance. It has not only been that the system
lacked the means for inducing the cultivator to
13collectivise.  ^ It also lacked the reserves of centralised 
power which would have enabled the government to take the 
ideological initiative and present cooperative farming, 
both to Congress and the nation, as a policy which was 
desirable per se. Only the very beginnings of such 
persuasive powers were available to the government. The 
problem is again the fundamental one of how the mobilisation 
of groups and individuals at all levels is to be achieved 
in a democratic system, whether or not the patterns adopted 
are those typical of more highly centralised regimes. It 
is the recurrent problem in what Hanson calls Nehru's 
"delusive vision" of the possibility "of combining economic 
mobilisation with political conciliation, a soviet economy 
with a western policy" (Streeton and Lipton; 43).
The need to counteract the Plan. The second problem which
was cited above as flowing from the distributionary effects 
of: the 2nd Plan, was that of how they should be countered 
in the short run. There was no doubt that the P.O. was 
aware of such conflicts of interests and claims, and that 
it did attempt to implement ameliorative measures. For 
example, it was clear that large investment in industry was 
liable to make urban incomes rise faster than rural ones.
The P.O., however, deliberately pursued such policies as 
the subsidisation of small scale and village industries.
Since there was little case for this on efficiency grounds,1^ 
the motive would seem to have been to boost rural incomes, 
as well as perhaps to reduce the incentive for urban 
migration. Of course in some cases, the alleviation of 
gross inequalities was perfectly compatible with the 
provisions of the Plan. O.D. and land reform, for instance, 
were partly intended, at least in theory, to improve the lot 
of the landless labourers, even within the general framework 
of a plan which concentrated resources on industry. But 
there were other areas in which the economic forces set in 
motion by the Plan had to be deliberately modified or 
countered in the interests of social equality. Insofar as 
group and sectoral allocations, as they affected differential 
incomes, were not offset by deliberate welfare policy, the
result was liable to be a growth of resentment and dis­
content, whether this was stimulated by a sense of absolute 
or, more probably, of relative deprivation. This leads on 
to the third major outcome of the change of policy emphasis 
in the mid-50fs, which was referred to above as the 
emergence of new, or newly vociferous, underprivileged 
groups. This was important both because it created 
immediate oppositional pressures against the proposed 
policies, and also because it provided potential support 
for the longer-term crystallisation of political opposition 
to Congress.
New interest groups. This kind of discontent, as it 
affected the rural sector, is best symbolised by the peasant 
leader and joint founder of the A.I.K.S., N.G-. Ranga.
Ranga had advanced socialist arguments in the 1930*s and 
had criticised G-andhi for showing signs of being too 
favourably disposed towards upper class interests, both 
rural and urban, in his trusteeship pronouncements, but he 
now developed a blanket anti-urbanism in face of large- 
scale industrialisation and planning.
Briefly, the gist of Ranga*s argument, which rests on 
a reinterpretation of the Marxist exploitation thesis, is 
that as far as the peasantry is concerned, "Sovietism has
come to take up the role of Capitalism in its machinations 
against his class" (1957: 351). Referring specifically
to the 2nd Plan, Ranga admits that "it is true to say that
peasants are the corner-stone in this adventure since in
the long run, their agricultural surplus forms the foundation 
for any development. But because of this, they should not 
be made to suffer too much ... there should be parity in 
the sacrifices demanded, burdens imposed and benefits 
conferred between Peasants and other classes of our society 
in making and implementing our National Development Plans" 
(479-80). Particular grievances are cited, such as that 
"although the 2nd Plan seeks to increase the national 
income by 25% *** peasants are expected to derive not 25% 
of benefit as could be expected ... in accordance with Cthe3 
canons of social justice, but only 18% of increase in their
sector's income" (482), and that "five to six million jobs
are being created for an urban sector which will have 6.3 
million unemployed while only 2.0 to 2.4 millions are being 
offered to the rural sector which will have 9 million 
unemployed" (486).
Ranga concludes that the peasant's position can only 
be improved by "developing political strength in order to 
ward off the mischief of Capitalism and Socialism" (351)*
In this process, cooperative societies have a role to play 
since they will increase group power and bargaining ability. 
Although Ranga claims to represent peasants in general, 
this would seem to indicate that he often identifies with 
the more substantial cultivator, who would benefit most 
from cooperative society membership. In the year after 
this was written, Ranga became one of the founders of the 
All India Agriculture Federation, an association which, as 
Erdman puts it, "claims to be peasant, but is largely kulak" 
(1967s 70). The nature of its sectional interest would
seem to be indicated by the fact that it has declared 
itself opposed both to extended peasant proprietorship and 
to joint farming, on the grounds that they destroy initiative 
(Karunakaran in Poplai, ed. 1963)* When the Nagpur 
Resolution on cooperative farming provided the immediate 
stimulus and rallying point for a new grouping of dis­
contented right-wing elements in the formation of the
Swatantra Party, the A.I.A.F., together with its counterpart
15for the industrial sector, the Forum of Free Enterprise, 
was an important contributing influence. When it came to 
the formulation of the 3rd 5-Year Plan, Swatantra was the 
main spokesman for the opposition, unlike the situation of 
1954-5 when this role had been fulfilled by the Communists.
The 1960's: Congress on the defensive
The growth of formal opposition. By the beginning of the 
1 9 6 0 ' s then, interests which had previously been accommodated 
under the Congress umbrella were finding a vocal mouthpiece 
through Swatantra. Swatantra united the disaffected 
elements which were beginning to channel themselves into 
independent groups at state and local level. For example, 
one small party which turned to Swatantra was the Dehati 
Janata Party which had been founded by the veteran Congress­
man, Nagoke, as a vehicle for opposing the Nagpur Resolution 
(Erdman 1967: 113-5). Ranga himself attracted the remnants
of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, a party dominated by Kamma
16landed interests in the Andhra delta. The most important 
caste group which turned to Swatantra were the Rajputs, 
mainly through the Kshatriya associations of N. India which 
they dominated, such as the Zamindari League in the Punjab, 
and the Kshatriya Mahasabha in G-ujerat.
Thus, although Swatantra was, and is, clearly an 
alliance of many outlooks and interests, as represented by 
the contrast between "modern men" such as Masani and Mody, 
and traditional G-andhians, between Hindu Code reformers and 
the religiously orthodox, it nevertheless contains a strong 
contingent of landed interests, almost certainly motivated
by opposition to land reform, or by the Ranga-type argument 
about exploitation of the rural sector, or by both. This 
would not be surprising, considering that the original 
raison d'etre of Swatantra was the alarm generated by the 
Nagpur Resolution. Erdman reports that ex-princes and 
landed interests dominate the Swatantra hierarchy in Bihar, 
Orissa, Rajasthan, U.P. and the Punjab (1967: 127).
Although now in the late 1960's, Swatantra seems to 
be somewhat in decline, and the initiative to have passed 
to separatist parties, such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazaghan 
in Tamilnadu or the Akali Dal in the Punjab, to the Hindu 
extremists of the Jan Sangh or the Communists of the W.
Bengal United Front, the birth of Swatantra was crucially 
important in that it represented the first major rightwards 
defection from Congress and the first incidence of an 
articulate and united opposition to Congress policy 
specifically and to the planning ethic in general. By 
1962, Swatantra had established itself as the main opposition 
party in the Lok Sabha. Its recurrent theme has been that 
it is not anti-planning per se, but only anti 'Soviet-style 
planning', and in this it has been able to capitalise on 
the Gandhian tradition. As Ranga said in a Lok Sabha 
debate, "we believe in a plan. But our plan is a Gandhian
plan, a plan that has for its foundation Dharma, a plan that 
is based on the initiative of our people, a plan that stands 
for self-employment and security of our people" (Ranga 
n.d.: 27).
Industry and the anti-planning ethic* This outcry against 
government-controlled or totalitarian1 planning■ has found 
a ready response in some areas of industry, where the impact 
of government controls over the private sector has been felt 
to outweigh the advantages of large-scale government invest­
ments in industry which were initially more appealing*
From this point of view, the ideal situation for private 
enterprise would be to retain the state's role as a builder 
of infrastructure, but to abolish, or considerably reduce, 
its control of private enterprise. As in the agrarian 
policy debate, where both cooperativisation and peasant 
proprietorship can be 'proved* to be economically desirable, 
so here too, economic theory can be appealed to for a 
Justification of minimal planning, Just as it can equally 
well be made to supply a rationale for strong central control. 
Economic theories, as is so often apparent, though often 
disputed, tend to contain their own value premises, or 
rather, to be selected for their adaptability to certain 
prior assumptions.
This point is well-illustrated by a speech made by 
A. Shroff of Tata's to the Forum of Free Enterprise in 
1963, after the Congress had '‘placed before the country 
the objective of democratic Socialism". The talk was 
entitled "Will Democratic Socialism help India?" Mr. Shroff 
quoted with approval Milton Friedman, "a world-famous 
economist" who "says of Indian planning 'There is a right 
way and a wrong way to do most things ... a Central 
Government which maintained law and order, provided for 
the national defence, secured people in the enforcement of 
private contracts freely entered into, provided a stable 
monetary framework, fostered the spread of elementary 
schooling and the improvement of road communications, and 
for the rest, fostered a free market to enable millions 
of individuals in this country to use their resources in 
accordance with their own objectives - such a Government 
would be engaging in good planning" (Shroff 1966: 75).
Shroff elsewhere argues that "the edifice of Socialism can 
be built only in the graveyard of Democracy" (56), and, 
in the F.F.E. speech, he went on to suggest that, as far 
as India is concerned, "the answer is provided by the French 
model of planning ... planning by consent," in which "the 
plan is a flexible one and is drawn up in consultation
with all interests concerned" (79)* One might imagine
from this that there were no processes of consultation built
into the operations of the P.O., and no scope for interest
groups to exercise an influence. This is belied, for
instance, by a comparison between the draft and final
versions of the 2nd Plan, which shows an upward revision
of such allocations as would benefit the private sector of 
17industry. The crux of Shroff's argument is revealed by 
the pronouncement that "realistic planning would concentrate 
on providing the infrastructure of the economy" (78).
The centrifugal trend. Thus, in the long term, the policy 
initiatives of the 1950's seem to have provided both the 
reason and the excuse for a renewed outcry of vested 
interests of many varieties, making themselves heard through 
more distinct and more formalised pressure groups and even 
parties, and giving rise to a stronger ideological backlash 
against central planning and the nexus of socialist attitudes 
of which it is accused of being a part. The 1960's has 
been a decade in which both Congress and the Government 
have been put progressively onto the defensive.
Of course this has been a complex process, in which 
the various aspects of reaction to the planning process 
itself have by no means been the only element. The rising
tide of separatism has also played a major part, as have 
external factors such as the Chinese and Pakistani Wars 
and the disastrous harvests of 1965-7* which certainly 
made a major contribution to the grind-down of planning.
But the growth of separatism has not been unrelated to the 
problems entailed by the Plans, since tensions between 
states, and between states and the centre, have been 
heightened and fed by the distributional decision-making 
involved. Indeed, the conflict gets sharper as the power 
balance shifts in the states1 favour through Congress's 
electoral decline. As Hanson puts it, "The allocation 
process has always been a balancing act, in which political 
considerations have been weighed against those of economic 
rationality; the act becomes more delicate as each state 
develops independent political consciousness" (Streeten and 
Lipton 1968: 31). Finally, both the growth of separatism
and the emergence of anti-planning pressure groups, can be 
related to the dying intensity of the impetus towards unity 
which was created by the independence movement. In this 
sense, the centrifugal trend has been a long-term secular 
one, which began immediately after Independence, and to 
which the increased activity and enthusiasm initially 
engendered by planning provided only an apparent and
temporary check.
One major symptom of the decline in the scope of
Government political initiative in the 1960*3 has been the
diminution in the status and power of the P.O.. Since the
end of the 3rd Plan there has been somewhat of a hiatus,
and planning has been based on three successive Annual
Plans, which are "related to the 4th Plan in a rather loose
and informal way.11 (Streeten and Lipton 1968: 4). But
the post-3rd Plan period has also seen aireorganisation of
the structure of the P.O., which took place in the autumn
of 1967. The P.O. was henceforward to concentrate on plan
formulation and evaluation and to avoid executive functions.
Its status was really to be that of an advisory bureau,
and its function as a decision-making body was to be assumed
more by the Development Council. This was what critics of
the Government had been recommending for a long time.
Swatantra in particular, in its anti-statism, had tended to
argue that the P.C. was a non-constitutional body and was
18not properly accountable to parliament.
The growth of "pragmatism11. Such structural indications 
of the decline in power of central Government have their 
parallels in ideological terms, in that there had 
undoubtedly been a swing away from the advocacy of relatively
yxh ^
"socialist" measures towards an increasing "pragmatism". 
Concrete examples of this are not hard to find. In the 
industrial sector, the clearest case concerns the "balance 
which has been thought desirable between private and public 
sectors, partly implemented through resource allocation and 
partly through the degree of control exercised by the state 
over the day-to-day operation of private enterprise.
Emphasis on expanding the public sector was heightened after 
the 1954 Avadi Resolution, and specifically underlined in 
the 2nd Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which stressed 
that "Ihe adoption of the socialist pattern of society as 
the national objective, as well as the need for planned 
and rapid development, require that all industries of basic 
and strategic importance, or in the nature of public utility 
services, should be in the public s e c t o r . I h e  
preference given to the public sector was well illustrated 
by the relative allocations fixed for the two sectors of 
the coal industry in the 2nd Plan. Private enterprise 
had hitherto been dominant in coal-mining, but the P.O. 
suggested that "the additional coal production required to 
meet the increased demand during the 2nd Plan should be 
raised to the maximum extent possible in the public sector" 
(2nd Plans 373). This meant in fact that "new mines had
x U
to be established in practically virgin areas11 (3rd Plan:
511).
The powers of the state to control the private sector 
directly were embodied in the Industrial Act of 1951 and 
the Companies Act of 1956, (Act no. 65 of 1951, and Act 
no. 1 of 1956), which provided various powers of investigation 
and regulation, through licensing and registration 
procedures. Such powers included, for example, possible 
distribution and price control, regulation of the distribution 
of profits, the limiting of simultaneous directorships and 
the right to audit accounts. But probably the most 
important form of control has been that of entrepreneurial 
licencing, "for it directly influences the size, shape and 
purpose of the private sector” (Hanson 1966: 489). This
has created an additional problem in that the attempt to 
influence the overall sectoral balance has become identified 
with a rather cumbersome and time-consuming bureaucratic 
structure.
It is such types and degrees of control that industry 
most objects to. During the 3rd Plan period, they did in 
fact begin to be loosened. As Hanson approvingly puts it,
"As a beginning, industrial licencing has been relaxed, the 
control of capital issues has been liberalised, price controls
on some sixteen commodities have been removed, administrative 
arrangements for dealing with foreign investment proposals 
have been 'stream-lined *, and - perhaps most significant 
of all ,.. control over the price and distribution of steel 
has been partly dismantled" (495)*
The agricultural sector in the I960*s.
The advance of "pragmatism" in the rural sector has 
been equally conspicuous. There are at least two indices 
of this, the first being the decline of interest in co­
operation as applied to farming and the disappearance of 
the 1st Plan's vision of cooperative village management, 
and the second being the virtual demise of community 
development and the advent of the Intensive Agricultural 
Areas Programme.
Decline of cooperative village management. The pattern 
of cooperative village management, as described in chapter 
4 above, was outlined fairly fully in the 1st Plan as the 
ultimate goal for the whole rural sector. Cooperative 
village management has subsequently not so much totally 
disappeared as become progressively diluted and dissected, 
so that the effects are far from what was originally intended. 
Even in the 1st Plan, the radical nature of the blueprint
was mitigated by the implication that its materialisation 
would necessarily be somewhat delayed and remote. The 
only concrete measure which was suggested as a step towards 
the implementation of the pattern was a scheme of land 
management whereby large farms were to be assessed and 
categorised on the basis of their probable post-subdivision 
loss of efficiency. The radical potential of cooperative 
village management was also diminished by the fact that 
community development received a great deal of emphasis in 
the 1st Plan period. As the Praja Socialist Party argued, 
community development without prior or simultaneous 
structural reform was robbed of much of its equalising 
potential.
Ostensibly, the 2nd Plan period witnessed an increase 
of enthusiasm for the cooperative principle as applied to 
farming, and an apparent determination to embark on the 
process of implementation. With zamindari abolution largely 
accomplished, attention could be shifted to the advocacy of 
a ceiling on land holdings and to the process of re­
distribution as a precondition for the establishing of 
universal joint farming. But it became evident during 
this period that, insofar as cooperative farming was to 
spread at all, it would do so in a piecemeal and somewhat
uncoordinated way. By the end of the 1st Plan, there had 
been reported to be 1,379 cooperative farming societies,
,!a fair proportion genuine ... others in which the object 
was to escape the incidence of tenancy legislation11 (2nd 
Plan Review 1957)• The 2nd Plan period did not succeed 
in markedly altering the outlook for cooperative farming.
In 1959* after the Nagpur Resolution, a Working Group 
on Cooperative Parms was set up* Its conclusions were 
that the spontaneous growth of cooperative farms should be 
encouraged, and that any compulsory legislation should be 
repealed. The large credibility and implementation gaps 
between the optimistic advocacy of universal cooperative 
farming, the actual policy of encouraging spontaneous and 
voluntary cooperative farming, and the concrete grass-roots 
growth of cooperative farming societies, have become 
increasingly obvious* By the time of the Draft Outline 
of the still-born 4th Plan, the P.C, was still paying lip 
service to the Nagpur Resolution, since there is a demand 
that the cooperative farm 1fshould be looked upon as an 
important element in schemes for achieving new advances in 
agriculture1 (144)* But the draft Outline does not in fact 
provide much money for cooperative farming, and it is clear 
that, insofar as cooperative farming does survive as a
component of official policy, it does so very much as a 
marginal option rather than as a contender for universal 
adoption.
This has in turn meant that land redistribution, 
originally conceived as an essential part of the evolution 
of cooperative farming, has taken on a quite different 
function. Insofar as redistribution has occurred, it now 
falls into place as an ameliorative and rather marginal 
adjustment to the individual proprietorship pattern, and, 
in this sense, a logical follow-up to zamindari abolition. 
The whole process of the shift in emphasis in successive 
Plans has been termed by one commentator, a ’'regression 
from agrarian reorganisation to land reform" (Dandekar 
1964).
Community Development and the I.A.A.P. The second index 
of the advance of *pragmatism* in agriculture is the marked 
flagging of enthusiasm for C.D., even as remodelled under 
panchayati raj, and its supercession by the Intensive 
Agricultural Areas Programme. A very important factor in 
this has been a growing realisation of the urgency of the 
agricultural situation, and a recognition that, as Mehta 
has put it, "Agriculture is the ultimate core of our 
difficulties and our problems 011 the economic front*1 (1966:
141). The first crisis in confidence vis a vis C.D. led, 
as was described above, to the reorganisation which was 
known as panchayati raj, but as Hansons somewhat sweepingly 
puts it, "anyone with knowledge of the realities of village 
life and of local politics could have predicted that, 
whatever virtues panchayati raj might have as a means of 
political 1 socialisation*, it would not, at least 
immediately, do much to promote the economic development 
of the rural areas." (Streeten and Lipton 1968: 36).
Thus the main criticisms of development under panchayati 
raj took two forms; first that, on its own terms it simply 
would not work, since the obstacles which had marred C.D. 
in the first place were not to be cured by increasing local 
control, and secondly, that in any case it was inefficient 
to spread resources universally and thinly. This latter 
argument was taken up particularly by the Pord Poundation, 
(Report on India’s food crisis and steps to meet it, 1959), 
whose advice was largely responsible for the evolution of 
the pilot Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme in 
the 3rd Plan, and subsequently for the Intensive 
Agricultural Areas Programme.
The logic of the scheme is that concentration of 
resources in receptive areas must represent the optimal
distribution. Lipton suggests that the acceptance of 
complementary development, as represented by these 'packages 
of investment', has been largely influenced by the Schultz 
hypothesis (1964) of the efficient peasant, which makes for 
the assumption that small injections of new resources will 
be relatively ineffective. As Lipton points out, the logic 
of the programme is questionable on many grounds, not least 
because of the probability that the peasant is generally 
engaged in seeking a."survival algorithm" rather than a 
maximisation of production (Streeten and Lipton 1968:
112-7). Another major point for concern must be the dis- 
tributional effects of the programme, since it explicitly 
channels resources to areas which are already relatively 
well-endowed. The aim officially is that they should have 
a spill-off effect, but this seems a rather remote and 
itnreliable possibility.
Community Development, as originally conceived and 
implemented, was at least intended to cover the whole rural 
sector and to distribute its benefits as widely as possible. 
In practice, it turned out to be distributing additional 
resources and income very unevenly as between the strata of 
rural population. While little has been done to overcome 
this lateral maldistribution, a new element of vertical,
or geographical concentration has now been added to the 
situation.
It seems inevitable, therefore, that the tendency of 
these two trends, the decline of cooperative farming and 
the supercession in priority of the I.A.A.P. over O.D., 
lies in the direction of consolidating peasant proprietor­
ship as it now stands, even if the occasional cooperative 
farming venture continues to decorate the margins of 
agriculture. Cooperative credit, supply, and marketing 
facilities are of course quite compatible with, and indeed 
even conducive to, this pattern, since they serve to support 
and increase the security of the individual proprietor.
But they can help the landless labourer not at all, and 
the tiny plot holder hardly at all.
Conclusion: the ideological cycle.
There is in all this, of course, the acute difficulty 
of trying to assess whether such changes of emphasis are 
due to the political elite having, as it were, on their own 
initiative, learned by experience, or whether it is mainly 
a case of the left wing within Congress having lost the 
initiative, especially since the death of Nehru, or whether 
finally, it is rather the product of the growing weight of
counter veiling pressure being exerted on the Government as 
a whole by the increasingly articulate pressure groups of 
a pluralist society, There is no doubt that all three 
types of factors have been relevant, but it is enough in 
this context to argue that the swing away from the more 
ideologically assertive policies of the 1950fs has at least 
been significantly exacerbated by oppositional pressures 
in the nation at large.
This leaves the way open for the suggestion that the 
ideology-power situation has come full circle, in the sense 
that, before independence Gongress ideology represented a 
demand-input vis a vis the Government of India, but Congress 
has now emerged as itself the receiver of similar demand- 
input s from the range of sectional interests in the community 
at large. In between, it has passed through two stages, 
in the first of which it found itself as intermediate between 
the demander and the receiver roles, its task then being to 
attempt to reconcile the two functions and their ideological 
counterparts through moderation and compromise. In the 
second phase, it took a step towards assuming the role of 
ideological initiator, in which, as the active policy-maker, 
it attempted to define objectives and priorities and to make 
use of ideology as a means of implementing these. But this
2/ *
latter attempt provoked reactions of many dimensions which, 
have had their feedback and have contributed to the nature 
of Congress's present role as more nearly that of a broker 
than a policy-initiator.
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NOTES * CHAPTER 5.
1. Functionalist theory in particular has been eager to 
explore the specific role of cultural symbols in maintaining 
national unity. Myron Weiner, writing of India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon, suggests that if,During the national movement and now 
after Independence, nationalists in each country have made 
some effort to utilise religion and other traditional elements
as a means of achieving integration.'*1 But for India, with 
its multi-religious community ansi avowedly secular state,
Hindu symbols could not prevail. Hence, "in selecting a 
national symbol, the leadership turned to the sculptured 
pillar of lions, the royal symbol of the Buddhist King Asoka, 
as a symbol drawn from neither Hinduism nor Islam, " and 
"postage stamps portray leaders of all religions™ (Almond 
and Coleman I960: 242).
2. The resolution included the clause: "the objective 
of our economic policy should be a socialistic pattern of 
society, and towards this end the tempo should be stepped 
up to the maximum possible extent" (Lok Sabha Debates 2, IX, 
3692).
3. The 1955-6 Budget has sometimes optimistically been 
called 1India1s first socialist budget*. It included special
*//
taxes for business executives, stiffer income tax, and the 
promise of substantial deficit financing for development.
It v/as described in the Times of India, 1st March, 1955.
4. The sharpest criticism of the Plan at an official 
level came from K.G. Neogy, a member of the Planning
Commission, who maintained that its magnitude was bound to 
be inflatfonayy and that '"a massive superstructure has been 
raised on precarious foundations11. But Neogy received little 
support when his views wer*e aired before the National 
Development Council (Hanson 1966: 140).
5. It can in fact be argued that Indian planners and 
economists alike have persistently understressed, or even 
glossed over, the dependence of industrial growth both on 
a parallel growth in agriculture and on the process of 
"siphonong off" agricultural resources. This case is put 
by T. Byres (1969). In the 2nd Plan, he says, "nowhere is 
it pointed out that in the event of inadequate growth in 
agriculture the only way to sustain industrial advance is 
through more effective mobilisation policies'" (5).
Similarly, in the 1955 joint Memorandum of the Planning 
Commission^ Economists Panel, the fact l"that industrialisation
might necessitate hardship for the peasant is not observed^
(7). Byres concludes that this may be partly due to the
phenomenon of ‘"intellectual attitudes reflecting political 
reality" (10), but he suggests that the major influence is 
to be located in the colonial past. On the one hand, the 
psychological legacy of colonialism has produced "a continuing 
adherence to the conceptual apparatus of the ex-rulers" (10), 
which militates against a recognition of sectoral conflict 
such as is contained typically in Marxist theory. On the 
other hand, the nationalist response to colonialism produced 
"a way of looking at economic reality which minimised 
possible sacrifice" (11).
6. Nehru1s presidential address to Congress in Oct.,
1951, after the Tandon affair, was, for example, a clear 
attempt to provide a rallying point after the divisions and 
conflicts of the previous year. "We have to pull ourselves 
up", he said, "from mutual recriminations...Let us not 
attach too much importance to winning or losihg an election.
If we win a fight within ourselves, then other triumphs will 
come to us also" (Presedential Address, Indian National 
Congress, 57th Session: 20-21).
7. The rate of urbanisation has been positive at least
teimce-'the beginning of the century, m  1901, the urban share 
of the population was 11$. By 1961, it had. risen to 18$
(Bose 1965).
8* Byres asserts that: ^The works on'taxation almost
invariably reveal, in the words of one of them, that "Indian 
agriculture possesses the capacity to pay additional taxes'* " 
(1969:9). But it is politically virtually impossible to raise 
rural taxation. The U.P. Zamindari abolition Act of 1950, 
for instance, eliminated any possibility of greater financial 
extraction through revenue by freezing the current rates for 
a period of forty years into the future.
9. The obvious example of an identification of
mobilisation' with command economies, is Apter's model of
the 'mobilisation system', whose polar opposite is the
'reconciliation system'. These and the intervening types 
of the 'modernising autocracy' and the 'feudal system' are
Outlified in The Politics of Modernisation, 1965.
10. • The Draft 4th Plan, for example, speaks of the need 
for 5f,a deliberate strengthening of the national will towards 
social and economic growth1' (33).
11. Sometimes, two types of panchayats were set up and 
endowed separately with judicial and administrative functions. 
This was the case in U.P. after an act of 1947. A 
description of the U.P. system is given in R.H. Retzlaff 1962.
12. These were B.J. Patel (Hon. Sec. Gen., All-India Coop, 
Union), and R.N. Rana (Registrar, Coop. Socs., Bombay State).
It is interesting that the two members who were involved in 
the structure of the cooperative movement advised in favour 
of credit and supply cooperatives, but against cooperative 
farming. Those who advocated the latter course (the majority 
of the Delegation), were. M.P.'s, a member of the Research 
Dept, of the A.I.C.C., and a ministerial advisor on 
cooperatives.
13. This is not to imply that coercive resources eliminate 
all mobilisation and motivational problems. This is clearly 
not the case, as the imperfect performance of Soviet 
agriculture and the persistence of productive private plots 
indicates.
14. The 2nd Plan set up a Small-Scale Industries Board, 
to provide facilities for supply, marketing, credit and 
technical assistance for firms with less than Rs.5 lalchs of 
capital and fewer than 50 employees. Such subsidies have 
been criticised on many grounds. Dhar and Lydalju, for 
instance, came to the conclusion that small factories % s e  
more capital and more labour per unit of output than large 
factories'** (1961: 19).
15. The B.P.R. was started in Bombay in 1956 by Shroff 
of TataTs and Vaidya of the Indian Rayon Corporation. It 
claimed to be non-political, but took a stand against government
controls and taxation.
16. Details of these small parties which joined with
Swatantra are given by Erdman (1967) in his chapter on !The 
Swat antra Coalition. 1
17. Comparison of the Plan-frame and the Pinal Draft of
the 2nd Plan, shows that the share of public investment in 
industry and mining.was reduced from 25.6% to 18.5%, whilst 
that for transport and communications rose from 22.1% to 28.9%. 
Brecher suggests that the development of transport was in
the interests of private enterprise because it mcould 
facilitate the growth of private investment in the countryside 
and would ease the flow of raw materials to the city and the 
reverse flow of urban-manufactured goods to the rural areas1* 
(1959: 543).
18. Masani, the Swatanta General Secretary, is reported
to have si ad, **If the Swat antra Party had a chance, its
first act would be to liquidate the P.O.** (reported in the 
Statesman: 6th J u n e , i960).
19. The text of the 2nd Industrial Policy Resolution is 
to be found in the 2nd Pive-Year Plan: 43-50.
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C H A P T E R  6 
Ideology and policy in the states
The importance of state politics.
Many reasons suggest themselves for looking at the 
course of policy development at the state level during
the period since Independence. Eirst, it might be assumed
that there is here a direct parallel with the process of
policy-formation at the national level. But has it in fact
been the case that there has been the same pattern of
conflicting and at times mutually-incompatible ideological
strands, and the same process over time of ideological
thrust followed by oppositional feedback, as has seemed to
characterise policy formation at the national level? It
is interesting to consider whether the states may be seen
as microcosms in this way, or whether there are more
distinctive factors at work which prevent the drawing of such
parallels.
The second reason for looking at the state level is 
that it is one stage nearer to the actual implementation 
of policy locally. This consideration may appear to
2SJ
represent a deviation from the main theme of the thesis, 
hut this is not really the case, for the process of 
implementation cannot hut have a feedback on the process 
of policy formation, even if a lag is involved. 'the 
process of implementation is particularly important in 
the case of rural policy, Y/hilst the major thrust of 
industrial policy can be executed under the aegis of the 
central government, as can many of the 1 chunky1 
agricultural investments, such as large-scale irrigation 
works, the actual application of agrarian and agricultural 
policy at the grass-roots level is to a large degree the 
responsibility of the states. liven within the framework 
of the formulated plans, which are partly the product of 
suggestions by the states, but are largely modified by 
central priorities and allocations, the federal government 
is very dependent on the willingness and efficiency of the 
state governments for the execution of its policies,
This is a great source of frustration for the central 
government, but at least New Delhi can sometimes employ 
incentives and sanctions through financial support. At 
first sight, it would seem to be the case that the 
proportion of public investment in agriculture for which 
the centime is responsible has been relatively low since
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the 2nd Plan, with only a slight rise again in the proposed 
4th Plan, the figures being 83k? 13k? 13k and 22>i for the 
four Plans respectively, which would seem to suggest that 
t e states have exercised a high degree of autonomy over 
their agricultural investments. However, even the sums 
which are designated as the states’ shares of total public 
investment, both agricultural and industrial, are in part 
subsidised by the centre, and this subsidy (for both 
sectors) has steadily increased from 39k in the 1st Plan 
to 43k in the 2nd and. 62k in the 3rd (Etienne 1968s 12). 
Whilst this increase has undoubtedly been largely prompted 
by the states' inability to expand their capacity for 
mobilising finance, it has also given the centre scope for 
control, however limited, over the execution of rjolicy by 
means of threats and incentives. At the beginning of 1964? 
for instance, "the Planning Commission informed the states 
that aid from the central government would be reduced if 
funds intended for agriculture and community development 
were used for other purposes" (Etienne 1968:13)•
Haybe this is a slender means of control, and such 
incidents serve only to indicate the way in which central 
government subsidies may go astray, rather than the 
effectiveness of central control over policy execution.
But in the case of. land., as distinct from agricultural, 
policy, not even this degree of control exists. As 
specified in Clause 7 of the Constitution, the states 
initiate their own agrarian legislation and are them­
selves responsible for rural taxation, with the central 
government confining itself to suggestions. It is 
therefore necessary to examine legislation at the state 
level to discover how far the policy initiatives of the 
centre succeed in percolating downwards. Only thus can 
it become evident how the grass-roots level has actually 
been affected by policy. Given the ideological configu­
rations at national level, in the last resort conditions 
in the village will be greatly affected by the politics of 
state government, the quality of local administration, and 
the impact of policy on the distribution of power in the 
village situation. Having considered the range of 
intentions and values implicit in policy-making at the 
various levels, it is then important to ask whether and 
how things; have been tangibly altered for the mass of the 
rural population. To take a case in point, what material 
changes have there been for the cultivator?
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The first task then, is to consider policy-making 
at the state or micro level, to see whether it has run 
in the same grooves of rising and falling ideological 
intensity, encountered the same ideological contradictions 
as national policy-making, and to see whether it has 
reflected the same priorities in terms of content. The 
general conclusion will be that there are parallels to be 
drawn between the two levels, but the pattern at the state 
level is usually a considerably dampened one, for a variety 
of reasons.
There is one major obstacle which immediately presents 
itself in the path of such an analysis. This is the 
contention that the whole language of ideological concepts 
and alliances does not form part of the currency of politics 
at any level lower t' an the national. This is a view 
which is frequently expressed, and which is typified by 
brass's remark, made specifically in the context of U.V., 
that it is unlikely 1 that party sentiment or ideology will 
play much of a role in local politics in India for some 
time to come, if ever" (Brass 1965:164) • V/hat is meant 
by this, n-pd is it the case that analysis in terms of 
ideology is quite .inapplicable at the state and lower levels?
ze>j
The infliieiice of fact 1 onalisin0 Brass's remark is made
in the coiirse of discussing the role of factionalism and
its ubiquitous influence, both in the fabric of government
formation and the exercise of power, and as a motivational
element in voting behaviour. He is engaged in modifying
the assertion that "for the greater part of India • • . caste
loyalty comes usually before party sentiment and ideological
alignments" (Purer-Iiaimendorf in C.II. Phillips, ed* 1962:65),
but only by arguing that factional allegiance creates a
further complicating factor which may cut across caste 
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loyalty. One might assume that factional, rather than 
caste, allegiances would be one stage nearer an ideological 
type of configuration, since factions might cohere around 
distinct economic interests and therefore give rise to 
consistent justifications and ideas about policy. But 
Brass argues that factionalism has no such, consistency of 
crystallisation, and often occurs for purely personal or 
nepotistic reasons.
The importance of factionalism from the state level 
downwards is convincingly demonstrated in Brass's study.
At the state governmental level, for instance, he describes 
the conflicts which arose under Sampurnanand's chief 
ministership, after Pandit Pant had left for Delhi in 1955c
Z&d
These conflicts, he argues, were almost solely the out- 
come of hitter persona1 rivalry between the two politicians, 
I!olo G-autnn and Chin GrijOta, and 1 the struggle which began 
between these two men in 1952 .0 . has brought disruption 
and division in the government and in the party, in Lucknow 
and in every district in the state" (1965s44)* 
dampurnanand can be argued to have exacerbated the conflict 
by pursuing a policy of rel 'ing first on one of the- rivals 
to the exclusion of the other, and then reversing their 
roles, but the main factor seems to have been personal 
antagonism, since it is claimed that "there were no real 
.policy differences between the opposing groups" (4b) c For 
instance, when Gkmtam was enjoying a period of supremacy, 
G-upta and his followers in the party organisation provoked 
a conflict over the retirement age of government officials, 
favouring fifty-five as against the government-favoured age 
of fifty-eight* The insignificance of the issue is argued 
to be a measure of the lack of doctrinal difference between 
the two contestants for powe.L »
Brass supports his assertion that factionalism invades 
the fabric of all levels of state politics by showing how 
this particular fission in Lucknow spread its tentacles to 
the district level through the medium of patronage. G-upta
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and G-autam were to some extent able to undermine each 
other’s supporters, and to promote their own, by exercising 
an influence on the distribution of tickets for local 
elections o In G-onda district in 1955? for instance, a 
local rivalry for a Congress Assembly candidature was taken 
up at state level, very much as local conflicts may be 
engulfed in the partisan disputes of the big power blocs 
in the global context. G-autam, who was at the time out 
of office, "worked tirelessly" on the members of the Central 
Parliamentary Board and finally succeeded in having the 
ticket given to his protege, a relative outsider. This led 
to the disruption and eventual rupturing of the G-onda 
District Congress.
finally, factionalism is held to exercise a rug or 
influence at the basic political level of voting behaviour.
This is illustrated from the constituency of Barnawa, "the 
only constituency in the entire state in which the majority 
of voters belongs to a single caste" (199) ? since 60(;o of 
the population are Jats. In 1962, however, a Jat candidate 
standing for Congress lost to an independent Rajput 
candidate. This seems to have happened because the Jat 
vote was split amongst several Jat candidates. As Brass 
puts it, "factionalism in the majority community and inter­
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caste alliances among the minority communities determined 
the election outcome*,tf
The overa.ll argument, then, is that in general, 
political conflict and competition do not actually occur, 
nor are they conceived as occurring, over matters of 
principle., Ideology as a set of motivational impulses 
is hard to find, either among politicians or the electorate. 
Political allegiances crystallise mostly around personal 
interests and antagonisms, whether of a factional or a 
caste natureo
Party support and ideology * Against this account of the 
situation, several points may he made. lire first is that 
parties, from wherever and however they derive their 
support, must formulate some sort of political programme, 
and differences of policy at the state governmental level ■ 
may he quite consistent with a non-existence of ideological 
cleavage in the lower ranks of party organisations<>^
Hywever, it is often argued that even party distinctions 
which at the national level would have some ideological 
content, at lower levels become merely convenient labels 
for opposing camps, and that in fact "the party labels Eire 
worn and interchanged by factions representing castes, 
regions or religious groupings or which are sometimes simply
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personal cabals around a particular leader” (haxwell, The 
Times: 6.1.69)•
But if this were entirely the case, if, in other words, 
there were 'pure factionalism1 as represented By an almost 
completely random distribution of party labels amongst 
competing factions, then it seems that two things should 
follow. first, there should be very little correspondence 
between kinds of people, in terms of social and economic 
categories, and the kinds of parties which they support or 
attach themselves to. Secondly, there should be little 
correlation between party labels and the kinds of policies 
advocated.
It must surely be the case that this is too extreme 
an account of Indian state, if not of district and village, 
politics. Social analyses of voting behaviour do show 
some evidence of connections between economic and social 
position and party identification, even if caste and 
communal loyalties do act as cross-cutting; and intervening 
variables. Ilardgrave (1966), for instance, in a study of 
the Nadars of familnad, comes to the conclusion that this 
community has passed through several stages of political 
cohesivenesso In their original toddy-tapping environment, 
in which they were numerically dominant, politics took place
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within the community and "between factional client grouos«
In their later urban setting in Itamnad, the Nadars were 
in a minority and politics became primarily a facet of 
caste-solidarity. finally, Hardgrave maintains, with 
long-term urbanisation in cities such as Madurai and 
Madras, the hadare have reached a stage of internal 
differentiation, fanning out over a range of occupations. 
There appeal’s now to be 110 "Nadar vote1 as such. The 
mill-v/orkers are more likely to vote Com;amist together 
with workers of other castes, than to vote Congress, as do 
many Nadars of more professional status, whilst the young 
are attracted by the Tamil nationalism of the D.II.K.. Caste, 
in other words, has been replaced by economic, generational 
or regional solidarity as the main moving factor. If the 
Nadars have voted more solidly for the D.M.K. since this 
was written, as seems likely, it is presumably more 
probable that they have been caught up in a general swing 
rather than that - they have returned to a caste consistency 
of voting.
Brass’s study also offers evidence that the support of 
parties is not wholly on a factional basis, or rather, is 
not wholly ideologically-arbitrary within a factional 
framework. In his description of the break-up of the
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G-onda Congress in 1955* he reports that the disaffected - 
Raja of i-!.ankepur who had previously controlled the local 
Congress5 and who had been crossed by the repercussions 
of the G-autam-G-upta conflict, mustered his allies to stand 
as independents in the by-election which had precipitated 
the conflict and in the subsequent Elections of 1957« But 
finally, in 1959* and in the first year of its formation, 
the Raja and his followers joined Swatantra* It seems 
more than coincidental that a Raja who had retained 2,000 
acres of land even after zamin&ari abolition, should end 
up supporting a party whose raison d’etre was to oppose 
the liagpur Resolution, and all that it seemed to.- entail of 
government intervention in the agrarian structure.
If, then, there can be said to be at least some 
evidence that the group or class support of parties is far 
from being completely random, even within a factional 
framework, there are also indications that, conversely, a 
party cannot be unaffected by the nature of its support*
In this context, Bailey's description of party politics in 
Orissa is interesting. It seems that the Orissa Congress, 
at least in the 1950's, rather than beginning to disintegrate, 
actually absorbed a wider range of interests ana extended 
its social base in an attempt to stave off electors,! defeat*
Its main rival has been the Ch-mat ante lari shad which 
flourishes in the ex-^rincely-state hill areas* In 1956, 
Congress leaders were so alarmed at the growing strength 
of this party, that t'-ey "healed the breach between them­
selves and the rentier class „* * and important individuals 
in the rentier class were given Congress tickets"
(Philips 1963: 99). furthermore, in 1959? the strategy 
of self-defence and alliance led to an actual coalition wi 
the Parishad, which, as Bailey puts it, "is commonly 
labelled 'feudal reactionary' " (1959: 187)•
The interesting point is .Bailey's conclusion that 
this shift or extension in the social base of Congress 
support must necessarily be reflected in Congress attitude 
"My own opinion," he says, "is that this Coalition will 
speak for the middle classes, and by its creation the 
territorial cleavage of East and Vest has been replaced 
by a class division, which may eventually become a class 
conflict when the peasants are better able to present tlne±r 
case in the democratic forum" (Philips 1963: 100)* 
Ideological cleavage between parties^ and programmes * 
Counter examples to the case of the Raja of hankepur could 
no doubt be produced of landowners, especially perhaps in 
Bengal, aligning, themselves with one or other wing of the
Communist movement, and it would clearly be impossible to 
argue that there is either consistent or widespread 
identification of social and economic interests or 
opinions with what might be termed the ."expected" political 
labels. Brass implies that a-major confounding factor is 
the personal nature of Indian politics, which means that 
”a politician may join a ’socialist’ faction, not because 
he has any ideas aoout Socialism, but because he admires 
certain characterisitics of the leader of the faction ~ 
characteristics which have nothing to. do with ideology1 
(1965; 54).
The most that can be suggested is that there is at 
least sometimes some degree of coherent differentiation of 
interest" between parties or between elements of their 
supporters. Therefore, in order to argue that parties 
at the state governmental level do exhibit some differences 
of policy preference which tend towards the manifestly 
ideological, it is not necessary to argue that such values 
persist in total disjunction from the social make-up of 
party support. It can instead be argued that the political 
differences between parties are probably nourished and 
reinforced only to the extent to which they do represent 
distinguishable cleavages of interests and opinion among
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their supporters and, more importantly, their 
representatives. Because factionalism is so rampant 
and because it more often overrides and blurs, rather 
than reinforces, such distinctions, the impulse towards 
doctrinal distinctness between parties is considerably 
weakened.
However, if there is even a degree of differentiation 
of interests behind party labels, this makes it more likely 
that they will exhibit different policy preferences. And 
even those writers who argue most forcefully that Indian 
local politics is faction-ridden and therefore not in any 
coherent sense ideological, are prepared to speak of 
governments formed by 1 coalitions from every shade of 
political attitude11, albeit "brought together* only by 
antipalhy to the Congress Party and the desire to share 
the fruits of office1 (Maxwell, The Times 6.1.69)* How­
ever arbitrary and fluctuating; the coalitions, it still 
seems that some kind of substantive ideological spectrum' 
emerges and can be identified. This point is further 
illustrated by Neville H'axwell when he argues that the 
1969 mid-term elections presented an interesting prospect 
because "This time,it seems likely that the state Congress 
Parties will agree to join coalitions; then at last it will
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be seen which way Congress jumps - or splits - when it
bias to choose between left and right*1
Altogether then it would seem too sweeping to argue 
that any ideological analysis is impossible in state 
and district politics* Whilst the conventional ideological 
cleavages and distinctions may not hold good as cognitive
and motivational elements, particularly at the lower levels
and may quite often not serve as distinguishing criteria 
between the personnel of parties because of other and 
cross-cutting ties, nevertheless there is still enough
i
coherence for parties at the governmental level to carry 
a recognisable political and ideological complexion, and 
for it to be possible for this to manifest itself in 
influences on concrete policy-making* It is with this 
level of governmental participation by parties and politicians 
that we are most concerned in considering the appropriateness 
of drawing a parallel between national and state policy 
formation*
Changes over time *
Another point to be made in qualification of the 
argument that state politics must be seen as 11 on-ideological, 
is that allowance must be made for change over time*
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Independence itself lias initiated processes which have 
affected the fabric of politics and its orientation towards 
or away from manifestly ideological conflicts« Again, 
this is an aspect of Indian regional politics which is not 
infrequently discussed, hut most often in the context of 
political ’’development" * This is largely because the 
growth of participationary politics is seen as an index of 
modernisation, even if one which may have the by-product of 
enlarging the gap between the so-called mass and elite 
cultures in India. It is worth looking at such discussions 
to discover whether they are dealing with processes which 
may have repercussions on the ideological content of politics» 
They may also suggest something about the fluctuation of 
ideological initiative in the states since Independence, which 
may be compared with the rise and fall of initiative at 
national level.
The two cultur es _ approach» Kyron Weine r, for ex amp 1 e ,
identifies the two political cultures which operate at 
different levels, as, on the one hand, the predominantly 
but not entirely 1 traditionalf politics of the district, 
which reaches out to state level also, and, on the other 
hand, the predominantly but not entirely ’modern' cuilture 
of the national leaders and planners of Hew Delhi (Pye and
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Verba 1965s 199)* The contention is that the increasing 
role of .government, the dispersion of political power 
through pancliayati raj, and the operation of parliamentary 
democracy, have provided the stimulus for an increasing 
intensity of activity at both levels, but also for a 
growing gap between the tv^ o, as their confrontation only 
serves to emphasise the difference between their 
perspectives.
It is argued that the expansion of village politics 
has contribiited to the emergence of a ma,ss political culture, 
signified by the high participation in elections and avid 
competition for office. Weiner contends that this is 
primarily a burgeoning of "status politics" though he does 
admit that the access to resources, both formal and informal, 
which office brings, is an important factor« The scope 
for patronage and bribery is increased and so, whilst 
participation in politics grows, so does sectionalism 
and political cynicism. This in turn produces a, common 
critique and disdain a ongst the modern and nationally- 
based elite, which expresses itself in opposition to 
communalism, in resentment at the allegedly disappearing 
spirit of dedication at lower levels, and in annoyance at 
the failures of planning implementation at the local level 
(22b-35).
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Movement of leaderSo Forrester (1966) pursues a similar 
argument in examining types of political leadership in India, 
lie argues, however, that it is not only increasing activity 
and contact "between the two levels which hes led to their 
more marked divergence, hut also the fact that Independence 
intensified the siphoning off of a particular type and 
vintage of leadership from the states to the national 
government. This left a vacuum which has been subsequently 
filled by new-style “siicro-political" leaders who are more 
insular in outlook and who are primarily interested in state 
and district politics as an arena for enlarging their own 
power,
Most members of state legislatures, he explains, are 
now rural by origin and have most often been brought up in 
their own constituencies and so have many local caste and 
kinship ties. In consequence of this rural shift, 
educational standards within the legislatures "have fallen 
considerably” and caste considerations have become more and 
more important. National politics, by contrast, functions 
in a more coherent and less fractionalised way primarily 
because there is still at this level a fund of educated, 
urbanised and more cosmopolitan leadership. The gap between 
the two cultures has become more evident not only because
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the scope of government has widened, so raising general rates 
of political participation and heightening the long- 
existent contrast between the nature of traditional village 
politics and. modern central government, but also because 
the pull of central government has actually deprived the 
states of some of the leaders who might otherwise have 
exerted a stabilising and more politically sophisticated 
influence«
Since it tends to be assumed in these accounts that 
part of what distinguishes the modern orientation of 
central government is the fact that alignments occur at 
least not infrequently along lines of interest or ideolo­
gical solidarity, and since it is also contended that a 
stratum of relatively modern-oriented leadership has been 
drawn away from the state level, there would seem to be 
grounds for the assumption that there has been a change in 
the nature of state politics over time. If its 
'ideological content' is now low, this must be seen against 
a bac! .ground ox secular decline or, less pejoratively, 
shift•
leaders hip in II»P * This again ties up with Brass's 
description of the course of U«P. politics since Independence* 
As noted above, he is committed to the view that ideological
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analysis is hardly applicable in contemporary state 
politics, but he explicitly sets the dividing line at 
Independence, arguing of the pre-Independence period that 
"Divisions between 'modernists1 and. 'traditionalists',
1 secularists' and 'revivalists', which seemed important 
then, hardly occur within the Congress party today" (1965s34).
This is held to be largely traceable to the fact that 
"political leadership in U.P. passed from the hands of the 
prominent leaders of the nationalist movement from this 
state into the hands of the second rank of party workers" (33)° 
Pre-Independence leaders are seen as divisible into the 
ideal-types of modernist (Jawaharlal hehru), traditionalist 
(ihirushottaudas Tandon), ideologist (Acharya Dev), 
virtuoso politician (Ha.fi Kidwai), and arbiter (Pandit Pant),
It is contended that several of these types have gradually 
become extinct, with the modernists, traditionalists and 
ideologists disappearing first, followed finally by the last 
of the arbiters when Pandit Pant went to Delhi. This has 
left the field almost entirely to the viituoso politicians, 
such as G-upta and Gautara. The new regime is characterised 
by the "rise of party men to government office", and an 
"increase in the frequency and intensity of internal factional, 
quarrels" (50), in which "neither ideological nor policy
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issues are involved” (52). Altogether, and. in spite of
the attempted congress reorganisation under the 1963 
5Kamraj Plan,' Mit is personal politics with a vengeance” 
(55).
That this has indeed heen the case and that it has 
had repercussions for planning implementation and for the 
administrative structure is confirmed 'by Etienne.
Iriting of the weaknesses of the U.P. administration, he 
suggests that t!To act effectively the administration needs 
to feel itself supported hy the cabinet at Lucknow, but the 
latter has been so racked with dissensions since the 
departure of 3?andit Pant in 1954 that it is at the mercy of 
political intrigues. The administration is usually 
subordinated to the short-term interests of local leaders” 
(1968s 181).
Tjie curve of ideological initiative at centre and state.
The combined effect of these various accounts of the 
course of state politics in general, and of IT.P. politics 
in ;articular, is to build up a picture which would seem in 
many ways to be in direct contrast to the development of 
national politics. whilst the latter has been character­
ised by an increasing crystallisation of interest groups 
which have served to help check the ideological initiative
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of the Government through their articulation of anti­
planning and anti-struetural-reor ganisati011 ideology, 
the state arena seems to have witnessed a total shrivelling 
of ideological dehate, It seems that it is not a case of 
rival or conflicting ideology, hut of no ideology at alio 
There has heen ideological disintegration, rather than 
segregation and crystallisation0
-thr many reasons, this stark contrast is misleading.
It dichotomises Indian politics in an unreal way, Whilst 
there are of course salient differences between national 
and regional levels, these are not so extreme as to prevent 
parallels being drawn. In many ways, the states have 
experienced a modified form of the course of national 
politics. But because there have been exaggerating or 
depressing factors, as well as leads and lags in time 
perspectives, and some features which are unique to 
politics nearer to the grass-roots, the parallel has often 
been obscured, It remains to try and spell out this 
parallel.
Congress 16 03.1116, hirst, it is certainly the case that, 
as at the national level, so in many of the states also, 
there has been an exodus from Congress of extremes of 
opinion which, until Independence, were retained within it. 
In Uolh, the earliest pivots of opposition were the
3 05
Rashtriya Gwayamsevak Sangh and the Jan Sangh, both of 
which were fornded by people who had ueither no past 
association with the Congress or who had only slight 
associations with the Congress1 .(Brass 1965. 24) « But 
the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, . 
which amalgamated in 1952 into the Pray a Socialist Party, 
and later on. Swatantra, all either issued directly from 
splits in Congress or drew support from former Congress 
personnel o \7ith the emergence of Swat antra, the range .of 
at least theoretically differentiated segments of the 
ideological spectrum was, as at the national level, fairly 
complete.
This meant that increasingly the area of political 
middle ground was left to Congress. Pith the shedding of 
extremes, there was likely to be less scope for ideological 
conflict within Congress itself. This may be one reason 
why the old kinds of dispute, which Brass finds typical of 
the pre-Independence Congress, became rarer and why non­
policy bickering grew. As Brass points out, it was 
precisely because there were ''no real policy differences" 
(4S) between the intra- and extra- Government Congress 
factions in the mid-50's that such trivial issues as the 
retirement age of officials had to be picked upon as bones
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of contention. In fact, after the departure of Pant, 
the !,new Saiupumanand ministry was composed almost 
completely of the old group of Oojigress Socialists who had 
remained in the Congress” (46). Moreover G-autam, who 
was at first excluded from the ministry and consequently 
'became the leader of the major extr .-Government faction, 
had himself been a founder member of the O.SoP. in U.Po*
It is thus arguable that the growth of factionalism, 
both \7ithin Congress and in state politics generally, has 
been but one aspect of the decreasing dominance of Congress, 
another aspect of which has been the multiplication of 
parties and the segregation out of ideological view­
points which this implies. The two processes have fed 
and exacerbated each other, for the passing of the older 
generation of politicians who derived their perspectives 
and their stature from the Independence movement has been 
accompanied also by a decline in the charisma of Congress„
In general, the buttresses to loyalty have progressively 
been undermined, and secession made easier, whether it is 
for reasons of ideology, such as caused the resignation of 
the twelve C.S.P. Members of the IuA* and the exit of most 
of the socialists from the U.P« Congress in 1948, or for 
reasons primarily of personal pique or ambition, such as in
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the case of the Raja of Manic e pur *
This has meant that the final range of parties 
.produced is a mixture of those which are ideologically 
relatively specific, and those which are mere excuses for 
opposition, and this is certainly a feature which is more 
characteristic of state than of central politics * However, 
after two decades of independence, the major contestants 
in the U.P* elections of 1969? besides Congress, were the 
two main Communist Parties and the Jan Sangh, which between 
them would surely seem to represent a considerable 
polarisation of political opinion.
The pace of the splintering.process« The second way in 
which the fanning out of state parties and interest groups 
has differed from that at the national level, is that it 
has been a more gradual and continuous process, and one which 
in some states at least, began earlier. Hot surprisingly 
perhaps, Congress has always received a higher percentage of 
votes and seats in the lok Cab ha. than in the state 
Assemblies as a whole, but on the contrary, and presumably 
because of the distribution of voting in constituencies, 
the other all-India parties have always done better in the 
states than at the centre, in terms of seats, though not 
of voteso^
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T lis would suggest that, insofar as national parties
have emerged to challenge Congress in the Lok Sabha, they
h i.ve done so partly by picking up support ana forming a
series of bases in the local context. ifon-Congress
politicians in the states have either attached themselves
to distinctively loca.1 or regional parties (such as the
Dol'hKo in Ladras or the Akali Dal in the Punjab) , or they
have provided a source of potential support for the all-
India parties0 Such support has been potential because it
has often gone through a transitional stage of apparent
independence before accepting the title of the larger
national body. An example of this, besides the above-
mentioned Raja of liankepur, is the case of 8.K.I. Paliwal,
a G-andhian who left the U.P. Congress in 1951 and formed
the Indian Progressive legislative Party which later merged
7
with Swatantra. The national parties, and in particular 
Swatantra, can thus be said to have capitalised on the 
splintering process which has been going; on in the states 
since Independence, and this, as the electoral figures 
show, has applied particularly at the level of candidates 
and politicians, as opposed to voters.
This means that the curve of Congress decline, in 
terms of -governmental power, has in general been straighten
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and more continuous in the states than at the centre.
It would of course he naive to suppose that politcal power 
in the states depended solely, or even mainly, on electoral 
results in terms of the number of seats gained, since the 
control of patronage is clearly a major offsetting and 
strengthening factor in the face of electoral decline0 
Brass even maintains that f,A local Congress organisation 
may lose every Assembly seat in a district and still retain 
its power as long as it maintains its hold over government 
patronage and district administration" (1965s 227). But 
it may be that this is only a practicable process at the 
district and village levels through the structure of 
panchayati raj and with the weight of Lucknow’s support in 
the backgroundo There is clearly a threshold at state 
level, beyond which the machinations of patronage cannot 
hold out, as the instability of state Congress Governments 
and their areas of influence since the 196 I Elections, has 
demonstrated.
The course of policy„ Against such a background, the role 
of ideology in policy fofmation at the state level might be 
expected, to have been both less pronounced and less varied 
than at the national level, and this does seem to have been 
the case. Because of the early growth of factionalisip. and
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the change in the nature of leadership, the 51 ideological
spurtn of the mid-50fs, although reflected in an increase
in the scale of planning'and a build-up of planning
administrative machinery in the states, often does not
%
seem to have represented a npeakn or a "big push" in the 
way that it did at the centre„ Consequently, although 
in the long term there has been a decline of Congress in 
the states and a splaying out of interests similar to that 
at the centre, this has not appeared as a major confer- 
impuls e, 1argely beeause any marke d c ontrast with -earlier 
ini t i at ives was mi s s ing»
'factors unique to the states. Other factors, specific 
to the state situation have of course combined to flatten 
the curve of ideological crescendo and couter-attack. 
for instance, because the state governments occupy a 
janus-like position between the centre ahd the districts, 
much of their energies are inevitably taken up in bargaining 
or in lodging complaints about failure of subsidy and supply 
and they therefore cannot or do not, concentrate single- 
nindedly on schemes for expansion and mobilisation. Ihe 
somewhat resentful tone of the IT.P. Annual Development Plan 
for 1959-60, is not untypical. Spearing of the gap between 
hew Delhi's and Lucknow's proposals for the state's share of
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total outlay, it comments, 1 It has heen represented to the 
PIauning Commission that the amount of Rs, 22/i crores is 
the maximum to which, with effort, the dtate can stretch 
itself, and that the yap of Hs.1.2. crores may he filled 
by the Government of India0 But no final decision has been 
taken and the matter is still under negotiation” (?)•
Another factor which is hound to influence state 
policy and sometimes increase resistance to central plans, 
must be the particular stage of development of the state 
concerned. InU.P., this has certainly increased the non- 
congruence between the pattern of priorities in the national 
and state plans0 As far as the sectoral allocations between 
industry and agriculture are concerned, it is clear even from 
the official figures that there has been a different balance. 
IT.Po’s natural orientation towards agriculture, and the fact 
that it seems to be unfavourably placed for industrialisation, 
have meant that, in the first place, the agricultural 
allocations have been proportionately larger than the 
national ones, and secondly that they suffered a smaller 
decline from the 1st to the 2nd Plan, namely one of 4<>13/ 
as against 2 2 in the national plans«^  The difference 
between agriculture and industry was even more marked in 
terms of actual spending, rather than targets. As the
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Progress Report on the first part of the 2nd U.P. Plan
pointed out, ”the balance left over in the last two years
under the head, ’industries1 namely Rs• 969 . 59 lacs, is
far in excess of the expenditure incurred in the first
three years, vis, Rs. 673.82 lacs” (1959s 2). Altogether,
the thrust towards heavy industrialisation has been missing
11m  the lido Plans o This has meant that a particular
ingredient in the ideological thrust at the national level, 
had almost no counterpart in U.P., again contributing to 
the flatness of the curve of policy-initiative.
But if the total curve has thus been muted, there 
still has been a. rise and fall of ideological initiative * 
All the blunting factors cited, such as the decline in the 
quality of leadership, the growth of factionalism, and 
the particular problems and perspectives of U.P._itself, 
have not prevented this. Moreover what peak there was 
(at least in terms of agrarian policy) seems to have 
occurred,as will emerge later, at the beginning of the 
3rd Plan or the end of the 2nd, v.rell aft ex* Pandit Pant’s 
exit and the demise of the ’good old regime'. It is of 
course difficult to assess the strength of determination 
which lay behind the legislation of I960, since this can 
only be deduced from the Act itself and the tone of the
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planning literature® But it does seem that, although 
the inte .sity and the time-scale may be different from 
the course of national policy, the basic pattern is still 
discernible o
1 d e o 1 o g i c al con trad i c t ions and 11,1 ® policy <>
Even if it must finally be concluded that ideology 
and policy in U.P, have not followed such a marked rise 
and fall of initiative, or been so clearly divisible into 
stages, as at the national level, it can certainly be said 
that they have conformed to the latter1s pattern in terms 
of continuing ambiguity of intent and internal contradic­
tion. The distinct and often conflicting influences of 
nationalism, socialism, social-democracy and Gandhism, have 
all been in evidence and have all born fruit to some extent 
in tangible aspects of policy. It now seems apposite to 
take the specific case of U.P. land policy and follow its 
development and effects in order to try to deduce from 
these the ideological factors which have been at work„
This may provide evidence both of the multiplicity of 
ideological influences at work, and of the rise and fall 
in dovernment initiative®
Agrarian po1icy in U.P. As far as state legislation is
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concerned3 the scene has been dominated by the original 
Zamindari Abolition Act of 1950, After this there was 
no major land legislation until the Imposition of Gelling 
Act in 1960o Since land redistribution was a principle 
which was in practice rejected by the Zamindari Abolition 
Committee (Z,A,C.) at the beginning of the decade, this 
would seem to represent a major new departure• And 
indeed, as with similar legislation in other states, it 
v/as an echo of the socialistic push of the 2nd H an and, 
in particular, of the Ifagpur Hesolution. What is unclear 
is the extent to which this was foisted onto the U.P. 
administration by pressure from Delhi, the tone of the 
U.P, planning litera/bure referring to the renewed emphasis 
on cooperative farming was certainly fairly enthusiastic in 
its own right, and U.P. had made relatively radical 
gestures before the I960 Act, such as the imposition of a 
large Land Holdings Tax in 1957. But in any case, however 
indigenous the enthusiasm at the time, the long-term fate 
of this particular ideological push would seem to be similar 
to that at the centre.
Again as with national policy, the long-term outcome 
directs attention back to the ear3_y legislation and suggests 
the possibility that the conflicts of aims and priorities
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which have dogged agrarian policy were equally evident 
then. It is therefore necessary to analyse the aims of 
the early legislation, to consider its implications and 
effects, and. finally to trace some of the continuities 
with later legislation.
Zamindari Ah olit ion. U.P.* s Zamindari Abolition Act is
now almost two decades old, and sufficient time has elapsed
12for many assessments of its effects to have been made.
It would seem most useful, therefore, to concentrate on the 
problems which faced the Z.A.G. and the U.P. legislature, 
and to analyse the values which were implicit in the 
policies proposed. This will of course entail considering 
some of the effects of the legislation.
As pointed out in an earlier chapter, there seems a 
good case for supposing; that attention came to be focussed 
on the institution of zair.iind.ari partly because of its 
connections, and those of some of its encumbents, with the 
British. The nationalist movement, almost in spite of 
Gandhi, came to see the abolition of the zamindars as an 
issue of social justice, and it became a liberative slogan. 
However, once the Z.A.C. was set up, which occurred in 1946, 
it attempted to bring within the compass of its task the 
whole range of agrarian problems. But it did this more by
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polemics and by arguing- the wide implications of this one 
reform, than by enlarging the scope of its proposals.
In its chapter on the case for abolition, for instance, 
it adduced a considerable range of justifications, including 
general social justice ("Any system under which the land 
is concentrated in the hands of a few persons means the 
degradation of large numbers who have less or none of it" i 
34 1 ) 9 the specific details of concentrated, ownership (”8 0 4  
landlords out of a total of more than 20 lakhs own anything 
between one fifth and one quarter of the land of the 
province": 343)* on grounds of revenue ("the State’s share 
in the revenue collected has progressively decreased": 3 4 5 )? 
the continuing ejection of tenants, and finally, on grounds 
of efficiency and productivity, since "the power and 
domination of the landlord have resulted in a lack of 
incentive in the cultivator and in the prevention of 
intensive cultivation."
ihroblems confronting the Z.A.Q. But however widel - and
imaginatively the case is argued, it is clear that 
zamindari abolition by itself could only effect a small 
proportion of the problems posed by the rural situation 
in U,Po. To see this, it is necessary to look at the state 
of land ownership and distribution.- Here, the problems can
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be classified under four headings* First, the structure 
of holdings had become immensely complicated, with a 
range of types of tenure, and with, in some cases, layers 
of rent-colleetors or intermediary interests between the 
state and the cultivator. Secondly, there was of course 
a highly skewed distribution of land-ownership, both vis 
k vis the population of cultivators at large, and within 
the category of land--owners * The 23 .A. 0. figures show 
that the 8 0 4 large zamindars cited above, constituted 0 , 0 4 1  
of the population of za:..indars and only 0 ,0 0 1 4 ’/ of the 
total population of U,P,
Thirdly, there was a maldistribution of access to
land., quite apart from ownership of it. At a. conservative
estimate , the Z.A.O, reckoned that 37 <>81 of all cultivators 
had holdings of 1 acre or less, and between them held 6u 
of the total area of holdings. Even those holding 5 acres 
or less, (oly of cultivators) had access to only 3o.8 p of 
the land cultivated (Z.A.O. 11., statement 5: 6 ). The 
fourth major problem, implicit in this latter one, was 
the fragmentation of holdings.. Studies of individual 
villages show how acute this problem has become. Etienne, 
for instance, reports that in the village of Kh&ndoi in
Western U.r., what were 47 holdings in 1916, had become, in
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less than 40 years, 116 (196a: 6 6 )* As with the skewed 
distribution of ownership and of access to land, this is 
a problem which is more acute in some areas of the state 
than others, a fact which dealing in averages tends to 
disguise * If anything, this makes the series of problems 
more intractible, since regional inequality is added to so 
mar.y other forms *
Against this range of problems, the E.A»C. Aeport and 
the subsequent legislation of 19.30 brought few weapons to 
bear* The problems which they did directly tackle were 
those of the rent structure and the maldistribution of 
ownership* Briefly, they did this by abolishing the 
institution of zamindari and vesting all land in the state 
so that, except for a snail category of permitted tenants, 
all land payments became revenue paid to the state. This 
meant that the majority of holders acquired some form of 
ownership right* 'There were to be two types of ownership 
interest in land* The first, bhumidhari, was a full 
ownership right, and the second, sirdari, was a restricted 
right, in that it excluded the possibility of alienation* 
But sirdars were enabled to acquire bhumidhari rights to 
their land, or parts of it, by payment of a sum equivalent 
to ten years1 revenue, which also entitled them to a 30y
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reduction in the payment of revenue. Thus the class of
bhumidhars was to be mo.de up of two categories,
bhumindhars by conversion, and bhumdhars by acquisition.
The 1950 Act did also attempt to do something about the
problem of fragmentation by setting a theoretical "floor11
for holdings at 6 1/4 acres. But this was a rather
nominal gesture. The problem was better served by
Idsubsequent consolidation measures,  ^but neither of these 
moves could possibly have any effect on the basic and 
allied problem of the acute land shortage.
'v*nnat then were the motive forces and the implications 
of this initial attack on the agrarian structure? Y/hat 
can be deduced about the intentions of the legislators, 
and the visions they entertained for the future rural 
pattern of U.P.?
hamindari a b olition as cg^ lilqer ative me as ur e. first, it 
must be said that the Act was to some extent, as it claimed 
to be, a move against the entrenched power of the large 
landowners and was thus in a sense ,!libera,tiven, and 
perhaps even socialistic. This intention is indicated 
first by the fact that the bulk of Congress propaganda was 
directed against the stereotype of the large avaricious 
exploiting landlord., or as the Z.A.G. put it, !,the large
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landed aristocrats" (3 4 4 ). Since, as Singh and Kisra
1 1
estimate from their sample of districts in 'hP, , L' apout 
6 6f of samindars owned less than 5 acres of land, this 
represented a very obvious choice of emphasis. Although 
the catchment area of the Act was much wider, Congress 
chose to emphasise its purpose in dispossessing the large 
land-owners of their rent-collecting rights.
This was not of■course, entirely or only, an 
altruistic move on Congress's part. As Reeves points 
out, Congress was also motivated by a. desire to liquidate 
the landlords as a source of political opposition (n,d,:l), 
and this naturally suggested that the force of the attack 
must lie where the nexus of the power lay. As Reeves also 
suggests, the fact that Congress took the trouble publicly 
to attack the U.P. Zamindars Union, an association of large 
landowners set up in 1946 under the leadership of Sir 
Jagdish Prasad, shows that it was regarded as a threat, 
not only over the specific issue of abolition, but in terms 
of general political power (n.d.:9 )«
As it was the large landholders who objected most to 
the idea of abolition, so it was they who mostly attern, ted 
to prevent is implementation and this too might be read as 
evidence that the Act was making more than token gestures
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against the large landed interests. Between May and July 
of 1949? when the billwas being presented in the Legislative
press
Assembly, the J.P.^was full of the zamindars1 alternative
suggestions, such as that "the Government might as well
bring a short bill enablin, the tenants to acquire
proprietory rights by paying ten times their rental to
the landlords directly" (Singh 1949: 13)° Because of
filibustering by the zamindars during the bill’s 2nd
reading, the guillotine finally had to be applied and the
President’s assent was given in January, 1951o However,
it was another eighteen months before the Act could begin
to be implemented, as the zamindars initiated another
15campaign oi litigation0
0omproinise with the zamindars, If the Act can thus be said 
to have had socialistic and liberative overtones, in that 
it was directed against private rent-receipt and against 
the power of the large landlords, this impulse was in­
evitably tempered by other and less radical considerations., 
first, it was in fact a very blunt tool for undermining 
the power and status of the zamindars, for it allowed them 
to retain all their hone-farm land, their ’sir1 or 
'khudkasht', and this left several landlords with "a 
thousand or two thousand acres of land" (Brass 1965: 12) 0
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Secondly, although tenancy was theoretically to be 
illegal, crop-sharing was to be permitted* Thirdly, the 
personal cultivation of land wa/s to include cultivation 
through servants or hired workers (Progress of land 
Reform: 54)* These were considerable loop-holes, and 
they meant that the only tangible1 way in which the large 
aamindar was penalised was through the future non-receipt 
of rents* But here too, the samindar’s loss was to be 
off-set by compensation, though a degree of egalitarian 
discrimination was exercised in that, as mentioned in an 
earlier chapter, rehabilitation grants were paid on a 
sliding scale* Nevertheless, the whole concept of 
compensation clearly stemmed either from a basic liberal 
respect for property rights or from a social democratic 
belief in the virtues of voluntary or peaceful change, or 
from a combination of both* Over this, the Congress was 
at odds with both the communists and the socialists, who 
both demanded that abolition should take place without 
compensation (Singh 1959* 1 3 9 - 4 2 and 1 5 1 )*
Glasses of o1wnership* The second query which must be 
raised in connection with the Zamindari Abolition Act 
concerns the degrees of ownership recognised* Why indeed 
should there be two classes? It was true that the superior
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right was, in theory, accessible to the former occupancy 
and hereditary tenants who now automatically became sirdars, 
blit the scales were weighted against them in several ways0 
I'irst, the original intention of this provision was 
clearly to provide a mechanism for funding the compensation 
to be paid to zaniindars0 -Before the Act came into 
operation, a Zarnindari Abolition kund had been started, to 
which the payments for bhumidhari rights were to be credited* 
The aim was to reach a target of As* 140 crores, which would 
only be attainable if 4 / 5 of those eligible paid their 
lump sums (Moore and kreydig 1955s 107-8)* It soon 
became clear that methods of intimidation were being used, 
such as threatened eviction or suspension of patwaris who 
failed to raise sufficient funds* As hoore and kreydig 
put' it 11 techniques used in the collection drives combined 
propaganda, the provision of special -facilities and direct 
official pressure * * * The most zealous officials went 
further *<,* On the advice of village patwaris, summonses 
were issued to any substantial tenants who were slow in 
making their payments" (3 3 )•
It seems unlikely that such scope for abuses could 
not have been foreseen by the instigators of the fund* The 
effect was to make the acquislotion of ownership rights into
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a leinci of forced buying™out of the zemindars, or at least 
a forced loan for this purpose. Here again, Congress met 
opposition from the left. In November, 194-9, the Social­
ist Party led a kisan demonstration against the Zaninda.ri 
Abolition Fund collections (National Herald Nov. 25th 1949)* 
Slogans used by the socialists expressed such sentiments as 
tTThe zauindars have a lot of money, why give them more?H^
The second way in which the scales were weighted against 
the sirdars1 access to full ownership rights was the method 
by which the payment was to be related to the revenue 
reduction. ' The 50?? reduction, after payment of a sum 
equivalent to 1 0 years1 revenue, meant that there was no 
real pay-off until 20 years had elapsed. In the shorter 
term, it could be interpreted as the receipt of a 5y rate 
of return on the original deposit, but this was of no real 
advantage since ua cultivator can always lend in the village 
at a much higher rate" (Hoore and Preydig 1955s 108).
Indeed, Etienne reports that village moneylenders usually 
charge 3 0?? a year ( 1 9 6 8 s 9 3 ).
All this has combined to produce the result that 
bhumidliari rights have expanded only slowly. Etienne 
reports that one of the major incentives is the desire, or 
 ^need, to sell land. Thus a sirdar nay acquire
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bju/inidhari rights to a piece of his land merely in order to
be able to sell it and obtain ready 08,311 (59) ° Over the
period since the-Act, the proportion of land on which
bhumidhari, as against sirdari, rights are held has
certainly increased, the change in the ratios being from
something under 1 : 4 in 1 9 5 0 , to roughly I t  2 as an average
17for the years 1957-1960 <> Baljit Singh reports that an
unpublished Lucknow thesis estimated for 1956-1957* that 
5 7 o7>’ of bhumidhari land was held by right of conversion, 
whilst the remaining 42 o h  was held on acquired rights 
(1 9 6 1 :2 0 ) a proportion which corresponds well with what 
could be deduced from the above ratios0
However, to calculate on the basis of the ratios of 
the acreages under bhumidhari and sirdari is rather mis­
leading, and Singh and Misra (1964) uncovered some revealing 
data when they analysed the situation in terms of the 
principal tenures of households« There were slight 
regional variations, bit the main differences axopeared, not 
surprisingly, amongst occupations and castes, Amongst 
’farmers1, for instance, 4 0 -4 7A were bhumidhars, and the 
remaining 53-60; • sirdars, but only 7/ of the households with 
land, rights amongst the agricultural labourers were 
bhumidhars, whilst 7 6>.> were sirdars, and 16 g as amis (tenants)
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(122)* They pointed out that "as we descend along the
occupational ladder or the caste hierarchy the percentage
of households having bhumidhari as their principal tenure
declines• Since bhumidhari was acquired partly by
conversion and partly by payment or purchase it is obvious
that the less prosperous or the more indigent could not
acquire bhumidhari interest to f e same extent as farmers
and the upper caste Hindus, whose holdings at an average
were larger, and who seem to have benefited, relatively
more in the process of conversion and had also a larger
capacity to acquire it by payment than others" (1 3 3 )®
Surprisingly enough, however, the data did not yield
significant correlations between bhumidhari acquisition by
payment, and factors such as the proportions of land under
irrigation, double cropping or commercial farming, which
would be expected to be associated with the capacity to
pay* On the other hand, a large majority of the sample
households, when questioned about their non-acquisition
of bhumidhari, gave inadequacy of cash as their main reasons
and the Rural Credit Survey Reports of the Reserve Bank, as
Singh and Risra point out, have certainly indicated that
3 3there is a shortage of savings amongst cultivators» '° 
nevertheless, Singh and Ivlisra conclude that "the political
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and social factors were perhaps more important than the 
economic ones in the acquisition of ’bhumidhari rights 
Whatever the precise mechanism, therefore, it is clear 
that in the attainment of bhumidhari rights, not only has 
there been a bias against the whole class of previous 
occupancy and hereditary tenants, as against the old 
zamindars and holders of proprietary status, but there has 
also been a marked difference of access -within this former 
class, with those of lower caste and occupational position 
experiencing a relative disadvantage. Ownership rights 
have certainly been extended, but by no means indiscriminately, 
and not by as great an extent as was originally envisaged.
It is possible, of course, that the 2.A.O. miscalculated 
and that total ownership was never as appealing or as 
psychologically stimulating as they imagined, but there 
was clearly an element of disincentive built into the 
legislation itself which has almost certainly reduced the 
attraction or the accessibility of full ownership.
The redistribution of land debate, fuming now from the 
question of.ownership to that of access to land, the 
Governments attitude to the possibility of redistribution 
must be considered. As was argued earlier, stages of 
land reform may be regarded as ends in themselves or may be
J2&
considered as steps in the attainment of a more remote 
final stateo In this light , redistribution may be 
advocated either as a social justice means in itself or, 
as happened in China, as a prelude to collectivisation, 
but the ZoA.O* adopted neither argument, Having cited 
a good deal of evidence which illustrated the uneven 
distribution of land as well as the maldistribution of 
ownership, they did consider the case for redistribution 
and even acknowledged that "The redistribution of land 
would reduce gross disparities in agricultural incomes 
and thus make for social justiceu (3 8 6 ), but in the end 
they were deterred by the difficulties«
Certainly there would have been great problems and 
restrictions involved in any such programme. On the basis 
of their study of sis representative districts, for instance, 
the Z,A,G, came to the conclusion that, even ignoring the 
large number of plots under 5 acres, 118 lakh acres of land 
would be required to make the holdings of between 5 and 1 0  
acres up to a standard size of 1 0 acres, but a ceiling of 
25 acres would yield only 6 <,7 lakh acres of land (3 8 8 ).
An additional obstacle cited was that redistribution was 
"likely to arouse opposition among the substantial tenants 
and increase the difficulty of zamindars in adjusting
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themselves to changed conditions 0" the conclusion was
19that redistribution was not to be recommended * Here
again3 Congress was at odds with the socialists and 
communists, as shown by their 1951 Election Manifestos 
(Singh. 1961? 151) As Neale puts it, the Z.A.Ch
argument shows considerable deviousness, with "radicalism 
in philosophy and realism about U.P. politics somehow 
combining to justify a policy of leaving the status quo 
undisturbed" (1 9 6 2 s 2 7 3 )•
file I960 Ceiling Act. It is interesting that by I960, 
the U.3?. Congress had arrived, at least in theory, at a 
different outlook, on redistribution, for the Government 
introduced and passed, albeit "without much enthusiasm" 
(Etienne 1968: 65), the Imposition of Ceiling on Land­
holding Act, which basically limited a holding to "40 
acres of fair quality land" (Progress of Land ‘Reform:67).
This was a repercussion of the Congress Nagpur Resolution 
of the previous year, and represented, as far as U.P, was 
concerned, a peak of initiative and an echo of the central 
ideological impulse of the 2nd Plan period. In fact,
Baljit Singh has argued that a limit of 15 acres would be 
more appropriate and more effective (1961: 65). At this 
level, more than 4 million acres or nearly 1 0y of the state’s
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cultivated land, would beeowe available* But the 40 acre 
limit could release only about l*3‘/: of the total cultivated 
area5 and in practice, the prevalence of evasion through 
parcelling out and claiming exemption on such grounds as 
the mechanisation of farming, has considerably reduced the 
amount of land actually surrendered* It seems that both 
the amount declared potentially surplus, and that actually 
regained, provide ground for controversy* Against bingh’s 
percentage, which works out at about 5 * 2 lakh acres, h ana mati 
and Anjaria report that 1*4 lakh acres was actually declared 
surplus (1 9 6 5 s 215)* If these figures are correct, it 
means that exemption was claimed on one ground or another 
for nearly 4 lakh acres between the passage of the Act and 
the declaring of the surplus* furthermore, lanavati and 
Anjaria give as the figure for the amount of land actually 
redistributed, 2 4 , 0 0 0 acres, which is no more than 1 7u of 
the officially declared surplus*
fire I960 Ceiling Act is interesting, not only because 
it seems to be part of the "peak” of U.}?*'s curve of 
ideological enthuisiasm but also because it sheds light on 
the continuing conflict which has permeated the U*P* 
agrarian structure debate* This again reflects the 
ideological conflicts which have occured at the federal level.
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and which were described in earlier chapters* It concerns 
the ultimate pattern to be aimed at, and is epitomised by 
the various notions of the role of cooperation* If the aim 
is total cooperativisation of agr iculture (i * e * joint 
farming of some kind), then the purpose of a ceiling is 
either to level off the size of holdings before they are 
grouped into cooperatives, or else, as Baljit bingh argues, 
to release enough land in the short run at least to enable 
a sizeable number of cooperatives to be started on the 
surplus* On the other hand, if the aim is to retain 
individual proprietorship and cultivation, and therefore 
to restrict the role of cooperatives to service and credit 
functions, then the imposition of a ceiling is an end-in- 
itself gesture towards equity, a purpose which any particu­
lar level of ceiling will serve to some degree. Such a 
measure is not dissimilar from the imposition of a 
progressive income tax, in that it aims at piece-meal 
reform and redistribution, the only difference being that it 
establishes an absolute limit, since land, unlike income, is 
a fixed resource*
In the light of this conflict, it might be supposed 
that the I960 -Act should be interpreted more in terms of the 
purely redistributive and welfare kind of purpose than in
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terns of the prelude-to-cooperativisation intention, since 
the prospects for universal joint faming seemed to have 
been growing increasingly remote in the intervening period 
since Independence * On the contrary, judging from the 
evidence of the planning literature, the Act does seem to 
have bee.: accompanied by a rise .in official enthusiasm for 
cooperativisatiorio However, the Ceiling Act was certainly 
not generally accepted as a logical step towards cooperati- 
visation and the Iona-term effects seem to have totally 
destroyed any such conjunction. Because cooperative 
farming has not flourished and spread, it has again wilted as 
a candidate for universal adoption and the ceiling legis­
lation has fallen into place almost as a kind of substitute. 
It has re-emerged as an end in itself, so that in the event, 
it has possibly even helped to entrench individual 
proprietorship and cultivation as the established norm, 
rather than facilitating its dissolution in favour of 
cooperative farming.
thus a strange three-stage process has taken place. 
Hirst, whilst firmly rejecting redistribution, the Z.A.C. 
advocated universal joint farming. "The ultimate solution 
of our problem,n they said, '’lies in the development of 
cooperative joint farming" (1327). Secondly, the U.P.
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Grove rnment, after an interval of ten years, adopted 
redistributive measures, apparently as a corollory to its 
renewed enthusiasm for cooperative farming. finally, 
the scope for joint farming has again begun to seem limited, 
and the existence of a legal and theoretical ceiling 011 
land has taken 011 the function of supposedly modifying, 
and thus strengthening, the old pattern of individual 
proprietorshipo The overall trend cam perhaps be deduced 
from the progress and fortunes of the cooperative farms 
themselves, as distinct from the degrees of enthusiasm 
for them which have been manifested by successive state 
plans.
Cooperative joint farming * I11 1949’J- the Z.A.C. , in
pursuance of what it saw as a long-term goal, recommended 
"a mouest beginning in the shape of small cooperative 
farms spread over different parts of the province so that 
their advantages may be demonstrated to the cultivators" 
(527)* Consequently, by the end of the 1st Plan, 202 
farming societies were in existence, and the target of 1 0 0  
new frms had been exceeded. But the Plan Review (1957) 
spoke 01 them, rather more equivocally, as experiments and 
gave as the rationale, the fact that "The cooperative method 
of farming is considered as the best means to do away with
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uneconomic holdings and (j>rovid£) rapidly increasing 
production" (11)« The 2nd Plan again set a target of 
1 0 0 new fanning societies and it was explained that "for 
undertaking; these experiments «• . adequate financial 
assistance in the shape of subsidies and loans and 
concessions will be required’1 (Ann.Dev. Plan 1957-8: 26) 
but signs of implementation difficulties appeared during the 
first three years and the Annual Development flan for 1959™ 
60 reported that progress under the heading of Cooperation 
had 11 for various reasons, been slower than originally 
envisaged" (3 )»
After this period of set-back, it does seem that there 
was a rise of enthusiasm for cooperative farming in the U.P. 
administration in the years immediately after the Nagpur 
Resolution. In the 1st year of the 3rd Plan, "30 pilot 
projects with 1 2 5 faming societies were set up as against 
a target of 30 projects with 100 societies" (Ann.Report 
1961-2: 11). There was again a greater emphasis on the 
democratic effects, and the possible diffusion, of coopera­
tive farms, Their receipt of preference in the allotment 
of financial and technical assistance, for instance, was 
justified in the hope that they would "work successfully 
and serve as radiation centres for the sound growth of
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cooperative farming in the State*11 But the revival seems 
to have been short-lived* In the all-India, context, it 
can only he said that u in fact the movement re mat ins limited 
and cannot he said to have had any marked influence on 
production* Of some 5,000 societies established between 
1 9 6 1 and i9 6 0 , many are hardly working and must be streng­
thened in order to be at all effectiveH (4th National Plan; 
143-4)*
Ideological continuity^ ana change, In a retrospective 
review of land policies such as this, the question must 
inevitably arise of the extent to which the later.develop­
ments were implicit in the original 1050 Act and the 2.A.G. 
Heoort which preceded it. Was it the case that subsequent 
trends were largely determined by these•early foundations? 
there are many ways in which su.ch' suppositions would seem 
to be correct, not only because the 1950 Act created a new 
set of conditions and so affected the impetus or incentive 
to further change, but also because the early legislation
betrayed sets of conflicts and ambiguities which could hardly
be expected to disappear. In this sense, tlie 1950 Act and 
the later trends have been joint products of the same com­
plex of influences*
The ideological conflicts evident in the Z.A.C. He sort
are the same as those which occurred at the national 
level, and can he traced to similar clashes of' interests 
and perspectives, IT he nationalist movement focussed
attention and opposition on to zamindari as an institution, 
hut the middle-class nature of the leadership created a 
sympathy for the notion of proprietorship* The Gandhian 
phase of Congress development provoked a general sympathy 
for peasant grievances, hut again the stratification and 
division of interests within the movement militated against . 
a whole-hearted identification with peasant grievances, let 
alone with the real rural proletariat, the landless labourers. 
The inevitiuble engrossment of Congress with constitutional 
debates and negotiations in the years before Independence, 
meant that socialism, insofar as it did penetrate to an 
offic al level, did so in the form ox imprecise formulas 
and sloganso Furthermore, an aura of tactical vagueness 
was hound to pursue these policy objectives because of the 
predominance of the social democratic over the Karrist 
strand of ideology within the socialist camp* T ds was 
reinforced at the strategic level by the Gandhian emphasis 
on consensus and voluntarism, and at the content level, by 
the Gandhian stress on the incongruous or seemingly 
anachronistic elements of anti-mechanisation and anti­
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centralisation. These could often only he accommodated 
within policy-slogans by increasing the level of abstraction 
and ambiguity of the latter.,
The Z.A.C, Report bore precisely the same kinds of 
hall-marks. It was radical in theory ana looked towards 
a completely restructured utopian rural pattern in the 
future, but in the presents it showed signs of what can 
only be■interpreted as considerable sympathy for the medium 
and small zamindar and the sifbstamtial peasant. The Report 
was eager to point out that nCongress has always been 
anxious to safeguard the interests of the smaller zamindars, u 
and cited as evidence the fact that "In the United Provinces 
Tenancy Act, 1939 5 the Congress l.linistry exempted landlords 
paying Rs, 2 5 0 or less as annual land revenue from the 
provisions limiting the area of sir and imposing other 
restrictions," Again, speaking of attempts which were 
being made by large zamindars to convince the smaller 
zamindars that it would be in their interest to oppose 
abolition, the Report announced "we have no doubt that the 
smaller zamindar is possessed of too much patriotism and 
intelligence to be duped by others'1 (3 4 4 ),
Uo doubt such remarks can be explained away as a 
tactical device to ensure support for abolition, and to
smooth the passage of the hill. But it is unlikely that 
this was their sole purpose. At least some sections of 
Congress saw the purpose of the whole operation as being 
the attempt to create a "huge class of strong opponents of 
the class war ideology" (Singh, 195bn 41)» Even if this 
was not the conscious aim on the part of all the framers 
of the Act-, many of its ingredients were bound to contribut 
to such an effect. The extension of ov;nership, combined 
with its somewhat selective dispersion, and the lack of 
land redistribution could hardly do other than lay the 
foundations for the emergence of the "rural petite 
bourgeoisie" of which Hanson speaks, a circumstance which 
was aided and confirmed by the effects of the Rational 
Extension and Community Development programmes, and the 
structure of panchayati raj.
The spurt of enthusiasm for land ceilings and for the 
extension of cooperative farming which occurred around I9 6 0  
and which is represented by the arguments of Daljit Singh 
(if61), in many ways seemed doomed to failure even at the 
tine, since it was a push against the tide of previous 
and continuing trends. The other side of the debate is 
represented, and has been for some time, by the sometime 
1.: in is ter for Ag rbhlture and "the leading ideologist in U,Th
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of the peasant proprietorn (Brass 1965 s 139) ? Oharan bingtn 
In his latest hook, he sets out the case against cooperative 
farming, arguing strongly from the ground that "whatever 
emphasis may he placed upon the differences between a co­
operative farm and a collective farm, so far as internal 
working is concerned there is , and there can be, no 
difference11 (1964s 139) <> It follows that the establishing 
of joint farming would lead inevitably to a degree of 
authoritarian!sm and bureaucracy which would "undermine the 
very foundation of our nascent democracy11 (vii) »
As far as land redistribution is concerned, Singh 
argues that this should have been carried out only through 
the mechanisms of economic forces, the imposition of a large 
land-holdinrs tax being allowed to force the inefficient 
large farms to reduce their size „ Redistribution under the 
auspices of the state has merely served to arouse land 
hunger amongst agricultural labourers and artisans, and has 
also meant that "in the class conflict so unleashed, various 
political parties will try to outbid each other in the 
matter of fixing as low a ceiling as possible •*. and the 
Communist Party, which aims at collective farming, will be 
the ga in ern (1 8 3 )*
l1 he recurrent theme in Singh* s writings is support for
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peasant proprietorship of a traditional and not a, contrivejdly 
egalitarian, kind, but backed by credit and service co-opera­
tives, and this is based on an appeal to democratic values.
The message is that 1 It is farmers' cooperatives, where the 
identity both of the farm and the farmer mill remain un- 
impaired, that are needed, not co op erative farms" (4 5 0 ).
l’he implementation of such a pattern could of course 
have been the immediate and logical aim of sauindari abolition, 
and some sections of opinion, including Gharan .0 inch, always 
saw it as such. In 1949? Gharan Singh was arguing that 
"cooperative farming „•. cannot be forced on the people 
wholesale” for, if it is, the result "may be 'compulsory 
collective' farming but you cannot call it cooperative"
(1949* 11). It was clear at the time that Singh sap; in the 
pattern set up by the 1990 Act, a viable permanent structure, 
lie argued against the practicability of land redistribution, 
but claimed that "for generations past, the peasant has been 
dreaming to see the day p/hen he will be able to call the land 
his own°, that dream stands fulfilled today o.. He will part 
with all he possesses, even the ornaments of his wife in 
order to become a Bhumidhar" {7).
However, the Z.A.G. Report, many within Congress, and 
certainly the socialists and communists, entertained other
34-1
visions for the future and imagined other and more 
idealistic paths of progress. It took the attempted push 
of the mid- and late 19150 fs to make it clear precisely how 
much opposition the prospect of joint farming and the pattern 
of rural society associated with it, could provoke, and how 
difficult it would be to implement any such major reform,, 
There is in Gharan Singh’s writings an echo of the anti- 
”sovietism” and the anti-statism of hanga and hv/atantra5 
and there is a considerable gulf between this and the tone 
of the ZnloO. Report• To the extent that such views have 
gained ground since I9 6 0 , it may be supposed that their 
growth represents the ideological backlash at state level, 
which in itself makes for a reflection of the downward 
curve of governmental ideological initiative which has 
occurred at the centre. To the extent that such parallels 
can be drawn, it would seem that there ia scope for analysing 
the relationship between policy and ideology at the state 
level, even if it trust be admitted that some parts and 
levels of the fabfic of state politics are much less
amenable to analysis in ideological terms.
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N o t e s o  C h a p t e r  V I
lo Based on figures from Etienne 1968s 12* Y/hilst 
relative shares have altered, it is of course the case 
that total absolute public investment in agriculture has 
risen steadily from Plan to Plan, the figures being;
Rs0 2,642 mill*, Rs* 59670 mill*, Rs* 10,680 mill*, and 
Rs* 245100 mill*, respectively* The Central Government 
percentage for the 1st Plan thus appears disproportionately 
high given the low overall total as compared with subsequent 
Plans *
2* Several other writers have supported the contention 
that appeals to caste loyalty can seldom dominate an 
election* Hayer writes 111 suggest that a candidate cannot 
win through the manipulation of any single relationship; 
he must fight on several fronts and. thr ugh workers having 
qualifications all-of which he cannot himself possess'
(Philips 1963“ 123)° Bailey also argues: uleaving aside
legal considerations, there are-'structural factors which make 
it difficult and dangerous for a candidate to rely too greatly 
or too openly on caste loyalties to get his votes for hSim" 
(Philips 1963“. 105 )<> Amongst such factors cited are the 
fact that castes are seldom numerically dominant in a
wconstituency9 that castes are subdivided into factions, and. 
that caste associations are seldom strong enough to provide 
o rganis e d s uppo rt•
3. As Bailey puts it, "there is not homogeneity ^  all 
levels; the issues which are at stake in state politics 
have to be translated into something else at constituency 
level and have to be translated yet again at village level" 
(1939s 232)„ Citing an example from the context of Orissa, 
he describes how "the Ganatantra-Congress conflict at State 
level appears in the guise of rival policies; in the
constituencies of Kalahandi district it appeared as a 
dynastic dispute; in Bisipara it was translated into caste 
conflict o"
4» Again as Bailey puts it, "I do not think that the 
voters are much concerned with their candidate's attitude 
towards China and the border question, or where he stands 
in the conflict between socialism and private enterprise.
It is enough that he is a local man and an energetic man"
(Philips 1963; 103)• And also* "the kinds of issues 
for which parties stand as yet mean nothing to the peasant 
voter, and even if they did, there is still the physical 
barrier of poor communications" (1959: 137)*
5* This was a suggestion in 1963 that some Congress
ministers should resign office to take up Party wo it
Porris-Jones describes this as 11 the kind of renunciation 
gesture which could be expected, first, to restore the 
public repute of Congress in the face of Bhave-IF ar ay an 
and general criticism about the sin of love for power” 
(1964s 177)o In the event, six Central Ministers and 
six state Chief Ministers resigned*
60 The relevant figures are as follows: (taken from 
ho rri s-J one s 1964s 163-4)
Vote p beats
Congress AJoP. 1 s Congress A O 0  O  -i. c ' S
1 9 5 2
1 9 5 7
1962
45.0 (42.2) 2b.1 (25.6) 74.4(66.4) 10.0(11.8
47.8 (45.0) 28.8(25.2) 75.1(64.9) 11.0(15.5
44.7 (45.7) 38.0(35.0) 72.9(61.3) 17.2(23.5
Unbracketed figui'es, Lok Sabha* Bracketed figures, 'date 
Assemblies„
The All India Ji'arties are the P * 8 • ? 0 (S • P. and in
19 '2 combined), C.P.I., S.P. (1962), Jan Sangh, Hindu 
J'lahasabha, Republican Party of India, ham Rajya Pari shad 
and Swatantra (1 9 6 2 )*
7o Paliwal had for fifteen years been either President 
or General Secretary of the U*P« Congress, and had been a
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member of the Plate Cabinet« After leaving Congress in 
19519 he led a group of Independents (between 20 and 29) 
in the Assembly• According to Erdman, he is a "very 
staunch anti-socialist, anti-comraunalist and anti-aristocrat." 
He brought to Swatantra "a modest semi-organised group of 
supporters11 and decided to join it because for him, "it 
represented a combination of Gandhism and modern capitalisiu 
000 with too much of the latter for his liking" (1 9 6 7 * 1 1 3 - 
4) .
80 As Hanson puts it, looking at it from the centre's 
point of view, nrfhe allocation process has always been a 
balancing act, in which political considerations have been 
weighed against those of economic rationality1 the act 
becomes more delicate as each state develops independent 
political consciousness „ „ Wisely, it (the Planning 
Commission) has refused to lay down firm and unambiguous 
principles of allocation, thereby giving itself maximum 
freedom in State-by-State negotiations" (Streeten and 
Lipton 1968; 31)«
9* This is sometimes attributed, a little dubiously, 
to the fact that U*i. suffers from si lack of "the enter­
prising spirit that is so characteristic of the Punjabis, 
who have always been ready to set up all manner of workshop
34G
or factory", and , mors concretely, to the fact that 
U.ro has few natural resources and experiences difficulty 
in attracting investment, having a per capita investment 
rate of Rs • 67*34 (3rd live Year Plan), the lorest for all 
India (Etienne 1968s 48-9).
10* The 1st and 2nd Plan IT.]?* figures for Agriculture,
0ommunity hevelopment, Irrigation and Power, were 62* and 
57• 5/* as against 44• 5^ and 22y at the national level•
(Based on figures from Etienne 1968: 46, and otreeten and 
lipton 1968: 8 6 )  o
11* The output of Industries and Minerals in U,P0 increased 
by 4*3?j from 1951-1961, as compared with 48,8m for all India, 
(Etienne 1968: 47)*
12 0 For examp 1 e , studies or acc0 tints by: Balj it 3ingh 
(1961), Singh and Ifisra (1 9 6 4 ) 9 Heale (1962), Moore
and. Preydig (1956) - A very interesting assessment also 
was that made by Wolf ladejinski in his study of tenurial 
condition.! in several areas of India* His judgment on 
the U.P. reform was relatively favourable„ As compared
with Bihar, Madras, Madya Pradesh and Punjab, "only in 
Uttar Pradesh", it was concluded, "has a well thought-out 
comprehensive legislation been enacted and''effectively 
implemented" (1963: 10) 0
13. There had been various provisions for voluntary 
consolidation in U .1 * before Independence, but the U.P, 
Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1953 provides for com­
pulsory consolidation wherever the government decides it 
is ready to undertake such measures. The procedure and 
rate of progress is described by Neale 1962s 264-7. The 
Ladejinski Report also comments on the U„P. consolidation 
programme; "By the summer crop of 1963-4, the work is 
scheduled for completion * 0 * The impact of this programme 
was quite apparent to us in villages where consolidation 
had been completed a couple of years ago" (1 9 6 3 ; 4 0 ).
14° The sample was a random stratified one. 25 districts 
ox.it of a total of 47 were selected, with probability 
proportional to size. Similarly, ol villages were selected 
from the paganas . Finally, a 10p sample of bhumidhars and 
a 5 A sample of sirdars was taken.
15. Details of the litigation are given in hoore and 
Freydig (1955; 39-43). By February, 19515 about 7 9000 
petitions had been filed challenging the validity of the 
Act and applying for writs of mandamus, under Article 226 
ox the Constitution. Cases were heard both in the Allahabad 
High Court, and the Supreme Court. The judgment against 
the zauindars was finally given in Hay, 1952. On July 1st,
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therefore9 the estates of the zamindars were officially 
vested in the State.
16o This is quoted from some unpublished field notes of 
McICin Harriott, for Oct- , 1951? as cited by lioore and 
Ureydig 1955s 31.
1 7 * These figures are based on a comparison of Hoore 
and Trey dig (1955) with Singh and luisra (1 9 6 4 ) 0 The 
former report that the 1950 Act created bhumidhari rights 
011 8 9 5 9 1 s 0 0 J acres and sirdari rights on 50 , 5 1 6 , 0 0 0 acres 
, (17)« The latter report that the later period showed 
bhumidhari rights on 1 5 ?1 1 9 5 0 0 0 acres and sirdari rights 
on 29?953?000 acres (110).
18. The initial Hural Oredit Survey found that, in just 
over 64> of its sample villages in 1951-2, the average 
outstanding debt of cultivating families was higher than 
Ks• 200, and in over 47y? it was higher than Rs. 300 
(15 table 2.2.1s69)0 Defining gross savings as "the owned 
resources used for expenditure 011 direct capital formation, 
on acquisition of a capital asset, or for lending or for 
repayment of old debts,” the Survey showed that the average 
sum of gross savings for all rural families was just over 
Rs.155 (I, table 13»li 733). The comparable debt figures 
for the years 1956 and 1957? as revealed by the Follow-up
Survey were 50v> and 75.5h of cultivating families with 
debts over Rs.200, and 36. ly and 56.2pi over Rs. 300 
(table 2.4: 33), the increase in debts over the year 
probably being due to the combined effects of adverse 
weather conditions and increased developmental expenditure# 
19• Of course, there are many economic and efficiency 
arguments against redistribution, but the 2J.A.0. did not rel 
on these.
20. Singh maintains, however, that it was only the 
socialists who had a concrete plan for redistribution, and 
that this was largely because the communists were wary of 
antagonising the richer peasants, in which respect they 
were closer to Congress and the Jan Cangh than they were 
to the socialists. But by 1939? at least, the communist- 
dominated A.I.K.S. was demanding a. ceiling of 20 acres 
(Krishna 1959: 307)*
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C O N C L U S I O N
The aim of the thesis, as defined in Chapter I, was 
two-fold; on the one hand to examine the specific ideological 
factors which had influenced both the development of agrarian 
policies in India and the range of attitudes manifested 
towards them, and on the other hand, to attempt to decide
how relevant to an understanding of this process were some 
of the varying sociological analyses of ideology.
Models of ideology. As far as the latter aim is concerned, 
it soon became apparent that no one type of approach to 
ideology could adequately characterise the relationship
between ideology and policy, or potential policy, in either 
the pre- or the post-Independence period. This was not 
necessarily a criticism of these particular types of 
analysis, each of which may well cater adequately for an 
analysis of specific aspects of ideology or for an examination 
of particular kinds of connection between ideology and the 
environment. Psychological or social psychological theories 
of ideology, for instance, may be geared to explaining the 
mechanisms of attachment of individuals to going ideologies
and may therefore be most interested in ideology as a 
cosmological reflection or rationalisation of individual 
and social insecurity. There is no reason why such an 
approach should have much to say about the substantive 
implications of ideology for the concrete execution of 
political power. But it may nevertheless be the case that 
an examination of this extended role of ideology can utilis 
some elements of a social psychological approach. The 
examination of psychological menchanisms may not, by itself 
suggest much about policy, but in combination with other 
kinds of approach, it may have a part to play in explaining 
the role of ideology in the wider context.
Thus the Geertz description of ideologies as ;,maps of 
problematic reality” and the Apter emphasis on their 
security - and solidarity - promoting functions were seen
to be interesting from the policy point of view only if
furtKer questions were asked about the power background to 
the psychological processes involved. This really meant 
enquiring to what extent, and how appropriately, social 
psychological theories could mesh with interest or pov/er- 
axis theories of ideology. The kinds of questions which 
needed to be asked were: how extensive were the bonds of
solidarity which underpinned the growth of nationalism in
Jf-2
the pre-Independence period and which groups did they 
encompass; to what extent were the sentiments of unity 
autonomously experienced or deliberately promoted? Was 
the tendency towards the minimisation of conflict over 
domestic policy issues a spontaneous product of nationalist 
sentiments or was it part of the strategic armoury of a 
nationalist movement with professed goals? To what extent 
did socialism reinforce the solidarity-promoting forces, 
and to what extent was it a threat to them?
These queries apply even more strongly in the post-
Independence period when it becomes evident that emotional 
appeals to national unity and cooperation are ijianifestations
of the governments attempt to coordinate individual 
motivations with the larger dictates of social and economic 
policy for development* It seems to be the case that the 
experiencing of such sentiments was seen by the government
as one of the behavioural prerequisites for the successful 
implementation of planning* Also in the post-Independence 
period, the potentially divisive effects of socialism 
become more apparent, particularly in the debates over 
the role of private enterprise in industry, and over the 
desirability of land redistribution and cooperativisation
in the rural sector. But paradoxically, it also becomes
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clear that socialism may be diluted or reshaped to fill a 
less divisive mould. This is the process whereby socialism 
has beeh accused of becoming orthodoxy in India, of showing 
itself to be merely the innocuous welfare-statism which may 
be a ‘"natural’" offshoot of modern industrial organisation.
If this is the case, then the apparently unity-promoting 
effects of socialism differ in the pre- and in the late 
post-Independence periods. In the former, socialism was 
certainly potentially divisive, as the Congress ministry - 
Kisan Sabha conflicts and the debates of the mid-50's have 
shown. Insofar as pre-Independence socialism seemed 
relatively non-divisive in its contribution to political 
statements, this was largely because it was overshadowed 
and dominated by the various influences of nationalism.
In the 1960!s, on the other hand, socialism has changed 
its connotations. In the sense in which 1 everyone is a 
socialist now1, the doctrine referred to is certainly not 
one which rests on class conflict, but rather one which 
seeks to ameliorate and mitigate class conflict through the 
mechanisms of the welfare state. It is not any more that 
socialism is over-shadowed by the strategic ends of nationalism, 
but that socialism has appeared more widely in its diluted 
form. There is of course also a militant and undiluted brand
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of socialism still in evidence, mainly in the communist 
camp. But socialism in the weaker sense of a widely- 
professed and apparently consensual set of attitudes, may, 
and is even quite likely to, coexist with strong ^pressure
groups and vested interests which are in fact able to 
exercise considerable influence on domestic policy and 
distributions Ydt again, therefore, the consensual and 
apparently solidarity-promoting aspects of ideology need 
to be examined in conjunction with the ways in which it 
may be related to the going power-structure.
Thus no single type of explanation of ideology and 
its role is adequate for considering the relationship between 
ideology and policy, first of all because the relationship 
is always a complex one and reliance on one kind of theory 
enhances the danger of oversimplification. But there is a 
second way in which reliance on one kind of theory would be 
limiting, for it appears not only that several kinds of 
approach may be simultaneously complimentary, but also that 
the relevance of different kinds of theories or models may 
•vary over time. In chapter £,and subsequently, it was 
suggested that ideal types may be constructed for the role 
of ideology in various types of political situations, and 
that such ideal types might be applicable to successive
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phases of policy-formation in India. It seems that, in 
these successive phases or'models, it is some kind of pov/er- 
axis characteristic of ideology which in each case is the 
salient one, with other aspects such as the social 
psychological and constraint ones as secondary.
Ideology and policy in India. Turning then, to the concrete 
conclusions about.the relationship between ideology and 
policy in India, it may be said that two themes have emerged.
On the one hand, there is the constant rivalry between 
opposing, or at least partially incompatible strands, such 
as for example, the conflicts between nationalism and 
socialism, between Marxian socialism and democratic 
scdcialism, between socialism and Gandhism or conservatism; all of 
which have produced elements of inconsistency and ambiguity
in policy statements and intentions. Secondly, the rise and 
fall in the relative emphasis placed on these various 
ideological strands may be related to changes in the overall
power situation; in other words to the developing and 
changing role of Congress. It is this which has brought about 
the succession of shifts in ideological gear and which makes 
evident the changing relevance of the ideal-type explanations 
of the role of ideology in policy formation referred to above.
Pour broad phases may be distinguished.
In the pre-Independence period, Congress ideology was 
mainly describable, in Easton's terms, as a demand input.
It was dominated by the major aim of winning successive 
degrees of political power from the British, and other aims 
and interests had to be subordinated to this. But in fact 
this major aim largely coincided with the interests of the 
professional middle classes and with those of the landlords, 
insofar as the latter were not already directly allied with 
the British. The prominence of these interests tended to
coincide with, or to work in the same direction as, the
effects of a unifying nationalism, in that an avoidance of 
conflict and divisive issues served both to stave off 
challenges from other groups, such as the Trade Unions and 
Kisan Sabhas, and, more officially, to retain the tactical 
unity of the Movement. Insofar as these challenges were
made, albeit under middle class leadership, the official 
Congress ideology began to reflect the emergent conflict, 
in that policy resolutions became both more radical and 
more all-inclusive and conciliatory.
This trend heralded the onset of the immediate post- 
Independence phase of Congress development and a shift 
in emphasis of the relationship between ideology and policy.
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With the coming of Independence, the dominant demand aspect 
of Congress ideology was lost, and Congress became rather 
the mediator between the range of unleashed pressure groups 
which on the whole remained within the party, but which 
exercised an influence on policy and policy possibilities.
The ideological, justifications which accompanied policies 
reflected this mediating role, whether itwas the socialisation 
of the vacuum in the industrial sector, or the eclecticism and 
the utopianism-combined-with-practical-second-best of the 
1st Plan’s vision of cooperative village management.
The mid-‘50*8, however, mark the onset of another phase, 
in that there seemed to be an upsurge of initiative on the 
government’s part. At this point the converse ideal-type to 
that which describes ideology as a demand input flowing from
the governed to the governing, becomes relevant. This is 
the characterisation of ideology as an extension of 
instrumental power in the hands of the politically dominant.
The government in this situation uses, or attempts to use, 
ideology as a didactic tool to underpin the implementation 
of policy and. as a stimulus to general cooperation with 
government action. The increasing emphasis on socialism 
in the mid-’^ O’s thus manifested itself in a statement of
proposed policies, a set of justifications for them, and
5^ 6
a series of exhortations designed to enlist support for 
them. There were factors in the situation itself which 
conduced to this kind of government initiative, such as the 
eagerness of industry for expansion and an enlarged 
superstructure, the high aspirations amongst the elite for 
economic ,development generally, and the eagerness of state, 
administrations for increased local benefits, but there is 
no doubt that the policies of the mid-150*s and the attitudes 
which accompanied them were symptoms of Congress and 
government assertiveness.
But the very process of increased ideological initiative 
on the government's part sparked off reactions which again 
produced, or contributed to, a change of ideological emphasis 
and a shift in the power balance. Newly distinct and vocal 
oppositional groups have emerged to challenge government 
policy. Hanson suggests that such interest groups are not 
yet formally accommodated in the process of policy formation 
and that what is lacking in Indian politics now is an 
advanced ‘"bargaining culture1' (Streeten and Lipton 1968: 53).
At the back of this remark there would seem to be a vision 
of the archetypal pluralist society with dispersed and
counterbalancing foci of power. But even if as yet such a 
structure is not formally or effectively in existence, this
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does not seem to prevent the pressure groups concerned from 
tangibly influencing policy. Indeed it may be, as Hanson 
also suggests, that interest groups which do not achieve 
^legitimation " become alienated and consequently more 
hostile, more threatening and therefore perhaps in the long 
run more effective.
The 1960fs then, has been a decade of government 
defensivehess and, in many ways, of withdrawal from the 
attempted policy goals of the 1950*s. The demise of joint 
farming and of community development are the prime examples 
of this in the rural sector. Government policy and the 
ideology which informs it have moved back to a position of 
relative passiveness, with Congress acting more as a broker 
and mediator than as an ideological initiator.
In general terms, this pattern of rising and falling 
initiative, even if in a less extreme form, has been reflected 
and repeated at the state level, as chapter 6 tried to show. 
What is not clear, §nd what can hardly become clear without 
a more detailed examination of recent state politics, is the 
extent to which the pattern was purely a reflection of the 
national level, or whether it was more substantially shaped 
by factors indigenous to the states. Necessarily, state 
administration must be largely influenced by New Delhi. The
3 Go
interesting point is whether or not priorities and programmes 
can really be foisted onto state level by the centre. However 
this may be, it does seem that the policy initiatives of the 
U.P. government have followed a roughly similar course to 
those of the national level.
Ideological shift or ideological decline? The trend of 
Congress ideology and policy since Independence may thus be 
seen in terms of a parabola, a rising and falling curve of 
initiative, feedback and decline. Precisely how this shift 
of emphasis is to be described raises again the fundamental 
problem, referred to in chapter I, of the way in which 
ideology itself is to be most usefully defined.
On the one hand, there is a tendency in some quarters 
to describe the change as a movement away from ideology and 
ideological solutions. Whilst it is clear what this 
argument is getting at, it can easily lead to fallacious
conclusions, for it is often implied that the movement is
away from ideology and towards a value-free pragmatism. This
seems to be the assumption in many of Hansonfs remarks.
Parts of the 4th Plan Draft Outline, it is argued, show
a **new realism** (Streeten and Lipton 1968: 39), as compared 
with the old ^ideologically-inspired panaceas*1 (37)* But
there is still, he suggest, a tainting element of idol
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worship left. The I .A. A.P., for instance/'has had to make 
its way against a great deal of prejudice based upon near- 
superstitious, respect for the Holy Trinity of collectivism, 
democracy and equality” (37). There is a clear implication 
here that ideology and pragmatism are somehow dichotomously 
opposed.
This kind of conclusion can surely only be reached if 
ideology is defined in the narrow and pejorative sense 
referred to in chapter 1. It can then be assumed that policy 
is either guided by a manifest set of political prescriptions, 
which are typically rigid and all-embracing, or else it 
conforms to the dictates of economic rationality. There 
are ways in which this dichotomyis obviously spurious. First, 
there is and can be no absolute criterion of economic 
rationality. Even if agreement is reached that data ought 
to be collected and evidence referred to, the interpretation 
of the material may still be controversial. Concepts of 
economic rationality are themselves based, on types of 
economic theory, and economic theories tend to contain 
differences of assessment which are not totally reducible 
to"factual” disagreement. Milton Friedman’s definition of
good economic planning as a governmental concentration ;n 
on infrastructure construction and a refraint from interference
in anything else, differs markedly from other possible 
definitions of efficient planning. Again, the evidence about 
the performance of Iddian agriculture since Independence led 
the Ford Foundation team to conclude that the criterion of 
economic efficiency dictated a package;' programme, a recipe 
whose rationality has been challenged on several grounds, 
as for example by Lipton, as referred to in chapter 5,
The second, and connected, objection to the supposed 
dichotomy between ideology and pragmatism is that no policy, 
whatever its derivations and criteria for selection, can be 
value-free in its implication. The I.A.A.P., whatever its 
claims to economic rationality, cannot disclaim the evaluative 
implications of its effects. It may of course be argued that 
the inegalitarian effects are unintentional, but they must 
surely have been foreseeable.
If these objections to the dichotomy are accepted, then 
it seams the conclusion must be, not that there has been a 
movement away from ideology and towards pragmatism, but 
that there has been a shift in ideological emphasis, a 
movement from one kind of ideological adherence to another.
One is then committed to the view that ideology, by definition, 
is virtually ubiquitous, since policies which are neither 
influenced by value judgements nor carry value implications,
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are hard to conceive. This definition of ideology is closer 
to Apter's concept, in nThe politics of modernization1*, of 
the general political values or normative elements which 
underlie and characterise the authority systems of types of 
polities, than to his definition of ideology proper as 
explicit political doctrine. It is also closer to the 
definition of ideology which was provisionally accepted in 
chapter I above.
But whilst the assertion that there has been a change
of ideological substance or emphasis rather than an abandoning 
of ideology in toto, would seem to be the more valid
description of the trend of Indian policy since Independence,
it nevertheless seems a rather weak and crude conclusion, 
and one which does not fully describe the nature of the 
changes which have taken place. The gap can surely only be 
filled by examining the origin, impetus and nature of the 
ideological content of policy, which has been the intention 
here in describing the course of Congress development and 
the 1?curve of ideological initiative’11. This allows scope 
for the suggestion that the ideological content of policy 
since Independence has not so much declined absolutely, but has
rather gone through phases of what may be called relative
activeness and passiveness, depending on whether and to what
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extent the government could act as the initiator, or whether 
its main function was to act as a receiver and mediator of 
demands from groups and interests in the country at large, 
and increasingly also from the wider circle of foreign 
advisors and creditors.
This is certainly not intended to imply that there is 
some kind of inverse correlation between ideological influence 
and the representation of interests, or between acting on 
ideological grounds and on those of interest, a suggestion 
which Bailey appears to make in discussing Qrissan politics.
A ^Survey of Orissa politics'1*, he says, '"brings into relief 
the high degree of moral activity in the more mature 
democracies. fMoraltihdre has a special meaning; it is 
any activity done, for its own sake, including habitual 
action, without close calculation of immediate material 
profit. In this definition, the man who votes Labour because 
he believes in Socialism, or votes Liberal because he believes 
in Bree Trade, is acting morally,t (1962: 27).
On these grounds, one would virtually have to be acting 
contrary to one's own interest in order to be accepted as 
acting ,?,morally'n or in conformity with a specified ideology, 
almost as the Kantian prescription seems to demand action 
in defiance of interest as evidence for having done one's
its
duty. But it would surely be unhelpful and downright 
misleading to define ideology qnd ideological motives only 
as the residue remaining when all elements of interest 
have been discounted. A good deal of the fascination in 
discussing the nature of ideology, as it is manifest in 
individuals or governments or policies, lies precisely in 
considering its relationship to whatever range of interests 
may be relevant, as in the case of pre-Independence 
nationalism.
Hence there ai*e ways in which both the assertion that 
there has been a decline in the ideological content of Indian 
policy, and the rival contention that there has been a shift 
in the nature of the ideology informing policy, seem: 
inadequate. One is led either to a spurious dichotomy 
between ideology and pragmatism, or to a glossing over of 
the decline of ideological initiative on the government’s 
part. The picture can only be filled out by considering the 
whole relationship between ideology qnd policy, and the way 
in which this has developed and changed in the context of 
Congress’s expanding and shrinking power base.
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